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Through cooperation, agents can transcend their individual capabilities and achieve
goals that would be unattainable otherwise. Existing multiagent planning work con-
siders each agent’s action capabilities, but does not account for distributed knowledge
and the incompatible views agents may have of the planning domain. These divergent
views can be a result of faulty sensors, local and incomplete knowledge, and outdated
information, or simply because each agent has conducted different inferences and their
beliefs are not aligned.
This thesis is concerned with Multi-Perspective Cooperative Planning (MPCP), the
problem of synthesising a plan for multiple agents which share a goal but hold different
views about the state of the environment and the specification of the actions they can
perform to affect it. Reaching agreement on a mutually acceptable plan is important,
since cautious autonomous agents will not subscribe to plans that they individually
believe to be inappropriate or even potentially hazardous.
We specify the MPCP problem by adapting standard set-theoretic planning nota-
tion. Based on argumentation theory we define a new notion of plan acceptability, and
introduce a novel formalism that combines defeasible logic programming and situation
calculus that enables the succinct axiomatisation of contradictory planning theories and
allows deductive argumentation-based inference.
Our work bridges research in argumentation, reasoning about action and classi-
cal planning. We present practical methods for reasoning and planning with MPCP
problems that exploit the inherent structure of planning domains and efficient planning
heuristics. Finally, in order to allow distribution of tasks, we introduce a family of
argumentation-based dialogue protocols that enable the agents to reach agreement on
plans in a decentralised manner.
Based on the concrete foundation of deductive argumentation we analytically in-
vestigate important properties of our methods illustrating the correctness of the pro-
posed planning mechanisms. We also empirically evaluate the efficiency of our al-
gorithms in benchmark planning domains. Our results illustrate that our methods can
synthesise acceptable plans within reasonable time in large-scale domains, while main-
taining a level of expressiveness comparable to that of modern automated planning.
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Modern computer systems are becoming increasingly complex and interconnected,
providing an extensive infrastructure used by multiple human users and artificial enti-
ties. Interesting problems arise as a result of the activities and interactions among such
entities. Multiagent systems research (Wooldridge, 2002; Weiss, 1999) is concerned
with the individual reasoning tasks and the interactions among autonomous entities
called agents. Agents perform actions in order to bring about their goals, and since in
many cases individual actions are not sufficient, they form plans involving sequences
of actions.
In complex domains, achieving one’s own goals may not be always feasible. This
can be the result of negative interactions with other agents, lack of information, lim-
ited individual capabilities, or requirements for joint effort (e.g. lifting a heavy object).
To overcome these issues, agents can coordinate to minimise the negative interactions
among their activities or maximise synergies. In a similar fashion, cooperative agents
can collaborate by following joint plans in order to achieve common goals. Coopera-
tion and coordination enable individual agents to transcend their individual capabilities
and achieve goals that would be unattainable otherwise.
Multiagent planning algorithms (de Weerdt and Clement, 2009) address problems
such as synthesising a plan for multiple, independently and often concurrently acting
agents, or coordinating multiple, independently computed individual plans. Existing
multiagent planning work usually takes account of distributed action capabilities, but
not of distributed knowledge and the incompatible views agents may have of the plan-
ning domain. And yet, there are many situations where this problem can arise in com-
plex multiagent scenarios. For example, this can be the result of faulty sensors, local
and incomplete information, outdated beliefs, or simply because different agents have
1
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Figure 1.1: Motivational example of a MPCP problem. Two agents Ag1 and Ag2 must
come up with a plan that navigates the robot safely to the exit. The left figure depicts
the planning knowledge of Ag1, whereas the picture on the right illustrates the beliefs
of Ag2
Ag1 Ag2
conducted different inferences and their beliefs are not aligned. Cautious autonomous
agents will not subscribe to plans that they consider to be harmful, ineffective or ques-
tionable. In order to reach agreement, agents need to align their knowledge and plans
using mutually acceptable information.
Argumentation (Dung, 1995) has attracted much attention as a technique for re-
solving conflicts between agents, mainly due to its strong logical foundation and its
suitability for use in multiagent situations. In previous work, argumentation methods
have been proposed for problems related to multi-agent coordination, deliberation and
practical reasoning (Sycara, 1989; Kraus et al., 1998; Parsons et al., 1998; Atkinson
and Bench-Capon, 2007b; Amgoud et al., 2011).
This thesis proposes an argumentation-based approach that enables agents to re-
solve conflicts in their planning beliefs, and reach agreement on plans. We call this pro-
cess Multi-Perspective Cooperative Planning under ontological agreement (MPCP). It
deals with the problem of synthesising plans for multiple agents which have different,
potentially conflicting views of the planning domain.
1.1 Motivating Example
Consider the example depicted in Figure 1.1. Two agents Ag1 and Ag2 share the goal
of leading a robot safely to the exit location in a grid-world. They share informa-
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tion regarding the location of the robot and the exit. Also, they both believe that the
middle-left location is on fire. However, Ag2 holds a more accurate specification of
the behaviour of the fire, and believes that it is not safe to cross a location containing
flammable objects (depicted by the square), if the nearby location is on fire. Also,
Ag2 holds the belief that there is a locked door in middle-right grid location, which is
something Ag1 is unaware of.
Based on their individual beliefs, the agents come up with different plans. Ag1
synthesises the plan 〈down, down, left, exit〉, whereas Ag2 comes up with the plan
〈right, down, down, left, left, exit〉. Unless one agent can persuade the other about
their beliefs (e.g. Ag2 persuading Ag1 that the door in the middle-right location is
not locked), both agents will not accept the plan synthesised by the other party. If they
utilise their collective beliefs, they may reach the decision to follow the alternative plan
〈left, pickup, right, right, down, unlock, down, left, left, exit〉.
1.2 Multi-Perspective Cooperative Planning
Take the standard planning problem specification P = 〈F, I,O,G〉, with fluents F that
are used to describe an environment state as a conjunction of logical literals, an initial
state I, operators O that describe the agents’ actions in terms of how they transform
states, and a goal state G. This thesis investigates the problem of synthesising plans
that can be defended against all possible objections based on a collection of individual
specifications Pi of the same planning problem, assuming that the fluent sets Fi and Gi
are shared. In other words, we address the problem of multi-perspective cooperative
planning under ontological agreement.
Assume a coalition of planning agents, each with a private set of beliefs
describing the initial state of the domain and the specification of the plan-
ning operators, and assume that they are trying to achieve a shared goal.
Construct a plan (i.e. a sequence of actions), that is entailed from the
collective beliefs of the agents, and that can be defended against all ob-
jections.
The MPCP problem arises in multiagent systems due to inconsistent views agents have
about the planning domain. MPCP is also relevant from an individual agent perspective
when multiple, potentially contradicting, sources of information are available. Even
though MPCP is a multiagent planning problem, as it involves multiple agents seeking
agreement on plans, the plan discussed might be a single-agent plan. Depending on the
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context, solutions may be synthesised in a centralised or distributed setting, and these
solutions may involve actions that are executed by multiple agents. The employed
model involves a classical, sequential plan representation.
MPCP supports distributed action execution, provided that the resulting plan is
encoded as a sequence of ground planning operators. Distributed action execution can
be encoded by reserving a term, within every planning operator, to encode the agent
that will perform this action. Equivalently, joint actions (e.g. lifting a couch) can be
represented using a vector of agents. The language does not involve concurrent actions
and does not address synchronisation issues, but everything that can be represented as
a sequential plan is possible. A restricted form of concurrency can be supported within
the limits of existing, conventional planning domain transformations (e.g. simple-time
transformations). This model allows the representation of the action capabilities of
heterogenous agents in the form of action preconditions (e.g. agents belong to classes,
and an action is only possible to be executed by agents of a specific class). Similar to
other aspects of the MPCP problem, the agents may hold contradictory views about
such information.
The formal specification of the problem depends on the following:
Formalism: The formalism specifies the representation of the MPCP problem. It is
related to the language that is used to specify planning domains and the structure
of the axiomatised theories. An important characteristic of the formalism is its
expressiveness, which governs its ability to encode rich domains in a succinct
representation, and imposes additional requirements on the reasoning mecha-
nism.
Plan derivation: Given a collective planning theory, which summarises the agents’
beliefs about the state of the world and the specification of the planning, a deriva-
tion mechanism must specify the conditions under which plans are entailed from
the agents’ planning theories, even if objections to these plans exist.
Plan acceptability: Due to the potentially contradictory nature of the agents’ be-
liefs, plan derivation cannot in itself define which plans should be accepted. The
notion of plan acceptability specifies how derived plans are evaluated against
potential objections that arise from the agents’ theories.
Knowledge: Planning problems usually take into account structured information
about the initial state and the operator specifications. The resolution of con-
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tradictions may require additional beliefs regarding the credibility and sources
of these pieces of information. Such meta-information does not appear in the
agents’ planning problem specifications.
1.2.1 Argumentation-Based Methods for MPCP
MPCP can be considered a compound problem consisting of a planning and a decision-
making sub-problem. The planning problem involves the synthesis of plans that are
entailed by the information held by the agents. This information is potentially con-
tradictory, i.e. may lead to contradicting conclusions, which leads to the second sub-
problem. The agents must evaluate whether plans can be defended against the ob-
jections that can be raised from the agents’ beliefs. This way, we view MPCP as a
planning problem with the additional constraint of plan acceptability.
In order to solve the first problem, we adapt the classical planning problem by
relaxing the implicit assumption that the planning beliefs are non-contradictory, i.e.
that they do not entail contradicting conclusions, and allow the agents to hold differ-
ent specifications of the same planning operators. The resulting set-theoretic planning
formalism enables planning with states which may contain contradicting information.
Solutions to this problem are candidate plans, i.e. potential solutions that can be de-
rived from the planning beliefs.
The decision-making sub-problem of MPCP is based on the specification of plan
acceptability, which defines when it is rational to accept a candidate plan. In order to
formalise this notion based on deductive argumentation, we propose defeasible situ-
ation calculus, a novel formalism based on the combination of situation calculus and
defeasible logic programming, which allows for reasoning about plans based on con-
tradictory planning beliefs.
We bridge the two formalisms and provide a translation mechanism and a scheme
for argumentation-based inference using the set-theoretic notation. The close rela-
tion to classical planning allows the exploitation of efficient state-of-the-art planning
techniques, which can achieve scalable plan synthesis in complex domains. The de-
ductive argumentation approach allows the formal specification of the problem based
on standard argumentation semantics, while relying on a purely logic-based argument
structure. In order to optimise the efficiency of our methods we exploit the inherent
structure of the planning domain with respect to both the planning and the argumenta-
tion sub-problems.
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The presented research has been conducted with practicality in mind. Given the
fundamental tradeoff between representation expressiveness and reasoning tractability,
we focus on a middle-ground that is expressive enough to allow succinct implementa-
tion of planning domains, but at the same time is practical, and enables reasoning with
reasonably complex domains.
1.2.2 Research Objectives
The core purpose of this work is the formulation of practical and theoretically sound
methods for dealing with MPCP problems. Our research hypothesis is outlined as
follows:
We can specify and solve the problem of multi-perspective cooperative
planning based on deductive argumentation, in a way that allows the syn-
thesis of solutions in an effective and efficient manner.
By the term deductive argumentation, we imply that every argument must have the
form of a deductive proof. Effectiveness refers to the quality of the specified solutions,
in terms of termination, soundness and completeness. Finally, efficiency refers to the
ability of the proposed mechanisms to solve MPCP problem instances of considerable
size in reasonable times.
The problem specification of MPCP and our research hypothesis raise the following
questions:
• Is the problem of multi-perspective cooperative planning common?
• Is argumentation theory suitable for the specification of the MPCP problem?
• What is the quality of the proposed solution to the problem of MPCP?
The first question is related to the significance of MPCP. It examines the commonality
of MPCP problem instances in multiagent domains. The second question is related to
the argumentation-theoretic specification of the problem. This question can be further
refined to two sub-questions. On the one hand, it inquires whether the argumentation
formalism can adequately specify the notion of plan acceptability, while on the other,
it refers to the expressiveness of this formalism and its ability to represent planning
domains in a succinct manner. The final question refers to the notions of effectiveness
and efficiency. The former describes whether the proposed methods provide sound
and complete results. The latter reflects the practicality of the reasoning process, that
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is, whether the proposed methods can synthesise solutions in a reasonable time in ex-
tensive domains. Based on the concrete foundation of deductive argumentation we
analytically investigate important properties of our methods, including soundness and
completeness, illustrating the effectiveness of the presented planning mechanisms. In
order to evaluate the efficiency of our algorithms, we conduct an empirical investiga-
tion using benchmark problems from the International Planning Competition (McDer-
mott, 2000).
1.2.3 Contributions
The main contributions of our work are outlined as follows:
Formalisation of the MPCP:
We define the problem of MPCP using two formalisms: a set-theoretic formal-
ism adapts the classical, STRIPS-style (Fikes and Nilsson, 1972), planning nota-
tion, and a formalism based on the combination of defeasible logic programming
(Garcı́a and Simari, 2004) and situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969).
The first formalism deviates as little as possible from classical planning, and
allows, as a result, the use of efficient automated planning techniques. The lat-
ter provides an expressive language for reasoning about contradictory dynamic
domains using deductive arguments. We provide a translation mechanism, and
formally show the relations between conclusions derived from theories encoded
in these notations, while comparing their relative expressive power and inferen-
tial capabilities.
Practical algorithms for reasoning and planning with MPCP domains:
We focus on the algorithmic aspects of MPCP and discuss heuristics that ex-
ploit the inherent structure of the planning domain to prune the search space of
performing derivations, generating arguments, and synthesising potential plans.
Also, we formulate the problem in a format suitable for classical planners, en-
abling the use of highly efficient, off-the-shelf planners.
Distributed mechanisms for reaching agreement:
We propose a family of abstract dialogue-based collaborative protocols for dis-
tributed decision making. Different protocols are proposed designed for scenar-
ios with different characteristics. The abstract dialogues models are concretised
with respect to the problem of MPCP.
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Analytical and experimental evaluation of our methods:
We analytically investigate important properties of our methods, such as termi-
nation, soundness and completeness, that describe their effectiveness. In addi-
tion, we experimentally evaluate the efficiency and practical relevance of our
approach in benchmark planning domains form the International Planning Com-
petition.
These contributions advance the state-of-the-art of the following research areas:
Automated planning: Our work is the first attempt on relaxing the assumption of
classical planning that domain knowledge is consistent. The implemented plan-
ning system is the first planner capable of planning with contradictory planning
beliefs in a scalable way.
Multiagent Systems: The main contribution to multiagent systems is the specification
of an argumentation-based dialogue protocol for decentralised decision making
in MPCP planning domains.
Reasoning about dynamic domains: We propose defeasible situation calculus, a novel
formalism for reasoning about contradictory dynamic domains.
Argumentation: By utilising the implicit structure of the planning domain, we pro-
pose practical argumentation-based reasoning methods that allow for scalable
planning in domains in which a naive argumentation approach would be infeasi-
ble.
Artificial Intelligence: Our work bridges research in three important areas of artificial
intelligence; classical planning, reasoning about action and argumentation.
1.3 Thesis Structure
Our work lies at the intersection of planning, reasoning about action, argumentation
and argumentation-based dialogue. Chapter 2 presents an overview of influential work
from these research fields, and details methods that are closely related to the prob-
lem of multi-perspective cooperative planning. In Chapter 3, we formalise the MPCP
problem and specify solution concepts based on a set-theoretic and a defeasible logic
notation. The inferential results of the two formalisms are analytically related and com-
pared. In Chapter 4, we focus on the algorithmic problems of MPCP. We exploit on
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inherent characteristics of the planning domain to optimise the reasoning process, and
utilise heuristic planning techniques and state-of-the-art planners to further increase
the practicality of our approach. Based on argumentation-based dialogue, Chapter
5 presents a family of protocols that allow the distribution of the conflict resolution
and planning tasks. Chapter 6 provides a comprehensive evaluation of our approach.
We discuss our analytical results, provide an empirical investigation using benchmark
planning domains, and analyse MPCP problem instances in scenarios inspired by im-
portant real-world problems. The final chapter overviews the main contributions of our
approach and describes potential future research directions.
Chapter 2
Background
This project lies in the intersection of planning, reasoning about action, argumentation
and argumentation-based dialogue. While there is limited directly related work, there
is an extensive body of loosely related literature. This chapter outlines influential re-
search that is relevant to this thesis, and presents in more detail work that is closely
related to multi-perspective cooperative planning.
2.1 Planning
The notion of plans and the process of planning are important to MPCP. This section
presents an overview of important work in automated planning, deductive planning and
multiagent planning that is relevant to this thesis. In addition, we discuss in more detail
problems from the planning literature that are related to MPCP and compare them to
the problem of this thesis.
2.1.1 Automated Planning
Planning can be defined as the reasoning side of acting (Nau et al., 2004). Automated
planning is the process of constructing a sequence of actions that can be applied to the
current state of the world in order to achieve an objective. More specifically, a planning
problem is specified according to the following:
• the state of the world
• a goal
• the actions that can be executed to affect the environment
10
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A planner is a process that identifies a sequence of actions, which can be applied in
any environment that follows this representation, and will cause a transition to a state
that satisfies the specified goal. Multiple formalisms of varying expressive power have
been proposed. STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1972) is the most influential and is the
basis for the formulation of the classical planning problem.
2.1.1.1 The Classical Planning Problem
The classical planning problem Weld (1999) assumes a fully observable, static and de-
terministic world. Knowledge of the environment and the specification of the available
actions is complete. There are no exogenous events, and actions affect the world in a
certain, deterministic manner.
The classical planning problem is defined on top of a logical language L contain-
ing predicate names, variable symbols, and constant symbols. F is the set of literals
specified by L . This set contains the set of unground literals Fv containing variables,
and the set of ground literals Fc, grounded for every object in the language. States are
sets of ground atoms of L . An atom p holds in a state σ if p ∈ σ. A state satisfies a
set of literals if every positive literal is part of the state and no atom which appears in
a negative literal is part of the state.
Definition 1. The classical planning problem is a tuple:
P = 〈F, I,O,G〉,
where
• F is a set of literals,
• I ⊆ Fc represents the initial state of the environment,
• O is the set of planning operators, and
• G⊆ Fc is the goal.
Planning operators are tuples of the form:
〈pre,o,eff 〉,
where
• o is the name of the operator,
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• pre⊆ Fv is the set of preconditions and
• eff ⊆ Fv is a set of effects.
The sets of preconditions and effects of operator o are represented as pre(o) and eff (o)
respectively.
Actions are ground instances of operators. An action a is applicable in a state σ
if all positive preconditions of the action is part of σ and no negative precondition
of a appears in σ, formally pre+(a) ⊆ σ and pre−(a)∩σ = /0. The sets pre+(a) and
pre−(a) denote the positive and negative preconditions of a respectively. The state
transition function specifies how applicable actions alter the state of the world. It is
represented as a function which, given the state of the environment and an action,
returns the successor state after the execution of the action. The successor state is
formulated by removing the negative effects of the action and adding the positive ones:
γ(a,σ) = (σ− eff−(a))∪ eff+(a)) .
2.1.1.2 Extending the Classical Planning Problem
The classical representation has been extended in various ways to increase the ex-
pressive power of the formalism and enable more concise planning theories. Syntactic
extensions include typed variables, negative literals in conditions and goals, quantifiers
in the conditions and effects of operators and operators with conditional effects.
Nebel (2000) formalises the notion of expressive power in planning formalisms
and investigates how different features of propositional planning formalisms affect the
planning problem. Nebel considers formalisms extending propositional STRIPS al-
lowing combinations of the following features.
• Incomplete state specifications
• Conditional Effects
• Preconditions and effect conditions can be literals
• Formulae in preconditions and effect conditions can be boolean formulae.
The computational complexity of planning remains the same across the different for-
malisms. With respect to expressivity, conditional effects cannot be compiled away
without causing polynomial growth of the size of the resulting plans, and that propo-
sitional formulae cannot be compiled into conditional effects and linearly preserve the
plan size.
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2.1.1.3 Synthesising Plans
Synthesising plans is usually performed by searching the space of states or the space
of plans (Nau et al., 2004). State space planning involves searching a graph, in which
nodes represent states and edges are state transitions. In this setting, a plan is a path
from the initial state to a goal state. Forward state space search begins from the ini-
tial state and searches the state space until a goal state is reached, whereas backwards
search begins with the goal and generates the plan in inverse order. Backwards search
selects operators that achieve subgoals and replaces subgoals with the preconditions of
the operators achieving them. A plan is found if the subgoals are satisfied by the initial
state. In plan space search nodes are partial plans and edges are plan refinement oper-
ations (Sacerdoti, 1975; Tate, 1977; Currie and Tate, 1991; McAllester and Rosenblitt,
1991; Erol et al., 1994; Nau et al., 2003).
Planning graph techniques (Blum and Furst, 1995, 1997) follow an alternative ap-
proach. A planning graph is arranged in layers. Odd layers are action layers (nodes
correspond to action instances), whereas even layers are proposition layers (nodes cor-
respond to propositions). Layer 0 is a proposition layer including all propositions that
hold in the initial state. Edges from proposition layer nodes to action layer nodes en-
code preconditions, whereas edges from action layer nodes to proposition layer nodes
encode effects (including maintenance actions for unaffected propositions). Action
layers encode parallel actions. After the expansion of the planning graph, solution can
be extracted in a backwards-chaining manner.
The extensive size of the state-space makes exhaustive search impractical. The
most successful recent approaches employ heuristics guiding the search through the
search space. One of the most influential heuristics (McDermott, 1996; Bonet and
Geffner, 2001; Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001) is measuring the quality of a state based
on the size of a plan solving a relaxed planning problem, in which delete lists (i.e. the
negative effects of actions) are disregarded (making states increase monotonically after
the application of actions).
FastForward or FF (Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001) is a highly regarded, forward state
space planner, which quickly calculates the heuristic quality of states based on a plan-
ning graph approach. State space search is performed by the enforced hill climbing
strategy: greedily move to the nearest, strictly better state discovered using breadth-
first search. If enforced-hill climbing leads to a local maximum, in terms of heuristic
quality, which does not achieve the goal, it fails and best-first search is invoked. Simi-
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lar to enforced hill climbing, best-first search gives priority to the state with the higher
heuristic quality, but also enables backtracking and guarantees finding a solution if one
exists.
2.1.1.4 Relevant to the Project
MPCP relaxes the implicit assumption of automated planning that planning beliefs are
consistent. MPCP is strictly harder than classical planning as it imposes the additional
constraint of plan acceptability on solutions. We focus on practicality and maintain a
middle-ground between representation expressiveness and reasoning tractability. The
set-theoretic formalism we present in Chapter 3 allows important features of standard
planning representations, such as variables and conditional effects, which can be used
to encode planning domains in a succinct manner. Chapter 4 presents algorithms that
utilise standard heuristics and planning systems to allow efficient synthesis of plans in
MPCP domains.
2.1.2 Deductive Planning
A deductive argumentation-based solution to MPCP requires the use of a formalism
that is capable of reasoning about actions and plans in a purely deductive manner.
Reasoning about action has been an major focal point of artificial intelligence research.
The general idea behind this work is that all types of reasoning should be performed
by a general problem solver, utilising all kinds of knowledge represented in a uniform
manner.
A major obstacle in this research has been the frame problem (McCarthy and
Hayes, 1969; Russell and Norvig, 2003). The frame problem is the problem of repre-
senting the effects of actions without having to explicitly encode what is not affected
by the actions. Consider a system with A actions, each one of which has E effects at
most. The representation of action effects requires O(AE) axioms. If there are F flu-
ent predicates, then the explicit representation of what stays the same requires O(AF)
frame axioms, and typically the overall number of fluent predicates is significantly
higher than the number of action effects.
Multiple action formalisms have been proposed in the literature, each offering dif-
ferent solutions to the frame problem. The most common formalisms are the situation
calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; Reiter, 1991), event calculus (Kowalski and Ser-
got, 1986) and A (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1993).
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Apart from the frame problem other important related problems arise in reasoning
about action and dynamic domains. The qualification problem is related to the impos-
sibility of listing all preconditions of a real-world action. The ramification problem is
the problem of representing all indirect, implicit effects of actions (McCarthy, 1977;
Russell and Norvig, 2003) .
2.1.2.1 Basic Theories of Action
Situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969) is a language for the representation of
dynamic domains. It supports three disjoint sorts: action represents actions; situation
represents histories of action sequences; object all the rest. S0 is a constant symbol
representing the initial situation. The binary function symbol do denotes the successor
situation after performing an action. Poss is a binary predicate symbol representing
whether an action is applicable in a situation. The binary predicate symbol @ defines
an ordering relation over situations, where s@ s′ denotes that s is a proper subsequence
of s′. Symbols whose value change in different situations are called fluents, and they
have an term of sort situation as their final argument.
Reasoning about dynamic domains can be performed in structured situation calcu-
lus theories, called basic action theories, overcoming the frame problem (Reiter, 1991,
2001). A basic action theory D has the following form:
D = Σ∪Dss∪Dap∪Duna∪DS0.
Σ is a set of fundamental domain-independent axioms providing the basic properties
for situations. Dss contains a successor state axiom for each relational fluent in the
domain1 of the form F(~x,do(a,s))≡ΦF(~x,a,s), which specifies all the conditions that
govern its value. The conditions under which an action can be performed are specified
by the action precondition axioms which have the form Poss(A(~x),s) ≡ ΠA(~x,s), and
are included in Dap. Duna contains the unique names axioms for actions. DS0 is a set
of first-order sentences that represent the initial state of the world.
For example, consider a domain with a robot moving in a grid, picking and deliver-
ing parcels. The successor state axiom for the fluent predicate Holds has the following
form:
Holds(r, p,do(a,s))≡ a = pickup(r, p)∨Holds(r, p,s)∧a 6= deliver(r, p) .
1Similar axioms are also included to account for functional fluents.
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The axiom states that robot r holds parcel p, in the situation resulting from the applica-
tion of action a in situation s, if and only if either the action a = pickup(r,x) is applied
in s or the predicate Holds(r, p,s) is true in situation s and a 6= deliver(r, p). The first
part of the body of the axiom denotes positive effects producing p. The second part of
the axiom is the frame part and lists the conditions under which the value of the fluent
persists in the successor situation. For the same domain, the action precondition axiom
for the action deliver(r, p) has the following form:
Poss(deliver(r, p, l),s)≡ at(r, l)∧Holds(r, p,s) .
The action precondition axiom lists the preconditions of the action deliver(r, p, l). In
order to deliver the package p to location l in a situation s, r must hold the p and be at
the delivery location.
The solution of the frame problem is based on the causal completeness assumption
(Pednault, 1989; Reiter, 1991), which asserts that everything affecting the value of a
fluent in the successor situation is accounted for in the right hand side of the relevant
successor state axiom.
2.1.2.2 Inference
The higher-order nature of situation calculus theories complicates inference. Regres-
sion is a powerful tool that uses the structure of basic action theories to simplify the
reasoning process. The definitional form of the axioms in a basic action theory as-
serts that the value of a fluent in a situation is exclusively affected by the values of
non-fluents and fluents in its predecessor situation. Regression exploits the defini-
tional form of the axioms in order to simplify queries regarding future situations by
substituting fluents with equivalent formulas regarding their predecessor situation, as
specified in the relevant definitional axioms.
Regression can be applied to formulas with specific characteristics called regress-
able formulas (Reiter, 2001). Essentially, every situation term that is mentioned in
such formulas must be rooted at S0. In addition, such formulas must not quantify over
situations, nor contain the symbol v. Finally, they should not mention equalities be-
tween situation terms, and when the special predicate Poss is mentioned, it must refer
to an action function symbol of Lsitcal.
The regression operator (Reiter, 2001) eliminates Poss predicates by substituting
them with the logically equivalent formula provided by the relevant action precondition
axiom. In a similar manner, it replaces fluents regarding a situation do(a,s) with an
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equivalent expression uniform in s, as provided by the relevant successor state axiom.
The operator follows this strategy until it reaches a formula consisting exclusively of
initial situation fluents and non-fluent predicates and functions.
The application of the regression operator produces a query which can be answered
by a subset of the theory without the foundational axioms, the successor state axioms
and the action precondition axioms, thus significantly simplifying the theorem proving
task.
Theorem 1. (The Regression Theorem, taken from Reiter (2001)) Suppose W is a re-
gressable sentence of Lsitcal that mentions no functional fluents, and D is a basic theory
of actions. Then, D W iff DS0 ∪Duna  R [W ], where R [W ] is the formula resulting
from the application of the regression operator to W.
Following the previous example, we use the regression operator to answer the query
Holds(R,P,do(move(R,L),S0)). R,P,L are ground terms representing a robot, a parcel
and a location respectively.
R [Holds(R,P,do(move(R,L),S0))] =
R [move(R,L) = pickup(R,P)∨Holds(R,P,S0)∧move(R,L) 6= deliver(R,P)] =
move(R,L) = pickup(R,P)∨Holds(R,P,S0)∧move(R,L) 6= deliver(R,P)
The only situation term appearing in the resulting formula is S0. The original query is
equivalent to the following:
DS0∪Duna move(R,L)= pickup(R,P)∨Holds(R,P,S0)∧move(R,L) 6= deliver(R,P) .
The unique names axioms for actions are used to simplify the resulting query with
respect to the action equalities and inequalities.
2.1.2.3 Synthesising Plans
Planning in a dynamic domain specified as a basic action theory can be performed
through search for an executable situation achieving the desired goal. A situation is
executable if all actions can be applied in sequence. The following abbreviation defines
executability (taken from Reiter (2001)):
executable(s)
def
= ∀a,s∗.do(a,s∗)v s⊃ Poss(a,s∗).
Using this definition, plans are defined as follows:
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Definition 2. Let D be a set of situation calculus axioms characterising some appli-
cation domain, S a variable-free situation term, and G(S) a situation calculus formula
whose only free variable is the situation variable S. Then S is a plan for G (relative to
D) iff
D  executable(S)∧G(S).
Deductive planning can be performed through proving the sentence (∃s).executable(s)∧
G(s). Alternatively, planning can be performed by constructing ground situation terms
for different sequences of actions (e.g. in a breadth first or a depth first manner) and
evaluating if the plan statement holds in this situation.
2.1.2.4 Implementation of Basic Action Theories
Basic action theories can be implemented as equivalent Prolog logic programs. The
implementation process asserts that when a query in the logic program succeeds, then
the relevant sentence is logically entailed by the theory, and whenever it fails, then
the theory entails the negation of the sentence. The corresponding logic program can
be obtained after a series of transformations called the Revised Lloyd-Topor Transfor-
mations (Reiter, 2001). These transform the if-halves of the definitional axioms into
a syntactic form suitable for implementation as Prolog clauses. Reasoning with the
resulting logic programs using Prolog’s backwards chaining mechanism is equivalent
to performing a series of regression steps and finally proving of the regressed formula.
2.1.2.5 Relevance to the Project
Chapter 3 introduces a defeasible situation calculus variant that serves as the under-
lying formalism in our project. This formalism is also employed as the language in
which agents communicate their beliefs about the anticipated effects of the plans when
discussing about potential plans.
The defeasible situation calculus variant we will use does not offer the expressive
power of the complete situation calculus language. Since we are dealing with con-
tradictory theories, which is not the case in basic theories of action, a less expressive
formalism is employed to enable tractable reasoning.
Our theories follow the structure of Reiter-style axioms. This structure enables
the concise representation of both the effect and frame information associated with
actions and fluents, and allows the expression of the agents’ views regarding change
and persistence.
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The defeasible situation calculus variant is syntactically similar to logic program-
ming implementations of basic action theories. The main distinction between such
theories and our formalism is that our work enables reasoning and planning with con-
tradictory theories.
2.1.3 Multiagent Planning
In multiagent systems (Wooldridge, 2002; Weiss, 1999) agents may need to coordinate
in order to achieve goals that are otherwise unattainable or improve plan efficiency. Ac-
cordingly, planning agents may coordinate, formulating plans involving actions whose
execution involves multiple agents. Also, agents may distribute the planning process
in order to utilise all their resources and construct plans in a distributed fashion.
Multiagent planning is considered to be the problem of planning in the presence
of multiple agents (Durfee, 1999; DesJardins et al., 1999; de Weerdt and Clement,
2009). There have been several approaches dealing with different aspects of the general
problem. These can be categorised with resect to the following dimensions:
• Planning: centralised or distributed?
• Execution: single-agent or multiagent?
• Agents’ attitudes towards cooperation: coopearative or strategic?
• Communication mechanism: prior to planning, during planning or during exe-
cution?
• Knowledge: shared or distributed?
In most approaches in the literature, multiagent planning usually refers to distributed
planning, distributed execution, or both. The third case is the most interesting, where
multiple agents are searching for a plan in parallel that involves actions contributed by
multiple agents.
2.1.3.1 Cooperative Distributed Problem Solving
In a general setting, multiagent planning problems involve a combination of planning
and coordination problems. Some of the most influential planning approaches involve
the study of coordination in multiagent systems. Partial global planning (PGP) (Dur-
fee and Lesser, 1991) is one of the most influential frameworks for the coordination of
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agents’ activities. Agents exchange information in order to reach common conclusions
about the problem-solving process. Agents individually generate partial solutions, and
utilise information obtained from others to achieve non-local views of the problem. A
partial global plan contains the overall goal and information on the agents’ activities
and how they should interact and exchange information to achieve the larger goal. PGP
has been further refined and generalised in Generalized PGP to handle redundancy and
coordination relationships. Other approaches view multiagent planning as the gener-
alisation of local plans to global plans (Durfee and Lesser, 1991; Ephrati et al., 1995;
Georgeff, 1983).
A different body of work in agent collaboration is based on agent theories of men-
tal state. Cohen and Levesque (1991a,b); Levesque et al. (1990) introduce a practi-
cal model of cooperative distributed problem solving based on the concepts of joint
intentions, joint commitments and joint persistent goals. Teamwork has been ex-
tended by several other approaches (Jennings, 1995; Wooldridge and Jennings, 1999).
Wooldridge and Jennings (1999) break down the problem of cooperative distributed
problem solving to the following steps:




They argue that the collective needs to come to some agreement about their joint course
of action, and that such agreements can be achieved using negotiation or argumenta-
tion. Other important approaches in this field include the theory of SharedPlans (Grosz
and Kraus, 1999, 1996), and STEAM (Tambe, 1997), which builds on Teamwork and
SharedPlans.
2.1.3.2 Cooperative Multiagent Planning
In a cooperative setting multiagent planning may involve the execution of actions by
multiple agents. The extension of automated planning to account for distributed exe-
cution is one aspect of multiagent planning (Katz and Rosenschein, 1989). Complex
models of distributed execution allow concurrent, interacting actions. Boutilier and
Brafman (2001) modify the standard STRIPS planning problem to accommodate for
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concurrent interacting actions and present a partial-order planning algorithm for cen-
tralised cooperative multiagent planning.
Contrary to single-agent planning approaches, multiagent planning approaches take
advantage of the distributed nature of the problem (DesJardins et al., 1999). On the one
hand, distribution of the planning problem (Corkill, 1979; Ephrati and Rosenschein,
1994a) allows the exploitation of the reasoning capabilities of multiple agents. On
the other hand, by considering the multiagent nature of the problem, it is possible to
break down the extensive overall planning problem to individual problems, which are
potentially simpler (Lansky, 1991). The individual solutions are then merged to for-
mulate a global plan (Stuart, 1985; Yang et al., 1992; Foulser et al., 1992; Ephrati and
Rosenschein, 1993; Tsamardinos et al., 2000).
The benefits of a distributed approach are related to the degree of coupling (Braf-
man and Domshlak, 2008) in a multiagent system. Coupling reflects the amount of
coordination required among the agents in the system. In domains with limited agent
interaction, the distributed multiagent planning algorithms can outperform state-of-
the-art centralised planners (Nissim et al., 2010).
2.1.3.3 The “Classical” Multiagent Planning Problem
There is no single, universally accepted formal definition of the multiagent planning
problem. Multi-Agent STRIPS (MA-STRIPS) (Brafman and Domshlak, 2008; Moses
and Tennenholtz, 1995) extends the classical planning representation to account for
cooperative multiagent planning.
A MA-STRIPS planning problem is the tuple Π = 〈F, I,{Ai}1≤i≤k,G〉.2 Ai repre-
sents the actions that agent i is capable of performing. An action a has the standard
STRIPS syntax and semantics, a = 〈pre,a,eff (a)〉. When k = 1, MA-STRIPS reduces
to STRIPS. The goal G is shared among the agents, making the problem formulation
cooperative.
MA-STRIPS does not restrict the action execution scheme. Depending on the spe-
cific approach, the agents’ actions may be executed synchronously, asynchronously or
in an interleaved fashion.
2.1.3.4 Strategic Considerations in Planning
Cooperative agents share a goal and are willing to contribute towards this goal. How-
2The notation is slightly adapted to follow the presented single-agent planning problem formulation.
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ever, autonomous agents may have strategic considerations in the general case that
drives them towards forming coalitions and coordinating exclusively in situations in
which personal gain is attainable through joint action (Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1994b;
Larbi et al., 2007; Brafman et al., 2009; Jonsson and Rovatsos, 2011; Crosby and
Rovatsos, 2011).
Joint plans, apart from achieving the goal, must be acceptable to the agents in-
dividually. For instance, rational autonomous agents would not subscribe to plans
that achieve goals that they can reach through less costly individual plans. Strategic
multiagent planning imposes additional constraints on potential solutions to planning
problems. These constraints are related to the utility of the achieved goals and the cost
of the actions each agent contributes to the joint plan.
2.1.3.5 Communication in Multiagent Planning
Communication can be applied in different phases of multiagent coordination in or-
der to align the agents’ viewpoints or partial results obtained by the planning process
(Werner, 1988; Wolverton and DesJardins, 1998). These can be categorised as follows:
• Communication before planning
• Communication during planning
• Communication during execution.
In the first case, communication is employed as a mechanism for the exchange of
information related to the state of the world. Communication during the planning pro-
cess is necessary when different agents construct partial plans that need to be merged
(Georgeff, 1983), or when the agents need to ensure that there are no interferences
between different individual plans. Communication during execution is necessary in
situations in which agents need results obtained by different agents, or when prob-
lems arise during execution and re-planning is required. In this case, there is also the
problem of determining which results need to be communicated and to which agents.
2.1.3.6 Relevance to this project
Most multiagent planning approaches in the literature deal with the problems of co-
ordinating the actions of multiple agents, or distributing the planning process utilising
the reasoning capabilities of multiple agents. Reaching agreement on plans for action
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may be hindered if different agents expect a plan to affect the environment in different
ways. Such disagreements can be the result of the locality of sensing, outdated infor-
mation, contradicting domain beliefs encoded by different agent designers, or simply
because different agents have conducted different inferences and therefore their beliefs
are not aligned. Since cautious autonomous agents will not subscribe to plans that they
consider to be harmful, ineffective or questionable, methods for reaching agreement in
a collaborative planning environment are needed.
This thesis focuses on the least researched dimension of multiagent planning in-
volving the distribution of knowledge. In order to simplify the process and focus ex-
clusively on knowledge we follow a simplified model of execution, in which actions
are performed in sequence, regardless if actions are expected to be executed by single
or multiple agents. We describe both centralised and distributed methods for coop-
erative multi-perspective planning. However, the distribution is specifically focusing
on reasoning about the acceptability of the plans, while the planning process is per-
formed individually. Finally, we focus on a cooperative setting, with agents sharing
the goals. However, we consider agents to be cautious, autonomous entities that are
only willing to agree on plans that seem correct with respect to their knowledge about
the environment, and won’t follow blindly the proposals of their peers. This imposes
the additional constraint of acceptability to solutions of the planning problem, in a
similar sense as in strategic multiagent planning.
2.1.4 Related Work in Automated Planning
This section details work from the areas of planning and reasoning about action that
is related to this project. We discuss why this work is relevant and how the problems
solved relate to the problem of multi-perspective planning under ontological agree-
ment.
2.1.4.1 Planning under Uncertainty
In multiagent systems, the actions of the agents make the environment dynamic. Ac-
tions performed by other agents can interfere with the plans of a planning agent, and
even make them fail. Agents cannot be sure about the effects of their actions, if these
are affected by the behaviour of other agents in the system. Single-agent planning in a
multiagent environment can be viewed as planning under uncertainty.
The classical planning problem assumes a fully observable, deterministic environ-
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ment. When these assumptions are relaxed, uncertainty is introduced (Goldman and
Boddy, 1996; Boutilier et al., 1999). Uncertainty may be caused by partial observabil-
ity or non-deterministic planning operators.
The planner can overcome uncertainty using test actions, which can be applied to
identify the actual state of the environment, and by planning for all possible contin-
gencies (Hoffmann and Brafman, 2005). Alternatively, the planner can search for a
conformant plan (Smith and Weld, 1998; Brafman and Hoffmann, 2004; Palacios and
Geffner, 2009) that can achieve the goal if it is applied in any one of the possible
states the environment might be. Another alternative for dealing with uncertainty is
decision-theoretic planning (Boutilier et al., 1999), which based on probability distri-
butions over the outcomes of actions for every state and a preference function over
outcomes, decision-theoretic planning searches for plans that maximise the excepted
utility.
2.1.4.1.1 Relevance to the Project Our work is related to planning under uncer-
tainty and conformant planning although the problem in this case is different. Con-
formant plans achieve the goal in all worlds that result from the combination of the
uncertain pieces of information about the planning domain, i.e. 2n for n uncertain
propositions. The problem we are dealing appears similar, since plans that need to
satisfy n different world views (one view for each planning agent). However, our sys-
tem is fundamentally different from conformant and contingent planning. Our system
allows persuasion, enabling the acceptance of plans that initially seemed unacceptable,
on the basis of convincing for disputed propositions. As a result, if ambiguity regarding
all proposition in the planning domain can be resolved, there is no uncertainty in the
resulting planning problem. As a result, planning under uncertainty is complementary
to our work, since its techniques can be employed if contradiction cannot be resolved
and a plan that succeeds regardless of the uncertainty is required.
2.1.4.2 Reasoning about Knowledge
Uncertainty can be reduced during execution through the application of sensing ac-
tions. Planning with sensing actions usually needs to account for all potential out-
comes, and as a result (Levesque, 1996) leads to conditional plans accounting for all
the possible outcomes if these actions. Planning in such settings can be performed
at the knowledge level, with sensing actions treated as actions that update the agent’s
knowledge (Bonet and Geffner, 2000; Bertoli et al., 2001; Petrick and Bacchus, 2002).
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There has been a body of work on extending reasoning about situation calculus ac-
tion theories with knowledge producing actions (Scherl and Levesque, 2003; Shapiro
et al., 2011; Demolombe and Parra, 2006) by incorporating specific axioms about be-
liefs. Reasoning about knowledge and change deals with the problems of belief update
(belief change as a result of action), belief expansion (belief change as a result of new
information) and in some cases the more general belief revision.
Knowledge producing actions can be used as the means for achieving epistemic
goals. In a multiagent setting, epistemic goals aim to bring about common knowledge
(Van Der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2002).
2.1.4.2.1 Relevance to the Project These approaches focus on how the beliefs of
agents change after the application of actions (including knowledge producing ac-
tions). The use of these methods in a multiagent setting can provide information about
the knowledge of every agent related to the application of different plans. Therefore,
they can be used to identify plans for which the knowledge of the agents is aligned.
However, they do not offer ways to align the agents’ views of the world themselves.
2.1.4.3 Revising Action Theories
In dynamic environments agents may hold outdated or erroneous action theories. Re-
search in action theory change (Eiter et al., 2010; Varzinczak, 2010) involves methods
for revising action theories in the light of new information.
Eiter et al. (2010) defines the problem of Action Description Update in the context
of the action language C (Giunchiglia and Lifschitz, 1998). The input of the problem
is an action description D, with unmodifiable Du and modifiable parts Dm, the update
that must be incorporated I, a set of “hard” and “soft” constraints C = Co∪Cp, and a
preference relation over action descriptions vc. An action description D′ is a solution
to the action description problem if it accomplishes the update of D by I relative to C
under the following conditions:
• D′ is consistent.
• D′ contains the new information I and the unmodifiable knowledge Du, and the
causal laws from the modifiable knowledge Dm are either accepted or disposed.
• The constraints Co are imposed on D′.
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• There is no action description D′′, for which the previous hold, such that D′ vc
D′′.
Varzinczak (2010) focuses on action theory change in the context of the multimodal
logic Kn (Popkorn, 1994). This method also focuses on constrained-based updates,
that is the resulting theory must respect a set of laws. Action theories contain static
laws describing constraints, effect laws describing action effects and executability laws
describe action applicability. Contraction of static, effect and executability laws is
performed based on minimal change based on the notion of distance between Kripke-
models.
2.1.4.3.1 Relevance to the Project This work is complimentary to our approach.
In our approach, agents do not have to revise their theories to account for axioms com-
municated by the other parties. However, they are forced to accept arguments that they
cannot defeat. Accepting such arguments entails acceptance of their conclusions. Res-
olution of contradictory views is situation dependant. Resolution of contradictions is
based on operator specifications but also depends on the relevant conditions. In differ-
ent situations with different conditions, different resolution results may be obtained.
As a result, it is not always possible to prioritise which beliefs must be used to update
the theory.
Our methods do not exclude the option of the agents individually revising their ac-
tion theories in light of new information. However, these methods cannot be applied to
solve the multi-perspective cooperative planning problem, since it is not clear which
views should be prioritised, triggering updates. Additionally, it is not clear if the spec-
ification of the employed formalisms are adequate for the representation of classical
planning domains without additional constraints.
In order to provide an overall solution to our problem without the use of argumen-
tation, belief revision methods may be used to merge the beliefs of multiple agents and
generate a shared theory by removing the inconsistencies. Such a process would have
to be centralised. Also, revising beliefs prior to planning requires the resolution of all
conflicts, even those completely unrelated to concrete potential plans.
This is closely related to the main distinction between the use of argumentation
and belief revision, the social and cognitive side of epistemic reasoning (Paglieri and
Castelfranchi, 2005). An argumentation-based method is better suited for a decen-
tralised setting, since it focuses on persuasion regarding specific conflicts that are rel-
evant to a concrete plan. Also, argumentation mechanisms (even if conducted in a
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centralised fashion) generate justifications that can be used to explain and persuade
autonomous agents towards accepting a plan. Falappa et al. (2009) discuss the rele-
vance of argumentation and belief revision in more detail.
2.1.4.4 Defeasibility in Planning and Reasoning about Action
Pollock (1987, 1998) emphasises the need for defeasible epistemic reasoning for plan-
ning agents in complex environments, where information about the world is uncertain
and possibly incomplete. The author argues that the product of the planning process
is bound to the assumptions of the planning knowledge, and since in such complex,
rapidly changing environments epistemic knowledge is in principle defeasible, plans
should also be. The author presents a regression-based planning approach based on the
defeasible reasoner OSCAR.
There has been a body of work related to handling defeasibility in action domains
(Baral and Lobo, 1997; Zhang, 2003). Baral and Lobo (1997) extend the language
A and incorporate defeasible constraints and effect propositions, using an extended
logic programming approach. Zhang (2003) introduces action languages AT 0, AT 1
and AT 2 handling defeasible action constraints, defeasible observations and defeasible
and abnormal effects of actions. Their approach is based on prioritised logic programs.
2.1.4.4.1 Relevance to the Project Contrary to these approaches we do not focus
on reasoning with theories in which action is represented in a defeasible manner. Our
focus is on resolving contradictions across the theories of multiple agents. Therefore,
the defeasibility in our problem lies in the collective beliefs the agents hold. Our rep-
resentation is based on an implementation of situation calculus basic action theories
in defeasible logic programming. Accordingly, we use successor state axioms to rep-
resent the effects of actions. We discuss this choice further in Section 6.1.2.5 and
compare it against an alternative formulation based on defeasible reasoning, which is
inspired from Zhang (2003). A representation based on successor state axioms pro-
vides a more succinct representation, and allows the resolution of contradicting views
about frame axioms as well as action effects.
2.1.4.5 Summary
There is extensive work in automated planning and reasoning about action that is rele-
vant to multi-perspective cooperative planning. However, no work in these fields deals
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with the problem of this thesis. MPCP is concerned with ambiguity, which compared
to uncertainty, can potentially be resolved based on relevant information held by the
agents. This makes the nature of our approach defeasible. However, compared to plan-
ning with defeasible operators, we do not use defeasibility to reason about default per-
sistence, but employ argumentation-based methods to resolve contradictory inferences
made from the agents’ theories. The resolution of such conflicts allows the agents
to agree on conclusions, but cannot indicate which beliefs and operator specifications
should be preferred over others in the general case, making the use of prioritising belief
revision methods infeasible.
2.2 Argumentation
In order to formalise MPCP, we need to concretise the notion of plan acceptability. This
notion determines when it is rational to accept a plan if there exist different views about
the planning domain. The proposed formalisation is base on argumentation theory.
Argumentation (Prakken and Vreeswijk, 2002; Besnard and Hunter, 2008; Rahwan
and Simari, 2009) is a mechanism for conflict resolution. Argumentation theory pro-
vides methods for the evaluation of the acceptability of arguments. These methods can
be used by a single agent, or combined with a dialogue process, enable multiple agents
to present their beliefs in the form of arguments. Argumentation provides a rich form
of communication, since it enables agents not only to present claims, but also provide
justifications for their beliefs. In light of new information, or better justification, agents
can identify acceptable beliefs and alter their view of the world.
2.2.1 Abstract Argumentation
Dung views argumentation at an abstract level (Dung, 1995; Baroni and Giacomin,
2009). Individual arguments are treated as abstract entities, disregarding their inter-
nal structure and meaning. Conflict between arguments is represented by the binary
attacks relation. A set of abstract arguments and the attacks among them form an
argumentation system.
Definition 3. An argumentation framework is a structure AF = 〈Args,Attacks〉 where
Args is a set of arguments and Attacks ⊆ Args×Args is a binary attacks relation be-
tween arguments.




Figure 2.1: Argumentation graph depicting the argumentation framework AF1 =
〈{α,β,γ,δ},{α→β,α→γ,β→α,β→γ,γ→δ}〉
An attack between two arguments α and β is denoted as α→β. Also, the attack relation
is generalised for sets of arguments. A set of arguments S is said to attack an argument
β if there exists an argument α ∈ S such that α→β.
Consider for example the following argumentation framework:
AF1 = 〈{α,β,γ,δ},{α→β,α→γ,β→α,β→γ,γ→δ}〉.
Figure 2.1 depicts AF1 in the form of a directed graph, called an argumentation graph.
Nodes correspond to arguments, whereas edges represent defeats.
If the arguments in an argumentation framework do not form a conflict-free set,
then it is not rational to accept all of them in the set at the same time. Argumentation
semantics formally define ways to evaluate the acceptability of the arguments in an
argumentation framework. Extension-based argumentation semantics specify sets of
arguments that are collectively acceptable. These sets are called extensions of the
argumentation framework.
Multiple extension-based argumentation semantics have been proposed in the lit-
erature (Dung, 1995; Baroni and Giacomin, 2007). Before we introduce the preferred
and the grounded semantics, we introduce some useful definitions.
Definition 4. Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈Args,Attacks〉, a set of argu-
ments S ⊆ Args is conflict-free if and only if there do not exist any arguments α,β ∈ S
such that α→β.
Here, conflict-freeness simply means that no two arguments in a subset of Args attack
each other.
Definition 5. Consider the argumentation framework AF = 〈Args,Attacks〉. An argu-
ment α ∈ Args is acceptable with respect to a set S ⊆ Args of arguments if and only if
for all β ∈ Args such that β→α, there exists γ ∈ S such that γ→β.
Chapter 2. Background 30
Acceptability of an argument with respect to a set S means that if there is any other
attackers of the argument, some element of S will attack this attacker.
Definition 6. Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈Args,Attacks〉, a set of argu-
ments S ⊆ Args is called admissible if it is conflict-free and if each argument in S is
acceptable with respect to S.
Admissibility, often taken as a criterion to determine whether a set of arguments can be
reasonably maintained, requires that every member of the set is acceptable with respect
to the set, and that this set is conflict-free.
2.2.1.1 Preferred Semantics
Preferred semantics are based on the notion of the preferred extension, which refers
to the maximal, conflict-free sets of arguments that defend themselves against every
attack (i.e. attack all their attackers).
Definition 7. A preferred extension of an argumentation framework is a maximal (with
respect to set inclusion) admissible set of the argumentation framework
Credulous preferred semantics, require for an argument to be part of at least one pre-
ferred extension to be acceptable overall. Sceptical preferred semantics require that
the argument is contained in all preferred extensions of the argumentation framework.
Following on the argumentation framework AF1 from Figure 2.1, there are two
preferred extensions: {α,δ} and {β,δ}. A credulous agent will accept arguments
α,β,δ, whereas a sceptical agent will only accept δ. The rationality behind sceptical
preferred semantics is that regardless of which preferred extension is selected, and in
this case regardless of either selecting α or β (given that both cannot hold at the same
time), γ is defeated. As a result δ can be accepted.
2.2.1.2 Grounded Semantics
Grounded (sceptical) semantics are defined using the characteristic function of an ar-
gumentation framework.
Definition 8. The characteristic function of an argumentation framework
AF = 〈Args,Attacks〉, is the function FAF : 2Args→ 2Args, which is defined as follows:
FAF(S) = {α | α is acceptable w.r.t. S}.




Figure 2.2: Argumentation graph depicting the argumentation framework AF2 =
〈{α,β,γ,δ},{α→γ,β→α,β→γ,γ→δ}〉
Definition 9. The grounded extension of an argumentation framework AF, denoted by
GEAF is the least fixed point of FAF.
Consider the sequence:
F 0AF = /0
. . .
F i+1AF = {α ∈ Args | α is acceptable with respect to F iAF}
. . .
According to Dung (1995), it holds that: all arguments in ∪∞i=0(F iAF) are in GEAF, and
if each argument is attacked by at most a finite number of arguments, then an argument
is in GEAF if and only if it is in ∪∞i=0(F iAF).
Figure 2.2 depicts the following argumentation framework:
AF2 = 〈{α,β,γ,δ},{α→γ,β→α,β→γ,γ→δ}〉.
F 1AF2 contains β, the only argument that is not attacked. F
2
AF2 = {β,δ}, since {β}
attacks the attackers of δ. This is the least fixed point of the characteristic function
since F 3AF2 = F
2
AF2 . Therefore, the arguments in AF2 that are justified with respect to
grounded semantics are {β,δ}. The argumentation framework AF1 does not have any
arguments that are acceptable with respect to the grounded argumentation semantics.
2.2.1.3 Preferences over Arguments
The previous examples illustrate that in certain cases mutual attacks appear in argu-
mentation frameworks. Such ties may be broken using additional information about
the preference of these arguments. This is usually represented in the form of an or-
dering among the arguments in an argumentation framework. Intuitively, preference
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orderings may be based on information regarding the credibility or source of argu-
ments, or their internal structure.
Preference-based argumentation (Amgoud and Cayrol, 1998) introduces a prefer-
ence ordering among arguments that can be useful to break mutual attacks. Accord-
ingly, a preference-based argumentation framework is a triple 〈Args,Attacks,Pref 〉,
where Pref is a partial preordering of the arguments in Args.
2.2.2 Proof Theories for Abstract Argumentation
The definition of argumentation semantics provides a formal specification of the no-
tion of acceptability. This section discusses the most commonly used algorithms for
the evaluation of argument acceptability. An overview of proof theoretic methods for
abstract argumentation can be found in Modgil and Caminada (2009).
2.2.2.1 Labelling
One way to compute the acceptability of arguments is to assign labels to the argu-
ments in the argumentation graph. Labelling is an assignment of a label from the set
{IN,OUT,UNDEC} (for undecided) to every argument in the argumentation frame-
work. Reinstatement labellings (Caminada, 2006) abide to the following principles:
• At least one attacker for an argument labelled OUT must be labelled IN.
• All attackers for an argument labelled IN must be labelled OUT .
Multiple such labellings may exist for an argumentation framework. Additional re-
strictions specify compliance to different argumentation semantics. For instance, la-
bellings with maximal sets of arguments labelled IN or OUT correspond to preferred
semantics, whereas labellings with minimal sets of of arguments labelled IN or OUT or
maximal sets of UNDEC arguments are connected to grounded abstract argumentation
semantics.
2.2.2.2 Argument Games
Argument games (Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000; Dunne and Bench-Capon, 2003) eval-
uate the acceptability of arguments through a dialectical process between two parties
called a dispute. One party plays the role of the proponent, leaving the role of oppo-
nent to the other party. In the single agent case, the agent assumes both roles. The role
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of the proponent is to introduce arguments defending the argument that is evaluated,
while the opponent is attempting to attack this argument and the arguments defending
it.
The game is initiated with the proponent introducing the argument to be evaluated.
Then it is the opponent’s turn to move an argument attacking the argument presented
by the proponent (if such an argument exists). The game progresses with the players
exchanging turns and introducing arguments attacking the previous argument of the
other party.
Throughout this process, sequences of attacks are generated, which are called dis-
pute lines. A dispute line consists of arguments defending the evaluated argument (line
of defence) and arguments attacking these arguments (line of attack). Since there may
exist multiple attackers for an argument, there may exist multiple different moves for
a player. The collection of all possible dispute lines form a dispute tree.
The requirement that every argument in a dispute line must attack the previously in-
troduced argument is not sufficient to produce a correct reasoning scheme. It does not
safeguard against circular attacks, causing the construction of dispute lines of infinite
length, or fallacies in the line of reasoning, as for instance lines of defence containing
conflicting arguments. In order to safeguard against fallacies and to guarantee correct
results, specific rules must govern the legality of moves in the argument game. Such
rules have been shown to produce correct results with respect to different argumenta-
tion semantics (Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000; Dunne and Bench-Capon, 2003).
2.2.3 Deductive Argumentation
In order to provide a concrete argumentation-based reasoning system, abstract argu-
mentation is not sufficient, unless it can be combined with a mechanism that generates
arguments and calculates the attacks relations among them. In logic-based argumenta-
tion, the internal structure of arguments is defined based on an inference procedure in
a knowledge base.
Prakken and Vreeswijk (2002) overview different logics that have been proposed
for deductive argumentation-based reasoning. According to their analysis the main
elements of deductive argumentation systems are:
• An underlying logical language.
• Definitions of an argument, conflicts between arguments and the attack relation.
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• Definition of the assessment of arguments, defining defeasible logical conse-
quence.
Examples of concrete argumentation systems are assumption-based argumentation
(Bondarenko et al., 1997; Dung et al., 2009), defeasible logic programming (Garcı́a
and Simari, 2004) and argumentation based on classical logic (Besnard and Hunter,
2001). Our system follows defeasible logic programming.
2.2.4 Defeasible Logic Programming
Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) (Garcı́a and Simari, 2004) is based on a com-
bination of logic programming and defeasible argumentation. The following analysis
follows Garcı́a and Simari (2004).
The DeLP language is defined in terms of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules.
Facts are positive or negative literals. Literals are ground atoms A or negated ground
atoms ∼A. The symbol “∼” represents strong negation. Strict rules encode non-
defeasible knowledge. They have the following form:
L0← L1,L2, . . . ,Ln,
where L0,L1, . . . ,Ln are ground literals and n ≥ 0. Accordingly, defeasible rules are
represented as follows:
L0 –≺L1,L2, . . . ,Ln.
L0,L1, . . . ,Ln are ground literals and n ≥ 0. Defeasible rules describe that if there are
reasons to believe that the body of a rule holds, then there are reasons to believe that
the head holds as well. Defeasible rules with an empty body are called presumptions.
The defeasible implication symbol distinguishes defeasible rules, which are inter-
preted as “tentative information that may be used if nothing can be posed against it”.
For instance, the non-defeasible knowledge that all penguins are birds is represented
using a strict rule:
bird← penguin.
On the contrary, the knowledge that birds are usually able to fly is encoded using the
defeasible rule:
flies–≺bird.
Both symbols “←” and “–≺” denote a meta-relation between literals without contra-
position.
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A defeasible logic program P = (Π,∆) is a possible infinite set of facts, strict rules
Π and defeasible rules ∆. Defeasible logic programs are ground. ‘Schematic rules”
with variables (Lifschitz, 1996) are sometimes used to represent all ground instances
of these rules.
Ground defeasible rules can be used in sequence to create inference chains called
defeasible derivations. A defeasible derivation is a finite sequence L1,L2, . . . ,Ln = L of
ground literals. For each literal L′ in the sequence there exists a rule R with Head(R) =
L′, and all literals appearing in its body appear in sequence before L′. A defeasible
derivation represents reasons to believe the derived statements, without meaning that
these statements are necessarily true, since contradicting statements may be defeasible
derived. If the rules used for a derivation are exclusively strict rules, the derivation is
called a strict derivation.
The derivations provide the basis for the construction of arguments. Given a defea-
sible logic program P = (Π,∆), an argument structure is a tuple 〈A ,h〉, where h is a
literal and A ⊆ ∆ such that:
1. there exists a defeasible derivation for h from Π∪A
2. Π∪A is non-contradictory, and
3. A is minimal, i.e. there is no proper subset of A satisfying both (1) and (2).
The literal h is called the conclusion, or the claim, of the argument. A is called
the support. Arguments indicate reasons towards a claim. They are minimal, non-
contradictory sets of rules that defeasibly infer a claim. A set of rules is non-
contradictory if there exists no literal which can be defeasibly inferred from the set,
if its complement can be also inferred from the same set. An argument 〈A ′,h′〉 is a
sub-argument of 〈A ,h〉 if A ′ ⊆ A .
The attack relation between arguments is specified using the notion of disagree-
ment. Given a defeasible logic program P = (Π,∆), two literals h1 and h2 disagree if
the set Π∪{h1,h2} is contradictory. An argument 〈A1,h1〉 attacks another argument
〈A2,h2〉 if there exists a sub-argument 〈A ′2,h′2〉 of 〈A2,h2〉 such that h1 and h2 disagree.
Arguments can be prioritised so as to resolve disagreements. One way to deter-
mine argument priorities is based on the generalised specificity principle (Poole, 1985;
Simari and Loui, 1992): higher preference is assigned to arguments with greater in-
formation content or more restricted use of rules. Another alternative is prioritisation
based on rule priorities. In this case, the preference of arguments is calculated based
on the least preferred rule in their support.
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The notion of defeat is based on the attack relation and the arguments’ preference
ordering. An argument 〈A1,h1〉 is a proper defeater of another argument 〈A2,h2〉 if
it attacks 〈A2,h2〉 at a sub-argument 〈A ′2,h′2〉 and 〈A1,h1〉 has higher preference over
〈A ′2,h′2〉. If these arguments are equally preferred then 〈A1,h1〉 is called a blocking
defeater.
Belief acceptability in DeLP is defined using the notion of warrant based on dialec-
tical analysis. A query q is warranted if an argument supporting q is found undefeated
by the warrant procedure. The warrant procedure is based on the generation of a di-
alectical tree. The root of this tree is the argument supporting the query. The tree is
expanded by considering the defeaters of this argument, their defeaters and so on. Ev-
ery line from the root of the tree to a leaf is called an argumentation line. Constraints
assert that the generation of infinite argumentation lines is avoided.
DeLP has been extended to support the default negated literals. Accordingly, Ex-
tended defeasible rules allow default negation “not” in the body of a rule. For instance,
consider the following example attributed to John McCarthy (Gelfond and Lifschitz,
1990):
∼cross railway tracks–≺not∼train is coming.
This statement represents that there are reasons to believe that we should not cross the
railway tracks, if there is absence of sufficient evidence to believe that the train is not
coming. Default negated literals are treated as assumptions.
The definitions of defeasible derivations, argument and defeat are also adapted to
account for default negated literals. Defeasible derivations ignore literals preceded by
default negation, since these are treated as assumptions. Defeaters may attack these
assumptions regardless of their preference.
2.2.5 Dialogical Argumentation Systems
The inherent dialectical nature of argumentation has been investigated in the form of
dialogical argumentation systems. In a distributed, multiagent setting, argumentation
can serve as a mechanism for reconciling conflicts among the agents. McBurney and
Parsons (2002), Prakken (2006) and McBurney and Parsons (2009) overview dialogue
games for agent argumentation.
Dialogue systems can be categorised with respect to their purpose. This is called
the dialogue goal and describes the reason behind the dialogue. Walton and Krabbe
(1995) provide a taxonomy of dialogues with respect to their purpose:







An important element in argumentation-based dialogue is the communication lan-
guage and the protocol. Some communication language is necessary to specify the
locutions the agents can exchange. The dialogue protocol specifies how from the his-
tory of the moves made in the dialogue, the possible legal moves for the next iteration
can be computed. The protocol accounts for commencement and termination rules and
the outcome of the dialogue. In addition, the dialogue protocol specifies the conditions
and effects governing the agents’ dialogue moves with respect to the state of the dia-
logue. The state of the dialogue is determined by the already exchanged messages and
the contents of the agents’ commitment stores.
Commitment stores capture commitments (Hamblin, 1970) the agents made during
the dialogue. Commitment stores allow for the verification of the consistency of the
agents’ statements, even though it is impossible to validate if these reflect their actual
beliefs.
The topic language is the language employed for discussion about the domain. It is
considered to be shared among agents. This assumption is necessary in order to ensure
that the information agents exchange is meaningful. Sharing the topic language is
similar to sharing the ontology for the domain in question. The context for the dialogue
is a subset of the topic language that the agents consider to be common knowledge
before the beginning of the dialogue.
2.2.6 Relevance to the Project
Argumentation theory provides the means for the specification of the notion of accept-
ability in the light of contradictory information. We utilise standard argumentation
theory definitions for specifying formal solution concepts for the problem of multi-
perspective cooperative planning.
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The use of argumentation-theoretic notions in combination with a defeasible lan-
guage for representing dynamic domains enables the representation of the agents’
views about plans and their anticipated effects in a structured, purely logical manner.
Argumentation-based dialogue enables distribution of the reasoning process to
multiple agents. Chapter 5 presents a dialogue protocol that exploits this, providing
a distributed solution to the problem of multi-perspective cooperative planning under
ontological agreement.
2.2.7 Related Work in Argumentation
This section overviews the most relevant work from the area of argumentation to the
problem of multi-perspective cooperative planning.
2.2.7.1 Argumentation-based Negotiation for Coordination
Argumentation mechanisms have been proposed for the coordination of the activities
of agents. These works utilise the conflict-resolution capabilities of argumentation,
providing mechanisms for the coordination of autonomous agents with individual goals
and interdependencies in their plans for action. This section presents approaches in
argumentation-based negotiation for coordination and discusses their relevance to this
thesis.
Sycara (1989) argue that persuasive argumentation can be employed in non fully
cooperative multiagent environments in order to increase cooperativeness and bring
about convergence to a global solution. The PERSUADER system is described in the
domain of Labour mediation. A persuader agent employs persuasive argumentation in
order to influence the beliefs of a persuadee and increase the potential of cooperation.
Kraus et al. (1998) follow up this line of work, developing a formal logical model
of the mental states of agents based on Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI), and use
argumentation as a mechanism for persuasion. Cooperation is achieved by influencing
change in other agents’ intentions, using arguments expressing threats, promises of fu-
ture reward and appeals to past reward, precedents, prevailing practice or self-interest.
Parsons et al. (1998) present a formal model of argumentation-based reasoning and
negotiation for autonomous agents. The authors show how this model can be used to
coordinate negotiating BDI agents.
Tambe and Jung (1999) utilise argumentation to resolve conflicts in the beliefs and
plans for action of the individual agents participating on team action. They present
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CONSA (COllaborative Negotiation System based on Argumentation), a system rele-
vant for teamwork models (Tambe, 1997) capable of dealing with conflicts regarding
beliefs about jointly initiating or terminating team operators or conflicts about individ-
ual operators and roles. This system in based on Toulmin’s argument model Toulmin
(1958).
Clement et al. (2004) present SHAC (Shared Activity Coordination), an
argumentation-based system for the negotiation of the shared activities of agents.
SHAC provides an algorithm for interleaving planning and sharing of plan informa-
tion with respect to shared activities.
2.2.7.1.1 Relevance to the Project Argumentation-based approaches for the coor-
dination of shared activities are relevant to our work, especially with respect to the use
of augmentation for the resolution of conflicts among individual plans in a multiagent
environment. However, the focus is different. We do assume that agents are coopera-
tive (share goals) and do not have private, individual goals. In addition, we focus on
agents that have different models of the environment, both in terms of the state of the
world and the specification of actions. Finally, since our model allows the specifica-
tion of and reasoning about concrete sequential plans, which may involve execution by
multiple agents, we do not account for conflicts arising from individual plans.
2.2.7.2 Argumentation-Based Practical Reasoning
Practical reasoning can be viewed as a two-step process involving deliberation and
means-end reasoning. Deliberation is concerned with reasoning about the desires of
the agent and goal-settings, whereas means-end reasoning deals with reasoning about
actions and plans that can achieve these goals.
Argumentation-based practical reasoning employs the conflict resolution capabili-
ties of argumentation theory to reconcile conflicts between beliefs, intensions, desires.
Different approaches deal with these aspects with respect to a single agent’s internal
reasoning process, or as a multiagent process for coordinating the activities of multiple
agents.
This section reviews the works in argumentation-based practical reasoning. We
also discuss the relevance these projects have to the problem of multi-perspective mul-
tiagent planning.
Amgoud and Cayrol (2004) and Amgoud (2003) present a framework that com-
putes consistent sets of intentions from a potentially conflicting sets of desired and
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a set of beliefs. Reasoning is performed using rules specifying planing rules of the
form: φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ . . .φn → h, specifying that if the agent achieves φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ . . .φn, then
it is possible to achieve h. Consistent intentions contain desires that can be achieved
by consistent complete plans, which include all actions necessary to achieve a given
desire.
Hulstijn and van der Torre (2004) propose a framework for dealing with goals and
plans. Compared to precious work, the authors agree that conflicts between plans
are fundamentally different to conflicts about beliefs usually studied in argumentation
theory. However, they present an approach for reasoning with standard Dung-style
abstract argumentation frameworks.
Rahwan and Amgoud (2006) present an argumentation framework that facilitates
argumentation about beliefs, generation of consistent desires and construction of plans
that can achieve these desires. Utilities measuring the worth of the desires and the cost
of the required resources are employed in order to evaluate the strength of the related
arguments. Reasoning is performed on top of three interacting argumentation frame-
works: one for beliefs, one for desires and one for plans. Argumentation over beliefs
follows Dung’s framework (Dung, 1995) as it was extended by Amgoud and Cayrol
(2002) to incorporate the strength of arguments. Desires are supported by explanatory
arguments describing the beliefs and other desires that justify them. Such arguments
may be defeated either by belief arguments undercutting the beliefs that support the
desire, or by other desire arguments undermining the desirability of the desires. Plans
are represented by instrumental arguments, which use planning rules to explain the
achievability of desires. A planning rule about a desire expresses that if a set of desires
is achieved and a set of resources is used then this desired is achieved. The accept-
ability of arguments is calculated, and intention sets are formed for desires that can be
achieved together.
Rotstein and Garcıa (2006) propose an argumentation-based framework for rea-
soning about agent beliefs and desires within a single argumentation system. Agents’
beliefs and filtering rules are defined as a defeasible logic program using facts and
defeasible rules. Rotstein et al. (2007, 2008) extend this work introducing agent in-
tentions, and generalise the filtering process to account for different agent attitudes
(accepting warranted desires, or desires whose complement is not warranted). Inten-
tion rules specify the preconditions and constraints under which filtered desires can be
selected to pursue.
Amgoud et al. (2008, 2011) argues that the separation of practical reasoning into
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two distinct processes may result in the selection of infeasible desires, even if feasible
alternatives exist. This work extends previous work introducing one-step generation of
intentions. In this approach, plans are considered ways of achieving a desire. They are
specified by their preconditions, their effects and the desire that is reached by the plan.
Atkinson (2005) describes an argument scheme following Walton’s sufficient con-
dition scheme for practical reasoning (Walton, 1996).
In the current circumstances R, we should perform action A, that will re-
alise goal G, which will promote some value V .
Justifications about action are instantiations of this scheme. Challenges to these justifi-
cations are identified through a series of critical questions. Examples of such questions
are the following:
• Are the believed circumstances true?
• Assuming the circumstances, does the action have the stated consequences?
• Is the action possible?
• Assuming the circumstances and that the action has the stated consequences,
will the action bring about the desired goal?
• Does the goal realise the value stated?
These critical questions account for resolution of disagreements related to problem for-
mulation, epistemic reasoning and action selection. Values are employed as qualitative
reasons explaining the significance of certain affairs. Atkinson et al. (2005) present a
dialogue protocol for argumentation over proposals for actions. In addition, Atkinson
and Bench-Capon (2007a,b) formalise the argument generation process by grounding
the underlying model to an action-based alternating transition system.
Medellin-Gasque et al. (2011) extend the scheme for practical reasoning to account
for plans and the temporal aspects arising from the combination of actions. The result-
ing scheme accounts for a comprehensive collection of 66, informal for the most part,
critical questions.
Tang and Parsons (2005) present an argumentation-based approach to deliberation,
in terms of goal selection, reduction of this goal to sub-goals, and formation of a plan
to achieve the overall goal. The environment is described in terms of states, and actions
causing transitions among states. The authors refer to transitions caused by actions, or
plans, from initial states to goal states as nisi. The deliberation process is initiated with
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a nisus, from the initial state to the goal state, and is conducted in phases. In each phase,
the agent decomposes intermediate nisi using a set of possible partial plans. Plans that
achieve the intermediate nisi are merged to form a plan for the initial transition. The
deliberation process is combined with argumentation, enabling reasoning about the
acceptability of plans in single-agent deliberation. Also, the authors present a two-
party deliberation dialogue protocol enabling the distribution of the process.
Toniolo et al. (2011) present a series of argument schemes that can be used for
argumentation-based deliberative dialogues for collaborative planning. This work fo-
cuses on conflicts among the plans of agents, which may be caused by concurent ac-
tions, plan constraints or norms the agents must adhere to. The model is formalised
using Reiter-style situation calculus extended to account for norms and durative ac-
tions.
2.2.7.2.1 Relevance to this project Most of the aforementioned work focus pri-
marily on the deliberation problem, dealing with the relations among beliefs, plans
and desires. We are interested on the means-end planning aspects of the problem of
practical reasoning, when the agents’ perspectives contain contradictory information.
In our work the term plan is closely related to the standard notion of a classical
plan. On the contrary, most of the proposed works refer to monolithic plans (similar
to single step actions), or employ non-standard notions, different from classical AI
planning. In the case of monolithic actions, the problem is different, with the focus
being on finding sets that are consistent, in the sense that are applicable together, and
achieve agent desires. On the contrary, classical planning treats plans as sequences of
actions that can be applied to affect the environment.
In addition, although these frameworks are expressive with respect to being able to
represent the beliefs, desires and plans, they are restrictive with respect to the repre-
sentation of actions. Their propositional nature does not allow concise representations
of realistic planning domains.
The underlying formalisation is very important. Some relevant approaches repre-
sent the agent’s domain knowledge as a state transition system. Usually, states are
monolithic and actions are simply transitions in the system. It is not clear how such a
formalism can facilitate the aggregation of agents’ views. It is not clear how one can
partially agree with some aspects of the operator, while at the same time disagreeing
with others. Additionally, it is not clear how such mechanisms will treat situations in
which agents disagree about information regarding a state that is irrelevant to a plan
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under consideration.
The work of Toniolo et al. (2011) is closely related to our work, due to the focus
on multiagent planning and the use of situation calculus. However, there are some im-
portant distinctions. In their work, argumentation is employed as a mechanism for the
resolution of conflicts caused by the interdependencies between the plans of different
agents, or the norms that individual agents have to abide by. On the contrary, our work
focuses on contradictions in the agents specifications of the actions they can perform or
the state of the environment. Dealing with contradictions is exactly the reason behind
our choice to resort to a less expressive formalism than the language used in Toniolo
et al. (2011).
2.2.7.3 Defeasible Argumentation in Planning
Recent work in defeasible argumentation (Simari et al., 2004; Garcı́a et al., 2007, 2008;
Pardo et al., 2011) investigates the problem of planning when planning knowledge is
combined with a set of additional defeasible rules. Simari et al. (2004) considers plan-
ning agents which are equipped, apart from their planning knowledge, with a set of
defeasible rules that are applicable in every state of the world. States represent non-
contradictory sets of facts. State transitions are revisions to the set of facts, which
remove any literal that is complementary to an effect of the action, and then add the
action’s effects to this set. Action applicability is evaluated through a set of precon-
ditions and constraints for each action. In order to account for defeasibility, action
preconditions must be warranted from a knowledge base consisting of the set of facts
forming the current state and the defeasible rules, whereas every constraint of the ac-
tion must fail to be warranted.
The authors describe an algorithm for progression based planning, but mainly focus
on a regression planning mechanism. The planner begins with a partial state containing
the goal literals. A plan is built, with each action regressing to a previous state, until
the initial state is reached. Extensions to this work (Garcı́a et al., 2007, 2008) present
DeLP-POP, an algorithm for regression-based partial-order planning. Dealing with
partial states in a defeasible setting is particularly interesting. The addition of actions
to the plan may cause the appearance of new defeaters, interfering with the existence
of assumed warrants.
Pardo et al. (2011) extend DeLP-POP to accommodate cooperative multiagent sce-
narios. The problem setting involves multiple agents, sharing a common goal, but
having different views of the planning domain, caused by knowledge about different
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actions that may be performed, different views about the initial state and the defeasi-
ble rules governing the domain. The collection of all individual beliefs regarding the
initial state is assumed to form a consistent set. The evaluation of plans, as well as
search in the plan space is conducted as dialogue process. Plan evaluation corresponds
to the collaborative search for threats to concrete plans. Search in the plan space is
performed as A∗ search, guaranteeing completeness and optimality of the solution.
2.2.7.3.1 Relevance to the Project The multiagent extension to DeLP-POP is re-
lated to the problem of this thesis. However, there are some important distinctions.
Contrary to Pardo et al. (2011) we do not assume that the collective initial state beliefs
of the agents are consistent. In addition, we consider that agents may hold potentially
contradicting specifications of the actions in the domains. Our planning language is
more expressive, allowing variables and conditional effects.
2.2.7.4 Argumentation in Multiagent Planning
The problem of multiagent planning in environments with non-deterministic actions
and distributed, possibly inconsistent, information is the focus of recent work (Tang
et al., 2009; Tang, 2012). Tang (2012) investigates the problem of coordinating the
planing processes of multiple agents and coordinating joint plans. Planning in this
approach is performed using symbolic model checking techniques. A defeasible fac-
tored action theory is introduced for the representation of multiagent state transitions.
Two different types of specifications are employed to reason about the applicability of
actions and the effectiveness of state transitions. This approach follows the Markov
assumption that the computation of the successor state depends exclusively on the cur-
rent state and the action causing the transition. Specifications are classified into layers
representing frame information (FRM), operator effects (OP), agents local understand-
ing of exceptions regarding effects (SLP) and agent interaction (IR). Inconsistencies
among different specifications are resolved according to their respective layers and ad-
ditional preference levels. It is assumed that IRs override SLPs, which override OPs,
which in turn override FRMs. Centralised and decentralised planning algorithms are
proposed to plan and coordinate the agents’ joint behaviour. These algorithms are
extended to allow planning with potentially inconsistent goals. The reasoning and
planning procedures based on the defeasible factored action theory are re-formalised
in an argumentation-theoretic fashion.
Chapter 2. Background 45
2.2.7.4.1 Relevance to the Project Research involving multiagent planning and ar-
gumentation is highly relevant to this thesis, and illustrates recent interest in the prob-
lem of planning with inconsistent theories. There are many similarities to our work,
since both approaches deal with planning with contradictory information. However,
there are also some important differences. Tang (2012) focuses on non-deterministic
planning based on symbolic model checking. We maintain a close relation to classical
planning, which allows the adaptation of efficient heuristic methods and the experi-
mental evaluation of our approach using contradictory instances of benchmark plan-
ning problems.
Another major difference is related to the employed representation methods. The
approach proposed by Tang (2012) is based on the logic of quantified boolean formulae
and binary decision diagrams. On the contrary, our argumentation-based semantics are
encoded on top of a defeasible situation calculus variant. We use defeasible successor
state axioms to allow the compact representation of dynamic domains by encoding one
axiom for every fluent literal. Moreover, our mechanisms can handle extended axioms
that are not necessarily bound by the defeasible successor state axiom structure (which
is useful to bind our formalism to the classical planning representation), as long as
these can be encoded in the form of defeasible rules. Contrary to Tang (2012), be-
cause we consider preference information to be domain dependent, domain axioms are
not explicitly prioritised depending on their type. Finally, in our work the evaluation
of acceptability of claims regarding future situations is based on the acceptability of
relevant information across the entire history leading to the final respective state.
2.2.7.5 Argumentation-based Reasoning about Dynamic Domains
Previously in this chapter we discussed works on non-monotonic reasoning about ac-
tion and dynamic domains. In a similar manner, argumentation-based reasoning has
been used for enabling correct reasoning with concise and intuitive theories of action,
while providing solutions to the frame (Kakas et al., 1999, 2001; Vo and Foo, 2005),
qualification (Allen and Ferguson, 1994; Vo and Foo, 2001, 2005) and ramification
problems (Kakas and Miller, 1997a; Vo and Foo, 2002, 2005). This section presents
approaches in argumentation-based reasoning about action and discusses their rele-
vance to this thesis.
Konolige (1988) argues in favour of the use of defeasible argumentation-based
systems for reasoning about action, and describes which arguments are important for
this type of reasoning and the information necessary to evaluate their status. This
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approach is described based on the Yale Shooting Problem.
Ferguson and Allen (1994) consider the problem of plan communication in mixed
initiative planning, and argue that a rich representation is necessary, allowing the com-
munication of important goals and subgoals, relevant plans, clarifications and sugges-
tions. Accordingly, they present an argumentation-based approach based on the logic
of time and action (Allen and Ferguson, 1994). They propose a representation scheme
based on defeasible rules and argue that it is better suited to deal with the qualifica-
tion problem, enabling the agent to reason about qualifications for as much time as
possible, while dealing with subsequently encountered qualifications given more time.
Kakas et al. (1999, 2001) focus on domains for reasoning about action written in
the language E (Kakas and Miller, 1997b). They present a translation for these the-
ories, enabling argumentation-based reasoning based on logic programming without
negation as failure (Dimopoulos and Kakas, 1995). Reasoning in the language formal-
ism E is based on default persistence to address the frame problem. The application
of argumentation methods enables treatment of default persistence by prioritising ef-
fects of later actions higher than effects of earlier actions. In this approach time is
considered to be totally ordered.
Vo and Foo (2001, 2002, 2005) present an argumentation-based framework de-
signed to address the frame, qualification and ramification problems in a uniform man-
ner. Argumentation-based reasoning follows assumption-based argumentation Bon-
darenko et al. (1997). Domain descriptions are based on a propositional action descrip-
tion language based on temporal logic (Sandewall, 1994; Drakengren and Bjäreland,
1999). Time is represented in terms of a sequence of discrete time points.
Augusto and Simari (2001) present an argumentation-based for temporal reasoning
using the notions of instant and interval as temporal references. This system is based
on temporal logic.
2.2.7.5.1 Relevance to the Project The focus of our work is different. We are
interested in defeasibility introduced by the different opinions of the agents. Our rep-
resentation is based on defeasible rules with the structure of successor state axioms.
As as a result, each agent encodes both the frame and effect rules regarding a fluent
predicate in a single axiom.
The implicit representation of the frame axioms allows reasoning about the differ-
ent opinions on what does not change in the world after the application of the agents’
actions. The different frame axioms held by different agents allow the implicit encod-
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ing of the different views of not only what changes, but also what remains the same.
Getting similar results from a defeasible representation would require the addition of
rules, increasing the size of the theory. We revisit this in Chapter 6 where we com-
pare our representation with an alternative defeasible representation based on default
persistence.
Another benefit from the use of a formalism based on situation calculus is branch-
ing time. Branching time is useful for constructing arguments regarding different po-
tential plans, especially when the agents engage in dialogue regarding different alterna-
tives. The tree-like nature of branching time enables reuse of arguments and argument
evaluation results for arguments extending a common initial plan.
2.3 Conclusions
Although there is an extensive body of work in the area of multiagent planning, there
has been limited attention to the distributed and potentially erroneous nature of knowl-
edge in multiagent systems. Most work dealing with the problems related to these
aspects comes from the argumentation community, but does not deal with the problem
of planning for multiple agents which have different perspectives about the environ-
ment. The related approaches mainly focus on the problem of deliberation rather than
the planning-related aspects of means-end reasoning. In addition, these works do not
deal with planning problems in the classical sense, and as a result either deal with
simpler problems, such as action selection, or due to the complexity of the planning





The problem of multi-perspective cooperative planning (MPCP) arises when a coali-
tion of autonomous agents, which hold incompatible views of the planning environ-
ment, need to come up with a plan that can be defended against possible objections.
MPCP deals with the problem of planning with distributed and potentially contradic-
tory knowledge, i.e. knowledge which contains directly contradicting facts or which
leads to contradicting conclusions.
Contrary to classical planning, we treat agents’ beliefs as evidence, rather than as
certain facts. For instance, an agent’s belief that a robot r1 is at location loc1 is treated
as evidence suggesting that the robot is at loc1, or that we have reasons to believe1
that r1 is at the suggested location. Accordingly, contradicting beliefs are viewed as
evidence towards opposing conclusions. The agents can compare such evidence and
identify which claims can be defended against possible objections.
The problem of multi-perspective cooperative planning consists of a planning and
a decision-making problem:
1. Synthesise plans whose success is suggested by evidence from the agents’ col-
lective beliefs.
2. Evaluate the acceptability of these plans by comparing the evidence supporting
1We use the expressions indications, reasons to believe and evidence interchangeably. If such indi-
cations lead to contradicting conclusions, the beliefs used to reach these conclusions are called contra-
dictory.
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them against possible objections.
The first sub-problem is essentially a planning problem. We formalise it based on a
standard set-theoretic planning representation, adapted to accommodate contradictions
in the agents’ beliefs and multiple operator specifications. This representation allows a
close relation to classical planning enabling the use of efficient, off-the-shelf planners
(McDermott, 2000; Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001) to solve the task at hand.
The planning sub-problem of MPCP focuses exclusively on the planning elements
of the overall problem, stripped from any additional information the agents may hold
regarding, for example, the source or credibility of planning beliefs. We specify a
solution concept to this sub-problem and discuss how it qualifies as a solution to the
overall problem.
The second problem involves deciding whether the agents should accept a syn-
thesised plan. The formulation of this sub-problem requires a concrete account of
the notion of acceptability. Based on argumentation theory (Dung, 1995; Garcı́a and
Simari, 2004) we formally specify these notions and concretise the problem of multi-
perspective cooperative planning.
The proposed argumentation-based approach is based on a defeasible logic pro-
gramming (Garcı́a and Simari, 2004) and situation calculus (McCarthy, 1963) variant
which enables the formulation of the problem and the methods in a purely logical, non
ad-hoc, manner. This language is strictly more expressive than the set-theoretic no-
tation used for the representation of the planning sub-problem. We provide a sound
mechanism for the translation of set-theoretic planning theories to equivalent defeasi-
ble logic theories.
3.2 The Planning Problem of MPCP
This section focuses on the first sub-problem of MPCP. We focus on the agents’ plan-
ning beliefs and disregard any additional information about the sources or credibility of
these beliefs that can be used to provide additional insight on the evaluation of different
alternatives.
We use the standard planning problem specification P = 〈F, I,A,G〉, with fluents
F initial state I action space A and goal state G, and consider the problem of working
out a plan that complies with several (potentially contradictory) versions Pi of P at the
same time, for each agent i. Agents maintain individual initial state beliefs Ii and action
specifications Ai. Fluents F and goals G are shared.
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The notation used in this section is based on the STRIPS planning model (Fikes
and Nilsson, 1972), extended with variables, negation immediately preceding fluent
predicates and conditional effects. We consider all actions to be deterministic. At this
point, we do not make any assumptions regarding the observability of the domain.
Variables are essential for the compact representation of a planning domain. The
use of negation allows the representation of states as sets of literals (rather than atoms),
and enables us to encode that a literal takes on a positive or a negative value, as well
as absence of information regarding the value of a literal. Conditional effects enable
a more concise specification of the operators. The resulting formal notation is suffi-
ciently expressive for the compact representation of complex, deterministic planning
theories.
We are not concerned with multiagent execution. Nevertheless, the employed plan-
ning model accommodates a simple execution model by including an additional term
in each action specifying the agent executing the action. In order to account for joint
actions, this scheme can be extended so that the agent term can be instantiated to a
coalition of agents. The resulting model accounts for multiagent execution of fully
ordered plans, and does not account for durative, concurrent actions.
3.2.1 Individual Planning Knowledge
Each individual agent’s planning knowledge is encoded as an individual planning
problem, defined on top of a logical language L = 〈Lp,Lv,Lc〉. Lp contains a fi-
nite number of predicate names. Lv is a finite set containing variable symbols, and Lc
contains a finite number of constant symbols representing the objects of the planning
domain. The fluents representing the domain are denoted by the tuple F = 〈Fc,Fv〉,
where sets Fc and Fv contain ground and unground fluent literals respectively. Fc is
obtained by grounding the elements of Fv using all possible objects from Lc.
Definition 10. The individual planning problem for agent i in a coalition of agents is
a tuple:
Pi = 〈F, Ii,Oi,G〉,
where
• Ii ⊆ Fc is agent i’s perception of the initial state of the environment.
• Oi is the set of planning operators i believes the coalition can apply.
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• G⊆ Fc is a goal shared by the agents in the coalition.
We assume that the goals shared by the agents are non-contradictory.
The set Oi summarises agent i’s beliefs regarding the specification of the operators
available to the agents in the coalition that can be used to reach the common goal.
Planning operators are tuples of the form:
〈prei,o,eff i〉,
where
• o is the name of the operator,
• prei ⊆ Fv is the set of preconditions and
• eff i is a set of conditional effects.
We refer to beliefs of agent i regarding the preconditions and effects of operator o as
prei(o) and eff i(o) respectively.
Conditional effects have the form 〈C,e〉, where C ⊆ Fv denotes the necessary con-
ditions and e∈ Fv represents the effects. An action a is a ground version of an operator,
where each variable has been instantiated to a constant object. We denote the set of all
ground actions for agent i as ground(Oi).
Contrary to classical planning, fluent literals can be considered to be indications, or
reasons to believe that the literal takes on the respective value. Consider the following
examples:
• At(x, loc1) ∈ Ii represents that agent i has indications that object x is at location
loc1 in the initial state.
• prei(pickup(x, loc1)) = {At(x, loc1),Movable(x)} denotes that agent i has rea-
sons to believe that object x can be picked up from location loc1 if we have
reasons to believe that x is at loc1 and that x is transportable.
• 〈{Power(l)},Light(l)〉 ∈ eff i(switch on(l)) represents agent i’s belief that, if
there are indications suggesting that a lamp l is connected to a power source,
there are reasons to believe that l is lit after the agent switches it on.
Planning domain beliefs can be used alongside the state transition function to calculate
the effects that the application of an action is expected to have on the environment.
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3.2.1.1 State Transition Function
The state transition function specifies how operators alter the state of the world. It is
usually represented as a function γ(a,σ) which, given an action a and the state of the
environment σ, returns the state obtained after the execution of a.
Positive and negative literals may appear in the same state, representing different
reasons suggesting that the respective atom takes a positive and a negative value in
this state. We adapt the usual state transition function specification to handle literals
instead of atoms in order to account for contradictory information.
The state transition function is defined for actions that the agent has reason to
believe that they are applicable. Agent i has reasons to believe that a ground action
a is applicable in a state σ if there are reasons to believe that this state satisfies the
preconditions of the action:
prei(a)⊆ σ.
The following definition describes the specification of the state transition function in
our setting. The proposed specification of the state transition function ensures that
ambiguity about conditions in a state is propagated to literals in successor states whose
value depends on these conditions.
Definition 11. Consider agent i, and the individual planning problem Pi = 〈F, Ii,Oi,G〉,
and a state σi. Let a ground action 〈prei,a,eff i〉 ∈ ground(Oi) such that prei(a) ⊆ σ.
e ∈ γi(a,σ) if and only if:
1. there exists an effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a) and C ⊆ σ, or
2. e∈ σ and for every conditional effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a), there exists c∈C such that
either
(a) c 6∈ σ, or
(b) c ∈ σ.
The notation e represents the complement of literal e. If e is a positive literal then
e = ¬e, whereas if e is a negative literal and e = ¬p, then e = p.
Condition (1) describes that if there are reasons to believe that the conditions of
a conditional effect hold, then there are reasons to believe that its effect holds in the
successor state. This is similar to the usual specification of the state transition function.
Condition (2) deals with persistence of literals. The successor state function must
account for the literals we have reasons to believe that they remain unaffected by the
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application of the most recent action. In non-contradictory theories, calculating which
literals remain the same simply involves deleting from the successor state the com-
plements of the added literals. As a result, a literal remains unaffected if there is no
conditional effect producing this literal whose conditions are all satisfied by the state.
Contradictions complicate this process. It is rational to conclude that, if the beliefs
suggest that the conditions of the effect are not applicable, then there are no reasons to
believe that the effect is valid. Accordingly, the successor state function must account
both for absence of information, similar to the standard case, and existence of infor-
mation to the contrary. Condition (2), accounts for the conclusion that the conditional
effect is inapplicable, due to:
• Absence of information suggesting that the condition holds in the previous state
(2a).
• Information that the condition does not hold in the previous state (2b).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the desirable behaviour of the state transition function. Con-
sider an agent that is considering the effects of the action of flipping the light switch,
while assuming that the light turns on if there is electricity in the building.
The transition from state σ1 illustrates that if there are reasons to believe that there
is power in the building, then there are reasons to believe that light will be on if the
lamp is switched on. At the same time, since there is no ambiguity regarding whether
there is power, there is no evidence to suggest that after the application of the action
there is no light, and as a result ¬light does not persist in γi(switchOn,σ1).
The transition from state σ2 to γi(switchOn,σ2) describes that if there are no rea-
sons to believe that the condition of the effect holds, then there is no indication towards
the belief that the effect is applicable. As a result, the complement of the effect persists
in the successor state. State σ3 is similar to σ2, but in this case there are reasons to
believe that the condition of the effect actually does not hold in the predecessor state.
State σ4 is ambiguous with respect to the predicate power as there are reasons
to believe that both power and ¬power are the case. The state transition propagates
the ambiguity to the successor state γi(switchOn,σ4). Since power is satisfied in σ4,
there are reasons to believe that the conditional effect is applicable. As a result, there
are reasons to believe that light holds in γi(switchOn,σ4). At the same time, there is
evidence suggesting that ¬power holds in σ4. This leads to the conclusion that the
conditional effect is not applicable, and accordingly, provides reasons to believe that
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Figure 3.1: Example illustrating the specification of the state transition function for in-
dividual planning problems for different states σ1, . . . ,σ4 and a single action switchOn
with the conditional effect 〈{power}, light〉. Fluent literals above and below states de-
note the beliefs that are part of the respective states
¬light holds in γi(switchOn,σ4). The literals power and ¬power are not affected by
the action switchOn. Their status persists to the successor state.
The state transition function propagates ambiguity to successor states, but does
not introduce contradictions in non-contradictory states when the applicable effects of
the action are not contradictory. The contradictions introduced are either a result of
contradictions that persist from the previous state, or due to contradictory information
regarding the conditions of conditional effects.
The state transition function for agent i, given an action a and the predecessor state
s is represented using our set-theoretic notation as follows:
γi(a,σ) = (σ−deli(a,σ))∪addi(a,σ) .
The set addi(a,σ) contains the effects of the action a that agent i has reason to believe
that are applicable:
addi(a,σ) = {e | 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a) and C ⊆ σ} .
The set deli(a,σ) contains the literals that agent i has reason to believe no longer hold
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after the application of the action:
deli(a,σ) = addi(a,σ)− inapi(a,σ) .
The set inapi(a,σ) contains the effects that are not believed to be applicable:
2
inapi(a,σ) = {e | for every 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a),∃c ∈C such that c 6∈ σ or c ∈ σ}.
The bar notation over a set represents the complements of every literal in this set, i.e.
S = {e | e ∈ S}.
The successor state is calculated as the union of the conditional effects that are
believed to be applicable (i.e. addi(a,σ)), and the literals which are believed to persist
from the previous state (i.e. σ−deli(a,σ)). In order to calculate the latter, we remove
the conditional effects that are believed be applicable without any ambiguity from the
predecessor state. This is asserted by removing from the applicable effects addi(a,σ),
all effects which are believed to be inapplicable in σ (i.e. inapi(a,σ)).
The following proposition asserts that the set-theoretic specification of the state
transition function follows Definition 11.
Proposition 1. Consider agent i and the individual planning problem Pi = 〈F, Ii,Oi,G〉.
Let 〈prei,a,eff i〉 ∈ ground(Oi) be a ground action which is applicable in state σ. Ac-
cording to the specification of γ, e ∈ γi(a,σ) if and only if:
1. there exists an effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a) and C ⊆ σ, or
2. e∈ σ and for every conditional effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a), there exists c∈C such that
c 6∈ σ or c ∈ σ.
Proof.
(⇒)
1. If 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a) and C ⊆ σ then e ∈ addi(a,σ), and as a result e ∈ γi(a,σ).
2. We assume (a) that e ∈ σ and (b) for every conditional effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ addi(a)
there exists c ∈C such that c 6∈ σ or c ∈ σ. Therefore, e ∈ inapi(a,σ), and as a
result e 6∈ deli(a,σ). Therefore, e ∈ γi(a,σ).
(⇐) Assume that
2More specifically, this set contains the effects that the agent has no reason to believe that they are
applicable, or has reasons to believe that they are inapplicable.
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1. there does not exist an effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ addi(a) with C ⊆ σ, and
2. (a) e 6∈ σ or (b) there exists a conditional effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a), such that for all
c ∈C, c ∈ σ and c 6∈ σ.
From (1) it follows that e 6∈ addi(a,σ). Then, if e 6∈ σ, it holds that e 6∈ γi(a,σ). If
(2b) is the case, e ∈ addi(a,σ), and also e 6∈ inapi(a,σ). As a result e ∈ deli(a,σ).
Therefore, regardless of whether e ∈ σ holds, it is the case that e 6∈ γi(a,σ).
The state transition function does not introduce contradiction in a non-contradictory
state, when the action causing the transition does not have any contradicting effects.
Proposition 2. Consider agent i and the individual planning problem Pi = 〈F, Ii,Oi,G〉.
Let 〈prei,a,eff i〉 ∈ ground(Oi) be a ground action which is applicable in state σ. If
σ is not contradictory (i.e. @p ∈ σ such that p ∈ σ) and all applicable effects (i.e.
addi(a,σ)) are non-contradictory, then γi(a,σ) is non-contradictory, for any action a.
Proof. For every e ∈ addi(a,σ), there exists a conditional effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a) such
that C⊆ σ. Since σ is non-contradictory, there does not exist any c∈C such that c∈ σ.
As a result, inapi(a,σ) is empty and as a result it holds that:
deli(a,σ) = addi(a,σ)− inapi(a,σ) = addi(a,σ) .
Therefore, the state transition is calculated is follows:
γi(a,σ) = (σ−deli(a,σ))∪addi(a,σ) = (σ−addi(a,σ))∪addi(a,σ) .
Accordingly, for every literal added to the predecessor state, its complement is re-
moved. As a result γi(a,σ) is non-contradictory.
3.2.1.2 Candidate Plans
Desirable states may not be reachable by performing single actions. Candidate plans
are sequences of actions, which are believed to be applicable in sequence, and reach a
desirable state.
Definition 12. A sequence of actions π = 〈a1, . . . ,ak〉 is a candidate plan for Pi if
• a1 is applicable in I,
• for every action a j, with 2 ≤ j ≤ k, a j is applicable in state γi(〈a1, . . . ,a j−1〉, I)
following the application of a1, . . . ,a j−1, and
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• G⊆ γi(π, I).
The first condition accounts for the executability of the plan, meaning that all actions
in the plan are applicable in sequence. The second condition asserts that i has reasons
to believe that the sequence achieves the goal. In order to accommodate the treatment
of plans, the state transition function γi is canonically extended to sequences of actions.
3.2.2 Collective Planning Knowledge
The multi-perspective planning problem is formulated with respect to the agents’ col-
lective planning beliefs.
Definition 13. A multi-perspective planning problem is a tuple P = 〈N,F, I,O,G〉,
where
• N is the set of the agents participating in a coalition,
• F are the fluents describing the domain,
• I = {Ii}ni=1 is a set containing all agents’ views of the initial state,
• O= {Oi}ni=1 contains every agent’s perception of the operators that the coalition
may apply, and
• G⊆ Fc is a non-contradictory set describing the common goal.
This definition is based on the assumption that the agents are cooperative, since they
share the same goal G. In addition, we assume that the agents operate under ontological
agreement, since they share the same fluents and operator names. On the contrary, we
do not make any assumptions that initial states are individually and mutually non-
contradictory, or that they maintain the same operator specifications.
The state transition function for the multiagent planning problem is defined as
γ(a,σ) = {l | l ∈ γi(a,σ) for every i ∈ N such that prei(a)⊆ σ}∪
{l | l ∈ σ for every i ∈ N such that prei(a) 6⊆ σ} .
The collective state transition function aggregates the results of individual state transi-
tion functions. If an action is not applicable with respect to an agent’s operator speci-
fication, then the state transition function for this agent is undefined. In this case, the
action is considered to have no effect on the state with respect to the specification of
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this agent. Clearly, the resulting states may be contradictory either due to contradictory
operator specifications, or contradictory initial state beliefs.
Equivalently to the individual agent’s case, a sequence of actions is a candidate
solution to the collective MPCP problem, if there are collective reasons to believe that
the plan is executable and the goal is achieved in the resulting state.
Definition 14. A sequence of actions π = 〈a1, . . . ,am〉 is a candidate plan for a MPCP
problem P if:
• there exists a tuple 〈prei,a1,posti〉 ∈ ground(O) such that prei(a1)⊆ I,
• for every action a j, with 2 ≤ j ≤ m, there exists 〈prek,a j,postk〉 ∈ ground(O)
such that prek(a j)⊆ γ(〈a1, . . . ,a j−1〉, I), and
• G⊆ γ(π, I).
The definition asserts that there is at least one specification of a1 that is applicable in I,
and for every action a j in the plan there is at least one specification that is applicable in
the resulting state reached after executing the actions in the plan before a j. The second
condition ensures that the agents have reasons to believe that the goal is satisfied in the
state resulting from the application of the plan.
Candidate plans that solve a collective planning problem include the candidate so-
lutions to the individual agents’ planning problems.
Proposition 3. Let multi-perspective planning problem P = 〈N,F, I,O,G〉, and an in-
dividual planning problem Pi = 〈F, Ii,Oi,G〉. If π = 〈a1,a2, . . .〉 is a candidate plan for
Pi, then π is a candidate plan for P.
Proof. Every action a that is applicable in σ with respect to Pi is also applicable in σ
with respect to P, since 〈prei,a,eff i〉 ∈ Oi ⇒ 〈prei,a,eff i〉 ∈ O, and prei ⊆ σ as a is
applicable in σ with respect to Pi. Therefore, since Ii ⊆ I and prei ⊆ Ii, prei ⊆ I.
From the specification of γ we infer that, for every action a that is applicable in
a state σ, γi ⊆ γ. As a result for every action a j in the plan with j > 1, it holds
that prei ⊆ γ(〈a1, . . . ,a j−1〉, I), since prei ⊆ γi(〈a1, . . . ,a j−1〉, I). In addition, G ⊆
γ(〈a1, . . . ,a j−1〉, I), since G⊆ γi(〈a1, . . . ,a j−1〉, I).
Therefore, every action in π is applicable in sequence with respect to P and the
final state satisfies the goal conditions G.
The specification of candidate plans asserts that reasons for executability and goal
achievement derive from the agents’ collective beliefs. However, they do not take into
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account possible objections. These bring about doubts regarding the a plan based on
indications that certain actions are not executable or that the plan fails to achieve the
goal.
Consider, for instance, a candidate plan, the first action of which is believed to be
executable because there are reasons to believe that its precondition p is satisfied in
the initial state. However, if at least one agent in the coalition has reasons to believe
that ¬p is the case, the agents have collective reasons to believe that the first action in
the plan is not applicable. In such cases, it is not straightforward to decide whether the
plan should be followed. Candidate plans can be viewed as weak solution concepts as
they indicate possible solutions, which derive from the agents’ collective beliefs, but
are not objection-proof.
The next section focuses on the notion of acceptability from argumentation theory,
and provides the formal semantics for the resolution of contradictions and the evalua-
tion of the evidence supporting candidate plans. Planning knowledge models the bare
minimum knowledge that is required to synthesise plans, and cannot represent addi-
tional meta-knowledge about these beliefs, such as useful information regarding levels
of confidence, origin or structure. In the next section we describe how such beliefs can
be utilised in a unified framework, enabling the agents to resolve domain knowledge
contradictions and make sound decisions.
3.3 Defeasible Reasoning about MPCP Problems
In the previous section we outlined the basic components of the planning sub-problem
of MPCP. Solving this problem, in the traditional planning sense, results in synthe-
sising candidate plans. These plans, however, are greedy as the planner may use any
beliefs even if contradicting views about these beliefs exist.
This section introduces the notion of acceptability, which provides the basis of
stronger solution concepts. Plan acceptability is based on the idea that plans must not
only derive from the agents’ collective beliefs, but these beliefs must be “stronger”
than any objections.
We follow an argumentation-based approach, where derivations from the agents’
collective beliefs correspond to arguments. Arguments are compared in order to iden-
tify which conclusions the agents should accept. According to Prakken and Vreeswijk
(2002), the specification of an argumentation system requires the definition of the fol-
lowing elements:
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• An underlying logical language.
• Definitions of arguments, conflicts between arguments and of a defeat relation
among arguments.
• Definition of how arguments are assessed, specifying a notion of defeasible log-
ical consequence.
This section provides a concrete specification of these notions for the problem of rea-
soning about the acceptability of plans.
The set-theoretic formalism introduced in the previous section provides a formal
specification of the planning problem. This reasoning scheme allows agents to use
their (collective) planning beliefs to evaluate whether they have reasons to believe that
a literal holds after the application of a sequence of actions. However, even though
this formalism allows the logical specification of individual states, it is inadequate for
the representation of logical statements explaining how derived conclusions regarding
different states are related.
In order to resolve contradictions regarding in future states, agents need to inspect
all relevant beliefs that lead to these contradictions. This requires regressing to previ-
ous states and identifying relevant beliefs and related meta-knowledge the agents may
possess. In order to resolve conflicts, the agents must be able to find all the explana-
tions relevant to a contradiction, and decide which one is the ‘strongest’.
We map derivations to arguments, and employ abstract argumentation techniques
to formally specify “acceptable plans”. The set-theoretic, state-based planning rep-
resentation does not allow us to formulate logical arguments based on some form of
deductive reasoning. In order to avoid imposing ad-hoc internal structure and seman-
tics, we introduce a defeasible variant of the situation calculus language that provides
the basis for a structured logical representation of arguments which in turn will be used
as the foundation of our plan acceptability semantics.
3.3.1 Desirable Properties of the Logical Formalism
Before getting into the details of our logical formalism, we outline a series of essential
properties. In Chapter 6 we revisit these properties in order to evaluate the suitability
of the employed formalism.
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3.3.1.1 Representation of MPCP Domains
The formalism must be sufficiently expressive to provide an accurate representation
of multi-perspective planning problems. Also, the inferential results provided by the
formalism should be correct with respect to the aforementioned solution concepts.
3.3.1.2 Reasoning about Dynamic domains
The employed logical formalism must be able to represent domains and change caused
by the actions of the agents. It must allow axioms describing the effects and precondi-
tions of actions. Additionally, it is necessary to be able to formulate sentences describ-
ing the state of the environment, and how the values of literals change throughout the
execution of the plan.
3.3.1.3 Expressive Power
The expressive power of the formalism is also relevant to the types of axioms that can
be represented. We have the basic requirement that the formalism allows the expression
of axioms describing planning operators. More expressive formalisms may enable
the more elegant representation of theories including more rules explicitly describing
concepts such as domain constraints and ramifications.
3.3.1.4 Handing Contradictions
The formalism must enable reasoning with contradictory theories. The inferential
mechanism must be able to handle contradictions and provide concrete, intuitive se-
mantics to specify what is acceptable. Since there is no universally accepted measure
of what constitutes adequate justification to accept new information, a single accept-
ability criterion may not be adequate. Multiple semantics may be necessary to account
for different agent attitudes towards accepting new facts. The combination of the re-
quirements of reasoning about dynamic domains and handling inconsistencies are the
focal points of our approach.
3.3.1.5 Practicality
Both the aspects of tractability of the inferential mechanism and the size of theory
determine the practicality of the approach. Expressive formalisms produce succinct
representations. However, complicated rules generally increase the complexity of the
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reasoning process. The practicality of the approach is related to this tradeoff, and can
be measured by its ability to handle domains of increasing size, complexity and number
of contradictions.
3.3.2 Defeasible Situation Calculus
Situation calculus (McCarthy, 1963) is a highly expressive logical language for reason-
ing about dynamic domains. Highly structured theories of situation calculus, called ba-
sic action theories, enable tractable reasoning, while providing a solution to the frame
problem (Reiter, 1991, 2001). Basic action theories, however, do not normally cater
for contradictory planning knowledge, which complicates the reasoning process.
The collective beliefs of multiple agents are may be contradictory and may include
multiple specifications for the same operator. Also, the task of combining distinct
specifications held by multiple agents to formulate well-formed successor state axioms,
pre-compiling the collective beliefs into a non-contradictory well formed basic action
theory, is not a straightforward task.
In order to be able to handle the additional complexity introduced by contradictions
and multiple operator specifications, we focus on a restricted variant of situation calcu-
lus based on defeasible logic programming, which we call defeasible situation calcu-
lus. Defeasible logic programming enables defeasible, argumentation-based reasoning
with propositional theories that may contain contradictory beliefs. The representa-
tion resembles the representation of extended logic programming (Garcı́a and Simari,
2004), and is syntactically similar to basic action theories that have transformed to be
interpreted by the situation calculus Prolog interpreter (Reiter, 2001).
3.3.2.1 The language Ldefsitcal
The language of defeasible situation calculus Ldefsitcal supports three basic sorts:
• action for actions
• situation for situations
• object for everything else
Ldefsitcal has the following alphabet:
• Usual DeLP negation ‘∼’, default negation ‘not’, conjunction ‘,’ and defeasible
implication ‘–≺’ connectives.
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• Equality ‘=’, inequality ‘6=’ and disjunction ‘;’ symbols.
• Countably infinitely many individual variable symbols of each sort.
• Two function symbols of sort situation:
1. A constant symbol S0, denoting the initial situation.
2. The binary function symbol do : action× situation→ situation.
• A binary predicate symbol Poss : action× situation.
• A finite or countably infinite set of predicate symbols with arity n, for each n≥ 0,
and sorts (action∪object)n.
• A finite or countably infinite number of predicate symbols of sort (action ∪
object)n× situation, for each n≥ 0.
Situations are interpreted as finite sequences of actions. The special function symbol
do(a,s) represents the sequence formed by adding an action a to the sequence s. For
readability we write do([a1, . . . ,an],s) to denote do(an,do(. . .do(a1,s))],s). Situations
that are subsequences of other situations are referred to as predecessors to these situ-
ations. For instance, s2 = do([a1,a2],s) is a predecessor of s3 = do([a1,a2,a3,a4],s).
We call s3 a successor situation of s2.
The special symbol Poss(a,s) denotes that action a can be applied in situation
s. Predicates are distinguished from fluents and non-fluents. Fluent predicates have
an object of term situation as their final argument. Non-fluents describe situation-
independent relations that do not change over time. Note that situation terms are al-
lowed to appear exclusively as the last argument of fluent predicates, or special sym-
bols do and Poss.
Default negation is interpreted, similar to Garcı́a and Simari (2004), as an assump-
tion about the absence of contradicting information. On the contrary, the usual negation
denotes reasons to believe that a literal takes a negative value.
Equality, inequality and disjunction symbols do not exist in DeLP. We introduce
these symbols to relate terms, as for instance a1 = a2 and x1 6= x2, for actions a1, a2
and objects x1, x2. Equality and inequality are treated, with respect to reasoning, as
grounding constraints, rather than logical symbols. We also allow the use of disjunc-
tion to enable the compact representation of multiple rules with the same body using a
single rule. The effect of these symbols in the reasoning process is further explained
after the introduction of our reasoning mechanism.
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We use Ldefsitcal to encode defeasible situation axioms, which have the following
form:
head –≺body .
The head of the rule may be any literal constructed for any predicate symbol in Ldefsitcal
or the special predicate symbol Poss(a,s), where a is an action and s a situation term.
The body of the rule may be empty. Alternatively, it may contain any literal for any
predicate symbol in Ldefsitcal, or equalities and inequalities for any terms in Ldefsitcal.
Literals in the body of axioms may be preceded by default negation. Conjunction
may appear between literals, default negated literals, term equalities and inequalities.
Disjunction is only allowed to separate multiple conjunctions. The body of axioms is
written in a form of disjunctive normal form adapted to account for default negation.
This work has been designed with practicality in mind. The restrictions in the
structure of axioms serve this purpose. By following these rules we allow the axioma-
tisation of planning domains in an ungrounded manner, while enabling a specification
of an efficient grounding scheme that generates propositional theories that can enable
efficient reasoning. More specifically, while we allow the use of disjunction to enable
the specification of complex axioms, we restrict its use so that it enables us to quickly
generate propositional theories that can be used for DeLP-style inference. Regardless
of these restrictions, the proposed axiomatisation scheme allows the specification of
complex domains. We revisit this issue in Section 3.4.1.3.
The formal grammar is outlined in Backus-Naur Form as follows:
1. 〈axiom〉 ::= 〈head〉–≺〈body〉 | 〈action〉= 〈action〉 | 〈action〉 6= 〈action〉
2. 〈head〉 ::= 〈literal〉 | [∼]〈poss〉
3. 〈body〉 ::= [〈disjunct〉]
4. 〈disjunct〉 ::= 〈conjunct〉[;〈disjunct〉]
5. 〈conjunct〉 ::= 〈element〉[,〈conjunct〉]
6. 〈element〉 ::= [not]〈literal〉 | 〈grounding-constraint〉
7. 〈literal〉 := [∼]〈predicate〉
8. 〈grounding-constraint〉 ::= 〈term〉= 〈term〉 | 〈term〉 6= 〈term〉
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The expression 〈poss〉 refers to the special predicate Poss(a,s).
Following standard DeLP, axioms with an empty body are called presumptions
(Garcı́a and Simari, 2004). Sometimes instead of head –≺we write head for simplicity.
According to the aforementioned restrictions the following axiom is not well-
formed:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),not((a = switch on,Plugged(l,s));
(a = switch on,∼Broken(l,b,s)) .
On the contrary, the next rule illustrates an example of a well-formed axiom:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),a 6= switch on,a 6= switch on;
∼Lit(l,s),a 6= switch on,not∼Broken(l,b,s);
∼Lit(l,s),not Plugged(l,s),a 6= switch on;
∼Lit(l,s),not Plugged(l,s),not∼Broken(l,b,s) .
3.3.2.2 Notational Conventions
Universal quantifications are not explicitly stated following the usual situation calcu-
lus convention. Lower-cased symbols denote unground variables quantified with max-
imum scope, unless stated otherwise. Constants are represented using capital letters.
The representation ~x denotes x1,x2, . . . ,xn. The notation L(~x) describes that the free
variables in L are among~x.
We follow the usual situation calculus naming conventions:
• Predicate names start with an upper case first letter.
• Function names are represented with a lower case first letter.
• Unground variables are denoted as lower case letters.
• Grounded variables are represented as capitalised letters.
In addition to the (defeasible) situation calculus representation, we need to also repre-
sent arguments and dialogue moves. To avoid confusion we represent arguments using
lower case Greek characters.
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3.3.3 Defeasible Basic Action Theories
The form of defeasible situation calculus axioms we described earlier is very liberal.
Here we impose a more restrictive structure that is sufficient to represent planning do-
mains. We call these theories defeasible basic action theory (DBAT). DBATs are influ-
enced by Reiter’s situation calculus basic action theories, and use defeasible successor-
state axioms, which provide a solution to the frame problem by encoding both the
frame and effect rules regarding a fluent predicate within an axiom. The result of this
structure is a succinct representation of the planning domain.
Definition 15. A defeasible basic action theory is a tuple D = 〈Dss,Dap,DS0,Duna,Dc〉
that contains defeasible rules describing successor state axioms Dss, action precondi-
tions axioms Dap, axioms regarding the initial situation and non-fluent beliefs DS0 , the
unique names axioms for actions Duna and constant symbols of sort object Dc.
Defeasible successor-state axioms detail conditions, providing reasons to believe that
a fluent literal holds in the successor situation. The head of a defeasible successor
state axiom is a fluent literal in a successor situation do(a,s) (e.g. F(do(~x,a,s)) or
∼F(do(~x,a,s))), and the body of the rule involves only fluent predicates referring ex-
clusively to situation term s. Examples of successor state axioms are the following:
Lit(do(a,s))–≺a = switch on;Lit(s),a 6= switch off
Charged(x,do(a,s))–≺Plugged(x,s),a 6= unplug(x)
∼Charged(x,do(unplug(x),s))–≺
Each agent holds one successor state axiom per fluent literal. This axiom must account
for any possible case that leads to the indication that the literal holds in the successor
state.
Defeasible Action precondition axioms denote reasons that govern the applicability
of an action. The head of these rules is the predicate Poss(A,s) or ∼Poss(A,s), where
A is a ground action. Fluents in the bodies of these rules are not allowed to contain
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Axioms regarding the initial situation are rules which only contain predicates that
have the initial situation as their situation term. For example, consider the following:
At(R,L1,S0)–≺
∼At(R,L1,S0)–≺At(R,L2,S0),L2 6= L1
Non-fluent beliefs never change from one situation to another (i.e. as a result of ac-
tion execution). Objects of sort situation are not allowed to appear in such beliefs.
Examples of non-fluent beliefs are the following:
Robot(R)–≺
Mobile(R)–≺Robot(R)
Regardless of their constant nature, and similar to every other belief in the theory,
non-fluent beliefs are defeasible and may contradict each other.
Equality and inequality are just used to disregard ground instances of defeasible
rules that do not respect these. For instance, given a successor state axiom that has
the equality a = A1, instantiating a with A2 is not possible since A1 and A2 are differ-
ent objects. We use the set of unique names axioms for our domain to encode these
constraints.
3.3.4 Grounding Defeasible Basic Action Theories
In order to utilise the reasoning mechanism of Garcı́a and Simari (2004) we introduce
a grounding mechanism for defeasible basic action theories. This mechanism produces
well-formed extended defeasible logic programs.
A ground defeasible basic action theory is obtained after grounding the defeasible
rules in the domain with respect to a ground situation term and all its predecessor
situations. All ground situation terms are rooted in the initial situation S0, and denote
the history of the application of sequence of ground actions in the initial situation S0.
Note that grounding the domain theory for an extensive number of situation terms is an
expensive process. We revisit this issue in the following chapter and present algorithms
for reasoning and planning with DBATs.
Definition 16. Let a defeasible basic action theory D = 〈Dss,Dap,DS0,Duna,Dc〉.
ground(D,S) represent the DBAT D grounded with respect to a ground situation sym-
bol S and be specified as follows:
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1. Collect all ground rules from D for every possible grounding using all terms
of sort object, every grounded action and every ground situation term in the set
{S}∪{S′ | S′ is a predecessor to S}:
ground axioms(D,S) =
{r′ | r ∈Dss∪Dap∪DS0 and r′ is obtained by the substitution
of every unground object, action and situation term
appearing in the rule with a ground term of the same sort
and the removal of trivial equalities of the form X = X and
inequalities X 6= Y for different ground terms X and Y} .
2. Simplify the grounded rules by separating disjunctions in their body into sepa-
rate rules:
simplified ground axioms(D,S) =
{r | r ∈ ground axioms(D,S) and the disjunction symbol
does not appear in r}∪
{L–≺Φ | L–≺Ψ ∈ ground axioms(D,S) and Φ is a disjunct in Ψ} .
3. Remove rules which contain equalities referring to different objects and inequal-
ities referring to the same object in their bodies:
ground(D,S) = {r | r ∈ simplified ground axioms(D,S)
and for any different terms X ,Y , the statement
X = Y or X 6= X does not appear in the body of r} .
ground(Dss,S) and ground(Dap,S) represent the ground defeasible successor state ax-
ioms and action preconditions respectively. The initial situation axioms do not contain
variables and therefore remain unchanged. The ground defeasible basic action theory
can be represented as the tuple:
ground(D,S) = 〈ground(Dss,S),ground(Dap,S),DS0〉.
In order to obtain the ground versions of the rules we instantiate their variables
in all possible combinations and remove trivial equalities (X = X) and inequalities
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(X 6= Y ). Then, we simplify the axioms by breaking down disjunctions in their bod-
ies. Due to the specific structure we impose on the axioms their body is written in
disjunctive normal form (slightly adapted to account for default negation), making the
simplifications of the axioms a trivial process.
After the grounding process, ground action and situation terms are treated as ob-
jects with respect to the reasoning process. These objects are equal if and only if they
have the same symbol name, arity and arguments. For simplicity, occurrences of the
special function symbol do and actions A(~X) may be substituted with an equivalent
unique ground situation and action terms respectively, in a uniform manner across the
theory. For instance, the action move(L1,L2) may be substituted with the new term
A1. Equivalently, do(A1,S0) may be substituted with S1 and do([A1,A2],S0) may be
replaced by S2.
Every axiom in ground(Dss,S) is a well-formed extended defeasible rule, since
heads of the rules are ground literals, and bodies of the rules are conjunctions of ground
literals (possibly preceded by default negation). Therefore, every ground DBAT corre-
sponds to an extended defeasible logic program. These programs do not contain strict
rules. Based on this relation, we follow the reasoning mechanism of DeLP (Garcı́a and
Simari, 2004).
3.3.5 Defeasible Derivations
Defeasible rules are used in sequence to create inference chains called defeasible
derivations. A defeasible derivation provides evidence for the derived conclusions.
The following definition is slightly adapted from Garcı́a and Simari (2004) to account
for lack of strict rules in ground DBATs.
Definition 17. Let ground(D,S) be a set of grounded defeasible rules and L a ground
literal. ground(D,S) |∼L represents a defeasible derivation of L from ground(D,S),
which consists of a finite sequence L1, . . . ,Ln = L of grounded literals. For each literal
L′ in the sequence, there exists a rule r ∈ ground(D,S) with head(r) = L′, and all
literals appearing in its body, except the ones preceded by default negation, appear in
the sequence, before L′.
Note that in the special case that L is a non-fluent symbol, grounding is performed only
with respect to the initial situation S0.
Defeasible derivations are monotonic. Introducing additional rules in a theory (pos-
sibly) expands the set of defeasible derivations that can be made using this theory.
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Proposition 4. Assume a defeasible basic action theory D , and two ground situation
terms Sk and Sl such that Sk is predecessor of Sl . For every ground situation term Si
and every ground fluent literal L, if ground(D,Sk) |∼L(Si) then ground(D,Sl) |∼L(Si).
Proof. Definition 16 states that ground defeasible basic action theories include all ax-
ioms grounded for all combinations of ground terms that respect the expressed equali-
ties and inequalities. The ground theories ground(D,Sl) and ground(D,Sk) have been
grounded with exactly the same constants, apart from the additional situation terms
that are successor to Sk and predecessor or equal to Sl . Therefore, ground(D,Sl) ⊂
ground(D,Sk), and as a result if ground(D,Sl) |∼L(Si) then ground(D,Sk) |∼L(Si).
This proposition asserts that any derivations relevant to a plan π are also relevant to
every plan that begins with the sequence π. As a result, derivation results regarding π
may be reused when focusing on any plan extending π.
For readability purposes, we write D |∼L(S) to represent that there is a defeasible
derivation ground(D,S) |∼L(S). As shown by the previous proposition, the overload-
ing of the defeasible derivation notation does not lead to erroneous conclusions due to
the monotonicity of the defeasible derivation relation.
3.3.6 Acceptability
Defeasible derivations identify conclusions that can be derived from the agents beliefs.
However, they do not investigate the tenability of these claims. This section introduces
the notion of arguments and provides a concrete specification of the criteria that qual-
ify acceptable reasoning about plans. The following analysis is based on Garcı́a and
Simari (2004).
3.3.6.1 Arguments
Arguments capture reasons supporting a claim. They are minimal, non-contradictory
sets of rules that defeasibly entail a conclusion. A set of rules is non-contradictory if
there exists no literal which can be defeasibly inferred from the set, and its complement
can also be inferred from the same set.
Definition 18. Let ground(D,S) be a set of ground defeasible rules and h a ground
literal. α = 〈B,h〉 is an argument for h if B ⊆ ground(D,S) and:
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1. B |∼h,
2. B is non-contradictory, and
3. B is minimal, meaning that there does not exist a proper subset of B that satisfies
conditions (1), and (2).
The functions Claim(α) = h and Support(α) = A denote the claim and support of the
argument α = 〈A ,h〉 respectively.
Arguments are constructed from ground theories in which axioms containing dis-
junctions have been simplified. As a result, the support sets contain rules whose bodies
are conjunctions of literals. Therefore, we only include the relevant disjuncts of the
original compound rule. So if we construct an argument using F –≺L2, from the orig-
inal rule F –≺L1;L2;L3, we include only F –≺L2 in the support set of this argument.
The rational behind this practice is related to the minimality constraint that is imposed
on the support of arguments. By excluding unnecessary information, we reduce the
support size and simplify the evaluation of the acceptability of arguments as we min-
imise the supporting beliefs that need to be investigated, excluding all irrelevant and
unnecessary information.
Arguments can be represented as pyramids. The lower level holds non-fluent state-
ments, and the level above holds statements about the initial situation. Higher levels
hold statements derived from statements appearing on the lower levels. Beliefs in
higher levels are intermediate results in the derivation of the overall claim. The deriva-
tions of these beliefs correspond to arguments, the collection of which form the main
argument.
Definition 19. An argument 〈B ′,h′〉 is a subargument of 〈B,h〉 if B ′ ⊆ B .
Example 1. The following argument claims that a parcel P is in a location L2 after
being pushed to this location, because the location is free and the parcel is reachable.
The argument has been constructed using the axiom
At(p, l,do(a,s))–≺a = push(p, l),Free(l,s),Reachable(p,s);At(p, l,s),a 6= push(p, l′)
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Free(L2, S0) Reachable(P, S0)
At(P, L2, do(push(R, P, L2), S0))






This argument can be represented as the following tree:
The tree is organised in levels. The top level is level 0, which contains the argument’s
claim. Odd-numbered levels contain defeasible rules. Even-numbered levels represent
the literals that are used to derive the argument’s claim. The literals on the same level
refer to the same situation. The leafs of the tree are beliefs derived using presumptions
or default negated literals.
3.3.6.2 Attacks
Arguments generated from a contradictory theory may present contradicting claims.
Such arguments are linked through the attack relation. The definition of the attack
relation is based on the notion of a sub-argument.
Definition 20. The argument 〈B1,h1〉 attacks 〈B2,h2〉 at literal h3 iff there exists a
subargument 〈B3,h3〉 of 〈B2,h2〉 such that h1 is the negation of h3.
The attack relation between the attacker and the attacked sub-argument is symmet-
ric. It provides no grounds for the resolution of ties between arguments attacking each
other. Consider, for instance, two arguments claiming contradicting beliefs about the
initial state. These arguments mutually attack each other. If there exist no other attack-
ers to resolve this tie, the conflict cannot be resolved. As a result, depending on the
employed argumentation semantics we need to either accept both or none of the claims.
Therefore, the result is either having to deal with uncertainty in the planning domain,
or synthesise weak plans whose success is suggested by contradictory evidence.
In order to overcome this issue, we inspect the internal structure of arguments,
while trying to identify whether there are grounds for preferring one over the other.
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Relying on a preference ordering over arguments is a common approach in the liter-
ature (Prakken and Sartor, 1997; Amgoud and Cayrol, 1998). Alternative approaches
have also been proposed for aggregating information about preferences (Amgoud et al.,
2000b; Brewka, 2001).
The defeat relation builds on the attack relation by taking the preference of the
conflicting arguments into account. Informally, an argument defeats another argument
if the first argument attacks the second argument, and has a higher preference than the
sub-argument that is directly attacked.
Definition 21. Argument b defeats argument b′ iff:
• b attacks b′ at its sub-argument b′′, and
• pref (b)≥ pref (b′′).
In order to take preference orderings into account, we compare the preference value
of the attacker with the one of the sub-argument that is directly attacked. The reason
for this is that the preference of the complete argument is determined by its other sub-
arguments as well, which are irrelevant to the attack. Consider an argument that makes
a claim about a literal after applying to actions in the initial situation. Also, assume
that the claim is supported by an initial situation belief and that there is an attack
exactly against this belief. It is obvious that in order to determine whether the attacker
defeats the argument we only need to take information regarding the initial situation
into account, since anything related to future situations should not bias the strength of
the initial situation belief that is attacked.
The notion of argument preference is used in the literature as a tie-breaking mecha-
nism, when there is no reason to prefer one argument over another. Multiple ways have
been proposed to provide the means for measuring argument preference (e.g. gener-
alised specificity (Simari and Loui, 1992), the weakest link (Pollock, 2001), and the
last link (Prakken and Sartor, 1997) principles). These are usually based on structural
characteristics of the arguments, as for example the number of derivation steps nec-
essary to reach the argument’s claim, or on preference orderings over the beliefs that
support these arguments. The specification of the preference ordering mechanism is
usually a domain specific way to fine-tune the system.
Our methods are generic with respect to a specification of the preference order-
ing among arguments. In the following analysis, we outline a simple definition of
preference relation based on a preference ordering over beliefs and the weakest link
Chapter 3. Multi-Perspective Cooperative Planning 74
principle. If such information is not available, the defeat relation is equivalent to the
attack relation.
Definition 22. Let pref be a function which given a belief returns an integer, and
assume that it is instantiated for every belief in the knowledge base. The preference
value of an argument a is the lowest preference value of a belief in its support set,
pref (a) = minφ∈Support(a) pref (φ).
More elaborate preference calculation mechanisms can be developed by focusing
on domain specific characteristics of individual theories. For instance, if an agent is
aware that the frame parts of the successor state axioms in the theory do not correctly
reflect the actions responsible for changing the value of the literal, it is useful to fine-
tune the defeat relations so that conclusions reached through the effect part of axioms
are preferred to conclusions reached using the frame part of the axioms.
Usually, preference values are used to represent the credibility of the beliefs. De-
pending on the modelled domain, these values may denote (or aggregate) notions like:
• Authority: In situations in which different agents have different roles.
• Capabilities: For instance, the preference values of axioms regarding the effects
of an action are higher for the agent executing this action.
• Number of conditions: More refined axioms are more credible. For example,
the more conditions on a conditional effect, the more credible the axiom, un-
der the rationale that agents without specialised knowledge may hold a generic
specification of the action.
• Timestamps on beliefs coming from observations: The newer the better.
• Learning from experience: Past execution failures reduce credibility.
• Preference over types of axioms: For example, derivations made using the effect
part are stronger than those made using the frame part.
We assume that the agents agree on the way preference orderings are calculated (e.g.
weakest link or generalised specificity). However, we do not consider that belief
preference values are shared. Nevertheless, agents must accept the preference val-
ues presented by their peers. This assumption follows from the cooperative nature of
MPCP. For example, consider a scenario in which agent i has reasons to beliefs that
Light(L1,S0) holds with a preference value of x, and agent j has reasons to believe that
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the same predicate holds, and has a preference value of y for this belief. Assume that
in this case preferences are based on the time an observation was made. Both agents
accept the information of their peers, and form two arguments claiming Light(L1,S0),
with different preference values x and y. Obviously, removing the argument with the
lowest preference will not affect the warrant results that are reached from the theory.
Therefore, maintaining both arguments is not necessary in practice, since agents can
always only use the highest preference value that is available for a believe.
3.3.6.3 Warrants
Argumentation theory provides theoretical tools for defining the notion of acceptability
in terms of arguments. Abstract argumentation methods define concrete acceptability
semantics by looking at arguments at an abstract level, disregarding their internal struc-
ture, and focusing exclusively on the defeat relations between them.
Different argumentation semantics (Baroni and Giacomin, 2009) can be used in
conjunction with our framework to define the notion of acceptability. Here, for sim-
plicity, we employ grounded (sceptical) acceptability semantics. Grounded semantics
impose a strict notion of acceptability to statements and plans that are warranted from
a domain theory, since it requires every acceptable argument to be defended by a set
of arguments, which does not include itself.
With this, we define the notion of warrant for ground literals. The notion of warrant
is twofold, it requires the existence of a defeasible derivation that forms an argument,
and that this argument is defended against every potential defeat.
Definition 23. Suppose a DBAT D and the corresponding argumentation framework
AF = 〈Args,Defs〉, for every argument that can be constructed from ground(D,S), for
any ground situation term S. Let GEAF, the grounded extension of AF. Any ground
literal L(S) is warranted from ground(D,S), denoted ground(D,S) |≈L(S), if and only
if there exists an argument A ∈ Args, with Claim(A) = L(S), such that A ∈ GEAF.
Note that in the special case that L is a non-fluent symbol, the grounding is preformed
only for situation S0.
The number of ground situation terms is infinite as each situation represents a dif-
ferent history (i.e. sequence of actions). Therefore, even if there is a finite number of
actions in the domain, grounding the theory for all situations will result in an infinite
set. If we focus on a grounded situation term the ground theory remains finite if the
axioms and the objects in the domain are finite.
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Similar to defeasible derivations, the warrant results in DBATs are not affected by
grounding the theory with respect to successor situation terms. This proposition asserts
that warrant results for a plan π are also relevant to every plan extending π.
Proposition 5. Assume a defeasible basic action theory D , and two ground situation
terms Sk and Sl such that Sk is predecessor of Sl . For every ground situation term Si
and every ground fluent literal L, if ground(D,Sk) |≈L(Si) then ground(D,Sl) |≈L(Si).
Proof. Definition 16 states that all ground defeasible basic action theories include all
axioms grounded for all combinations of ground terms that respect the expressed equal-
ities and inequalities. The ground theories ground(D,Sl) and ground(D,Sk) have been
grounded with exactly the same constants, apart from the additional situation terms
that are successor to Sk and predecessor or equal to Sl . Therefore, ground(D,Sk) ⊂
ground(D,Sl). ground(D,Sk) |≈L(Si) entails that there exists an argument α claim-
ing L(Si) and that this argument can be defended against every defeater. Every ar-
gument that can be constructed from ground(D,Sk) can also be constructed from
ground(D,Sl). Also, every argument that can be constructed from ground(D,Sl), but
not from ground(D,Sk), does not defeat α, since its conclusion refers to a situation that
is successor to Sk. As as result, if ground(D,Sk) |≈L(Si) then ground(D,Sl) |≈L(Si).
For readability purposes, we write D |≈L(S) to represent ground(D,S) |≈L(S). Over-
loading of the warrant does not lead to inconsistencies, since every other potential
grounding extending ground(D,S) leads to the same results.
Proposition 6. Assume a defeasible basic action theory D , and a ground situation
term S. If ground(D,S) |≈L(S), there does not exist S′ such that ground(D,S) ∪
ground(D,S′) |6≈L(S).
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Assume that there exists S′ such that ground(D,S)∪
ground(D,S′) |6≈L(S). Let the set ArgsL(S) be the subset of the arguments that can be
constructed from ground(D,S), such that it contains every argument claiming L(S),
their defeaters, the defeaters of their defeaters, etc. There exists no argument that
can be constructed from the beliefs in ground(D,S′), which does not already exist in
ArgsL(S), and defeats an argument in ArgsL(S). This is the case, since every belief from
ground(D,S′) that does not exist in ground(D,S) refers to a situation term that does
not appear in the arguments in ArgsL(S). As a result, ground(D,S′) is irrelevant to the
warrant status of L(S).
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Grounded semantics assert that the warrant relation is contradiction-free.
Proposition 7. Suppose a defeasible action theory D and a ground predicate L(S). If
D |≈L(S) then D |6≈L(S).
Proof. If D |≈L(S) and D |≈L(S), there exist two arguments aL(S) and aL(S) with
Claim(aL(S)) = L(S) and Claim(aL) = L(S), which are both part of the grounded exten-
sion of the argumentation framework containing all arguments that can be constructed
from ground(D,S). This is impossible, since the grounded extension of an argumen-
tation framework is conflict-free (Dung, 1995).
The notion of warrant is extended to conjunctive statements. For any ground literal
predicates L1,L2, . . . ,Ln we write:
D |≈L1,L2, . . . ,Ln if and only if D |≈L1,D |≈L2, . . . , and D |≈Ln .
This is essential for formalising the notion of plan acceptability, which entails that
every action of the plan is executable and that the goal is achieved. An alternative
solution without extending the warrant relation would require the addition of rules
specifying the requirements for the acceptability of a plan. Due to the limitations of
the expressive power of the formalism, this would need to be done for every situation
and goal.
3.3.6.4 Warranted Plans
A warranted plan is a sequence of actions if the beliefs that every action can be exe-
cuted in sequence and that the goal is achieved in the resulting situation are warranted.
Definition 24. Suppose a defeasible action theory D , and let AF = 〈Args,Defs〉 be
the argumentation framework for all arguments that can be constructed from D , and
GEAF its grounded extension. Let the expression G1, . . . ,Gm be the shared goal of the
agents. The sequence of actions π = A1,A2, . . . ,An is a warranted plan if and only if:
D |≈Poss(A1,S0),Poss(A2,S1), . . . ,Poss(An,Sn−1),G1(Sn), . . . ,Gm(Sn) ,
where Si = do(A1,Si−1) denotes the situation resulting from the application of action
Ai to the predecessor situation Si−1.
We use terms warranted and acceptable plan interchangeably.
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3.4 Axiomatising Planning Domains
This section discusses important issues related to the process of encoding planning do-
mains in the form of DBATs. We focus on the internal structure of defeasible successor
state axioms that is required to represent planning operators, and explain how MPCP
problems can be expressed as DBATs.
3.4.1 Encoding Defeasible Successor State Axioms
Basic action theories restrict the form of axioms, especially with respect to the sit-
uation terms that appear within the axioms. However, they do not impose a specific
internal structure on the bodies of the rules. In order to axiomatise planning domains as
DBATs, we need to impose additional structure. This structure must account for both
the effect, and the frame information that describes under which conditions literals re-
main unaffected by the application of actions. Successor state axioms are compound
rules that incorporate defeasible effect and frame axioms.
3.4.1.1 Defeasible Effect Axioms
We describe how effect axioms are encoded using the following example. Consider the
operator switch on(l), with the conditional effect 〈{Plugged(l)},Lit(l)〉. This effect
states that we have reasons to believe that a lamp is lit, after performing the switch on
operator, if we have reasons to believe that it is plugged to a power source. This effect
is encoded by the following defeasible rule:
Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺a = switch on,Plugged(l,s).
Multiple conditional effects from different specifications that produce the same effect
literal are written within the same axiom using disjunction. The following axiom adds
an effect from a different specification stating that we have reason to believe that a
lamp is lit if, after performing the switch on operator, if we have reasons to believe
that it is not broken:
Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺a = switch on,Plugged(l,s);a = switch on,∼Broken(l,b,s).
Obviously, without additional domain-specific knowledge, the agents cannot reach the
conclusion that the specification of both effects is incomplete, and a complete specifi-
cation can be achieved by combining the two.
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Every conditional effect for an operator A of the form 〈{C1,C2, . . . ,Cn},L〉 in an
agent’s specification corresponds to a defeasible effect axiom of the form:
L(do(a,s))–≺a = A,C1(s),C2(s), . . . ,Cn(s) .
Defeasible effect axioms that produce the same literal can be combined in a single
axiom: L(do(a,s))–≺γL(s), where γL(s) abbreviates the disjunction of the bodies of all
relevant effect axioms. For the previous example, we write Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺γLit(l,s),
where γLit(l,s) abbreviates the expression a = switch on,Plugged(l,s);a = switch on,
∼Broken(l,b,s).
3.4.1.2 Defeasible Frame Axioms
Constructing a defeasible frame axiom is a more complicated process. The frame
axiom encodes that we have reasons to believe that a literal holds after the application
of an action a in a situation s, if it holds in the previous situation, and every conditional
effect producing its complements is inapplicable. Consider for instance the following
frame axiom produced for the first specification of the previous example:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),not(a = switch on,Plugged(l,s)).
This axiom states that we have reasons to believe that the lamp is not lit after the
application of a in s, if we have indications that it is not lit in s and it is not the case
that a is the action of switching on the lamp or l is not plugged in the power source.
Accordingly, the frame axiom for the second operator specification is the following:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),not(a = switch on,∼ Broken(l,b,s)).
We encode one frame axiom for each operator specification, since every specification
implicitly states not only what changes due to the application of the action, but also
what remains the same. All effect and frame axioms referring to the same fluent literal
are combined within one successor state axiom. This axiom needs to be transformed
to disjunctive normal form following the specification of defeasible rules.
The frame axiom for a literal L has the following form:
L(do(a,s))–≺L(s),not(γL(s)) ,
where γL(s) abbreviates the body of the compound effect axiom that is encoded from
the agent’s theory for the complement of literal L.
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3.4.1.3 Well Formed Defeasible Frame Axioms
The structure of defeasible axioms only allows default negation immediately preceding
fluent literals. This is not the case in the aforementioned form as γL(s) may consist of
multiple effects and conditions. To produce a well-formed axiom we transform the
axioms in a fashion similar to the Lloyd-Topor rules (Reiter, 2001). We present the
axiom L–≺body, in the form L–≺ψ,φ,ψ′, where any one of ψ and ψ′ may be missing.
1. Replace L–≺ψ,not(φ2;φ3),ψ′ by
L–≺ψ,not φ2,not φ3,ψ′.
2. Replace L–≺ψ,not(φ2,φ3),ψ′ by
L–≺ψ,(not φ2;not φ3),ψ′.
3. Replace L–≺ψ,not(a = A),ψ′ by
L–≺ψ,a 6= A,ψ′
4. Replace L–≺ψ,(φ2;φ3),ψ′ by
L–≺ψ,φ2,ψ′ and L–≺ψ,φ2,ψ′.
5. Replace every rule of the form L–≺φi, where φi is a conjunction of (possibly
default negated) literals, equalities and inequalities with the rule L–≺∧∀i φi.
The first two transformations assert that the default negation symbol appears only be-
fore fluent literals. The third rule simplifies the resulting axiom from disjunctions.
Its application generates a set of axioms for each head L, whose body consists of a
conjunction of literals. The final rule integrates these into a single defeasible axiom.
The axiom resulting after the application of these rules to an axiom of the form
L(do(a,s))–≺L(s),not(γL(s)) is a well formed defeasible axiom. This is the case,
since default negation appears in the resulting axiom only before fluent literals, and
the body of the rules is either a conjunction of literals, equalities and inequalities, or a
disjunction of multiple conjunctions, equalities and inequalities.
For effects with at most one condition, the application of the transformation is
straightforward. Consider the frame axiom from the previous example:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),not((a = switch on,Plugged(l,s));
(a = switch on,∼Broken(l,b,s)) .
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After the application of the first transformation rule we have:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),(not(a = switch on,Plugged(l,s)),
not(a = switch on,∼Broken(l,b,s)) .
We apply the second transformation and rewrite the expression as follows:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),(not(a = switch on);not Plugged(l,s)),
(not(a = switch on);not∼Broken(l,b,s)) .
The third rule transforms default negated equalities to inequalities:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),(a 6= switch on;not Plugged(l,s)),
(a 6= switch on,not∼Broken(l,b,s)) .
The application of the fourth rule simplifies the axiom:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),a 6= switch on,a 6= switch on
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),a 6= switch on,not∼Broken(l,b,s)
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),not Plugged(l,s),a 6= switch on
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),not Plugged(l,s),not∼Broken(l,b,s) .
Finally, the fifth rule combines the above into one frame axiom:
∼Lit(l,do(a,s))–≺∼Lit(l,s),a 6= switch on,a 6= switch on;
∼Lit(l,s),a 6= switch on,not∼Broken(l,b,s);
∼Lit(l,s),not Plugged(l,s),a 6= switch on;
∼Lit(l,s),not Plugged(l,s),not∼Broken(l,b,s) .
The resulting frame axiom for ∼Lit requires that either none of the actions producing
Lit applied, or that if one is applied, at least one of its conditions are not warranted.
Observation 1. Let an action A that produces L under conditions C . Either a 6= A or
∼C, with C ∈ C , appears in every disjunct in the body of the frame axiom for L.
3.4.1.4 Default Negation in Defeasible Frame Axioms
The frame axiom specification is based on default negation preceding the conditions
of the contradicting effects. If we use normal negation instead, we need to be able to
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derive all conditions in the body of the rule in order to make a derivation using this
frame axiom. For instance, consider the first frame axiom from the previous example,
grounded for lamp l = L1 and situation S1 = do(switch on,S0):
∼Lit(L1,S1)–≺∼Lit(L1,S0),∼Plugged(L1,S0).
If there is no defeasible derivation for ∼Plugged(L1,S0), then we cannot construct
a defeasible derivation for ∼Lit(L1,S1) using this frame axiom. This situation causes
problems when there is uncertainty about the domain. If for example DS0 =
{∼Lit(L1,S0)–≺}, and Dss contains the first specification from the above example,
then D |6∼∼Lit(L1,S1) and D |6∼Lit(L1,S1), since both rules are inapplicable as
{Plugged(L1,S0)–≺,∼Plugged(L1,S0)–≺}∩S0 = /0.
On the contrary, consider the same frame axiom with default negation preceding
contradictory effects, grounded for lamp l = L1 and situation S1 = do(switch on,S0):
∼Lit(L1,S1)–≺∼Lit(L1,S0),not Plugged(L1,S0).
If D |6∼∼Lit(L1,S0) then D |6∼∼Lit(L1,S1), since following the semantics of default
negation in DeLP, default negated literals are treated as assumptions. The burden
of evaluating these assumptions is shifted to the argumentation phase. Essentially,
if there exists an undefeated argument claiming Plugged(L1,S0) the assumption is re-
futed. Otherwise, and if D |≈∼Lit(L1,S0), then D |≈∼Lit(L1,S1).
3.4.1.5 Defeasible Successor State Axioms
For every operator specification and fluent literal, we construct one defeasible succes-
sor state axiom, by combining the effect and frame axioms described above. For literal
L this takes the following form:
L(do(a,s))–≺γL(s);φL(s) ,
where φL(s) denotes the body of the well formed defeasible frame axiom after the
application of the necessary transformations.
3.4.2 Encoding MPCP Problems as DBATs
In this section, we consider how derivations made from MPCP problems relate to in-
ferences from DBATs. In the general case, the two formalisms do not necessarily lead
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to equivalent conclusions. The major difference between these reasoning mechanisms
is outlined by a special case illustrated in the following example.
Consider a MPCP problem with two operators plug and switch on, such that the
first has the effect 〈{¬Cut},Plugged〉 and the second has the effect 〈{Plugged},Lit〉.
Let the initial state I = {Cut,¬Cut,¬Lit}. Projecting the plan 〈plug,switch on〉 leads
to calculating the following states:
σ1 = γ(plug, I) = {Cut,¬Cut,¬Lit,Plugged}, and
σ2 = γ(switch on,σ1) = {Cut,¬Cut,Plugged,Lit}.
The uncertainty regarding the predicate Plugged in the initial state leads to having
reasons to believe that Plugged holds in σ1. However, since ¬Plugged /∈ I, we do
not have reasons to believe that ¬Plugged holds in σ1, even though we have reasons to
believe that the effect of the operator plug may not be applicable. As a result ¬Lit /∈ σ2.
The specification of successor state axioms described in the previous section treats
uncertainty differently. Consider the same domain written as the DBAT D . The set
of initial situation axioms contains the rules: Cut –≺, ∼Cut –≺, and ∼Lit –≺. The
following successor state axioms are encoded:
Plugged(do(a,s))–≺a = plug,∼Cut(s),
Lit(do(a,s))–≺a = switch on,Plugged(s), and
∼Lit(do(a,s))–≺∼Lit,not(a = switch on,Plugged(s)).
For the derivation of∼Lit(S2), where S2 = do(switch on,S1) and S1 = do(plug,S1) we
construct the following arguments:
α = 〈{∼Lit(S0)–≺,∼Lit(S1)–≺∼Lit(S0),
∼Lit(S2)–≺∼Lit(S1), not Plugged(S1)},∼Lit(S2)〉 ,
β = 〈{∼Cut(S0)–≺,Plugged(S1)–≺∼Cut(S0)},Plugged(S1)〉, and
α′ = 〈{Cut(S0)–≺},Cut(S0)〉.
The argument β attacks the assumption not Plugged(S1) of argument α, and argument
α′ attacks the premises ∼Cut(S0) of argument β. If α′ has higher preference than β,
then α is acceptable and D |≈∼Lit(S2).
The above example shows a case in which the defeasible mechanism leads to in-
ferences that cannot be made by the set-theoretic notation. This situation arises due
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to the initial uncertainty with respect to the predicate Plugged. The defeasible rea-
soning mechanism using the default negation makes the assumption not Plugged(S1),
although D |∼Plugged(S1) and D |6∼∼Plugged(S1). Then, since the argument attack-
ing the assumption is itself defeated, the assumption is defended and argument α is
acceptable.
3.4.2.1 MPCP with Incomplete Initial States
The problematic situation illustrated by the previous example is caused by the inter-
action of incompleteness and ambiguity. In order to be able to overcome this issue
we transform incompleteness to ambiguity. This can be accomplished in two ways:
changing the planning theory, or altering the state transition function.
The MPCP problem with incomplete initial states can be transformed to problems
with complete initial states by simply adding to the initial state I both literals L and L
for every ground literal L, if neither L or L is part of I. If preference-based measures
are used, we assign a minimum preference value to the introduced literals.
Alternatively, we can utilise an alternative state transition function specification
which transforms incompleteness to ambiguity. The problematic situations arise when
we calculate the successor state, for literals which we have no information about. For
example, consider the effect 〈C,L〉 of an action A. If both L and L are not part of state
σ, then, if there exists at least one uncertain condition in C ∈C such that both C and
C is part of σ, we must introduce both L and L to γ(A,σ). L is introduced due to the
conditional effect, whereas L is introduced because the applicability of the effect is
ambiguous and there is uncertainty regarding L and L in σ.
Altering the state transition function leads to a specification that is significantly
different from the “classical” definition. As a result, and in order to be able to utilise
already existing systems with minor modifications, we focus on translating incom-
pleteness in the initial states of the planning domain theory to ambiguity.
3.4.2.2 Initial State Completeness Assumption
We introduce the assumption that there is no incompleteness in the initial state of the
planning domain. This does not imply that the initial state is unambiguous.
Assumption 1. Let a MPCP problem P= 〈N,F, I,O,G〉. The initial state I is complete
if for every ground literal L in Fc, it holds that {L,L}∩ I 6= /0.
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If there is no incompleteness in the initial state of the planning problem, then there is
no incompleteness in any state of domain.
Proposition 8. Consider a MPCP problem P = 〈N,F, I,O,G〉, and let there be no
incompleteness in the initial state I. It is always the case that L ∈ σk or L ∈ σk, where
σk is the state reached by a plan 〈a1, . . . ,ak〉.
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of the plan k.
(Base case) k = 0. Holds from proposition hypothesis.
(Induction step) We assume that it holds for k = n and we need to show that it holds
for k = n+1.
Proof by contradiction. We assume that for some literal L:
L /∈ σn+1 (A) and L /∈ σn+1 (B).
From (A)⇒ L /∈ σn (A1) and there is no applicable effect producing L (A2) or
there is no applicable effect producing L (A3).
From (B)⇒ L /∈ σn (B1) and there is no applicable effect producing L (B2) or
there is no applicable effect producing L (B3).
So (A) and (B)⇒ ((A1) and (A2) or A3) and ((B1) and (B2) or B3)⇒
(A1 and A2 and B1 and B2) (i) or (A3 and B1 and B2) (ii) or (A1 and A2 and
B3) (iii) or (A3 and B2) (iv).
If (i) then A1⇒ L /∈ σn and B2⇒ L /∈ σn, which refutes the derivation step.
(ii) is impossible since A3 and B2 contradict each other.
(iii) is impossible since A2 and B3 contradict each other.
If (iv) then from the induction step’s assumption L ∈ σn or L ∈ σn. On the one
hand, if L ∈ σn, from B3 we have that L ∈ σn+1. On the other, if L ∈ σn, from
A3 we have that L ∈ σn+1. In any case, L ∈ σn+1 or L ∈ σn+1, contradicting the
assumption L /∈ σn+1 (A) and L /∈ σn+1.
We can exploit the initial state completeness assumption to simplify the definition of
the individual agent’s state transition function γi. The second condition of γi details
that a fluent literal is unaffected by the application of an action, if for every conditional
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effect producing the complement of this literal, there exists a condition C of this effect
that is either not part of the state, or that its complement C is part of the state.
Due to the completeness of the initial state, every successor state is also complete.
As a result, for every condition C, if C is not part of the state σ, we can infer that
C ∈ σ. Accordingly, we simplify the individual state transition function specification
when used in conjunction with domains without initial state incompleteness as follows:
Definition 25. Consider agent i and the individual planning problem Pi = 〈F, Ii,Oi,G〉.
Let a ground action 〈prei(a),a,eff i(a)〉 ∈ ground(Oi) for which there is evidence sug-
gesting that it is applicable in state σ. The state transition function γ must assert that
e ∈ γ(a,σ) if and only if:
1. there exists an effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a) and C ⊆ σ, or
2. e∈ σ and for every conditional effect 〈C,e〉 ∈ eff i(a), there exists c∈C such that
c ∈ σ.
3.4.2.3 Translation Mechanism
This section describes a translation mechanism for encoding multi-perspective coop-
erative planning problems in the form of defeasible basic action theories. Consider a
MPCP problem P = 〈N,F, I,O,G〉.
The objects and the variables of the planning domain correspond to the ground and
unground terms of sort object of the defeasible basic action theory.
Dc = Lc
Planning operator names correspond to action functions in basic action theories.
Duna = {o = o | 〈pre,o,eff 〉 ∈ O}∪{o1 6= o2 | 〈pre,o1,eff 〉,〈pre,o2,eff 〉 ∈ O and
o1 has a different name or arity from o2}
Planning domain predicates correspond to fluents in the basic action with an additional
final argument of sort situation. For instance, the planning domain predicate Light(loc)
corresponds to the fluent predicate Light(loc,s). For simplicity we do not differentiate
between fluent and non-fluent predicates, since this distinction is not explicit in MPCP
problems. If the complexity of the domain demands this distinction, we can identify
non-fluent predicates by inspecting the operators and searching for predicates that do
not appear in the effects of any action.
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The initial state axioms correspond to the initial state of the planning domain. Ev-
ery fluent that holds in the initial state corresponds to a predicate that holds in the initial
situation.
DS0 = {L[S0]–≺ | L ∈ I}
We use notation φ[s] to denote the formula obtained from substituting all fluent pred-
icates L(~x) appearing in φ with predicate L(~x,s), which has s as an additional final
argument. Also, in order to account for the different notation, the negation symbol ¬
is replaced by the symbol ∼.
Defeasible action precondition axioms are constructed from the preconditions de-
fined in the action specifications. For every operator o we create one action precondi-
tion axiom. The left-hand side of the axiom is the predicate Poss(o,s). The right hand
side of the axiom comprises of a sequence of disjuncts, with each disjunct being the








For example, given two specifications of the action switch on(l) for agents 1 and 2
such that pre1(switch on(l)) = {reachable(l),¬broken(l)} and pre2(switch on(l)) =
{powered(l)}, we construct the following defeasible action precondition axiom:
Poss(switch on(l),s)–≺reachable(l,s),∼broken(l);powered(l) .






C[s] | for every operator o} .
Defeasible successor state axioms have the structure discussed in Section 3.4.1:
L(do(a,s))–≺γL(s);φL(s) ,
Contrary to planning operator schemata, DBATs do not maintain a link between defea-
sible action precondition axioms and defeasible successor state axioms. As a result, if
we have different specifications for the same action and one of them leads to the con-
clusion that the action is applicable, we infer that the resulting situation is executable.
In order to be able to preserve the link between preconditions and effects in an oper-
ator specification we must be able to utilise only the successor state axioms that were
created from the specifications which suggest that the action is applicable. To this end,
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we incorporate the preconditions defined in every specification into the corresponding
successor state axiom in the form of additional conditions in the operators’ conditional
effects. As a result, the effects are applicable, only in situations in which the action
preconditions hold.
Let a MPCP problem P. The DBAT constructed using the above mechanism is
called the corresponding DBAT for P. Next, we specify an important assumption that
is necessary to illustrate the correctness of the translation mechanism.
3.4.2.4 DBATs with Complete Initial States
The initial state completeness assumption carries over defeasible basic action theories.
Consider a DBAT D . D has a consistent initial state if for every ground fluent literal
L, it holds that either D |∼L(S0) or D |∼L(S0). The logical disjunction in the previous
statement is not exclusive. It may be the case that both D |∼L(S0) and D |∼L(S0) hold.
The following lemma outlines the effect of the initial state completeness assump-
tion on defeasible derivations and warrants made with a DBAT whose initial situation
rules contain only presumptions (i.e. rules of the form: L(S0)–≺).
Proposition 9. Consider a DBAT D with complete initial state whose initial situation
rules contain only presumptions. Let Sk a ground situation term, and L a fluent literal.
If D |6≈L(Sk) then D |∼L(Sk).
Proof. Proof by induction on situation term Sk.
(Base case) k = 0. From the hypothesis that the initial state is complete it holds
that D |∼L(S0) or D |∼L(S0). Since, D |6≈L(S0), it is either the case that D |6∼L(S0)
or D |∼L(S0) and there is an argument defeating the argument corresponding to the
derivation of L(S0). This is only possible if D |∼L(S0). In any case, D |∼L(S0).
(Induction step) We assume that it holds for k = n and we need to show that it holds
for k = n+1. Proof by contradiction.
Assume that for every literal L it holds that D |6≈L(Sn+1) and D |6∼L(Sn+1) (1).
From (1), it holds that D |6∼L(Sn) (2) and for every effect rule
L(Sn+1)–≺C1(Sn), . . . ,Cm(Sn) there exists l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that D |6∼C(Sn)
(3).
From (2) and the induction step, it holds that D |≈L(Sn) (4).
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From (4) and because warrant requires the existence of a corresponding deriva-
tion, it holds that D |∼L(Sn). Also, the DBAT contains a successor state axiom
for every literal, and the corresponding ground frame rule for literal L has the
form L(Sn+1)–≺L(Sn),notC′1(Sn), . . . ,notC′1(Sm′). Since a defeasible deriva-
tion does not require the derivation of literals preceded by default negation, from
D |∼L(Sn) we derive that D |∼L(Sn+1) (5).
From (3) we derive that there exists a ground frame axiom with head LSn+1 for
which there is no attack on every condition in its body preceded by default nega-
tion. This is the case since every such axiom describes in its body a sequence of
conditions, whose absence causes every effect producing the complement of the
literal in the body of the frame axiom not to be applicable (6).
As a result, there exists an argument claiming L(Sn+1) (from (5)), whose premises
cannot be defeated (from (4) and (6)) and whose conclusion cannot be defeated
(1).
Therefore, this contradicts the assumption that D |6≈L(Sn+1), proving the lemma.
A corollary of the previous proposition is that for every such DBAT D , literal L and
ground situation term S, it is either the case that D |∼L(S) or D |∼L(S).
3.4.2.5 Relating Candidate and Warranted Plans
This section connects the conclusions made using the defeasible and the set-theoretic
planning formalisms. We show that every warranted plan is a candidate plan. This ob-
servation is useful in restricting the application of the complex argumentation process
to candidate plans.
First of all, we show that defeasible derivations in defeasible basic action theo-
ries are strictly more relaxed than the corresponding derivations made using the state
transition function. The reason behind this is the use of default negation in successor
state axioms. Default negation is interpreted as an assumption, and shifts the burden of
evaluating these assumptions to the argumentation mechanism. As a result, derivations
with arbitrary assumptions, which are later disqualified in the argumentation phase, are
made. Consider the following example.
Example 2. The successor state axiom Lit(do(a,s))–≺Lit(s),(a 6= switch off ;a =
switch off ,not Working Switch(s)) describes an operator specification in which the
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predicate Lit is negatively affected by flipping the light’s switch, if the switch is func-
tioning correctly. Assume that, for DBAT D and a ground situation S, we derive that
D |∼Working Switch(S) and D |6∼∼Working Switch(S). D |∼Lit(do(switch off ,S)) is
a valid derivation if D |∼Lit(S). Obviously, the argument corresponding to the later
derivation is defeated by a counterargument based on the derivation of
Working Switch(S).
The state transition function γ has an ambiguity propagating nature both with respect
to inertia and effect conditions. Consider the previous example, and the case in which
there is ambiguity regarding the predicate Working Switch in a state σ (meaning that
{Working Switch,¬Working Switch} ⊆ σ). There is also ambiguity in the successor
state σ′ regarding the predicate Lit (meaning that {Lit,¬Lit} ⊆ σ′). As a result, as-
sumptions that will be defended in the argumentation phase with counterarguments
attacking the defeating arguments’ support, are also derived using the state transition
function, exactly due to ambiguity in the support.
Proposition 10. Consider a MPCP problem P= 〈N,F, I,O,G〉, and the corresponding
DBAT D = 〈Dss,Dap,DS0,Duna,Dc〉. Also, let a possibly empty sequence of actions
〈A1, . . . ,Ak〉. σk = γ(〈A1, . . . ,Ak〉, I) is the state reached after performing these actions,
and Sk = do([A1, . . . ,Ak],S0) is the corresponding situation for the application of this
action sequence. For every ground predicate literal L, if L ∈ σk, then it holds that
D |∼L(Sk).
Proof. The proof is based on induction on the length of the plan k.
(Base case) k = 0. From the proposition hypothesis we have that L(~X) ⊆ σk. As a
result, according to the MPCP problem to DBAT translation mechanism, it holds that
L(S0)–≺ ∈DS0 . Therefore, D |∼L(S0).
(Induction step) We assume that the proposition holds for a plan of length n, and we
show that it holds for a plan of length n+ 1. To do so, we need to show that if L ⊆
σn+1, where σn+1 = γ(〈A1, . . . ,An+1〉, I), then it holds that D |∼L(Sn+1), where Sn+1 =
do([A1, . . . ,An+1],S0). L⊆ σn+1 may be the case either due to an effect of action An+1
or inertia.
1. If L is added in σn+1 as an effect of an action, then there exists an agent i ∈ N
with prei(An+1) ⊆ σn, and there exists an effect 〈C ,L〉 ∈ eff i(An+1) such that
C ⊆ σn, where state σn = γ(〈A1, . . . ,An〉, I).
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From the assumption of the induction step, it holds that for every C∈ prei(An+1)∪
C it is the case that D |∼C(Sn), where Sn = do([A1, . . . ,An],S0).
From the translation mechanism and the grounding process we know that





Therefore, as there exists a defeasible derivation for every condition in the body
of the rule, D |∼L(Sn+1).
2. If L is part of σn+1 due to inertia, then it must be the case that L is also part of
σn.
From the assumption of the induction step, we derive that:
L ∈ σn⇒D |∼L(Sn) .
From the translation mechanism of MPCP problems into DBATs and the ground-
ing process, we know that ground(D,Sn+1) contains a frame axiom of the fol-
lowing form (Observation 1):
L(Sn+1)–≺L(Sn),notC1(Sn), . . . ,notCm(Sn) .
In the special case in which there is no specification of An+1 which contains an
effect producing L, the ground defeasible frame axiom takes the form:
L(Sn+1)–≺L(Sn) .
In any case, since D |∼L(S) and if any other literals appear in the body of the
rule are assumptions, we conclude that D |∼L(Sn+1).
In order to ensure the correctness of the translation mechanism, defeasible derivations
made from DBATs with complete initial states, but which cannot be derived from the
corresponding MPCP problem, must not be warranted. To show that this is the case,
we need the following proposition.
Chapter 3. Multi-Perspective Cooperative Planning 92
Proposition 11. Let a MPCP problem P= 〈N,F, I,O,G〉, and the corresponding DBAT
D = 〈Dss,Dap,DS0 ,Duna,Dc〉, both with complete initial states. Also, let σk =
γ(〈A1, . . . ,Ak〉, I) the state reached after performing the sequence of actions 〈A1, . . . ,
Ak〉, and the corresponding situation Sk = do([A1, . . . ,Ak],S0). For every ground pred-
icate literal L, if L ∈ σk and L /∈ σk, then it holds that D |≈L(Sk).
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of the plan k.
(Base Case) k = 0. From the hypothesis, we have L ∈ σ0 and L /∈ σ0. From the
translation mechanism of MPCP problems to DBATs, we derive that L(S0)–≺ ∈ D ,
L(S0)–≺ /∈ D , and that there is no other defeasible rule in D with head L(S0) or
L(S0). As a result, the argument 〈{L(S0)–≺∈D},L(S0)〉 can be constructed from any
ground instance of the theory, and there exists no defeater for this argument. Therefore,
D |≈L(S0).
(Induction Step) We assume that the proposition holds for k = n. So, for every ground
literal L, if L ∈ σn and L /∈ σn, then it holds that D |≈L(Sn). Next, we show that the
proposition holds for k = n+1. To do so we first explain that L∈σn+1 and L /∈σn+1⇒
D |6≈L(Sn+1) by proving that every argument α claiming L(Sn+1) is defeated. Finally,
we show that L ∈ σn+1 and L /∈ σn+1 ⇒ D |≈L(Sn+1) by differentiating between the
two cases: L ∈ σn and L /∈ σn.
Proof of induction step:
1 Show that D |6≈L(Sn+1) by proving that every argument claiming L(Sn+1) is de-
feated by an acceptable argument which attacks its supporting conditions (and
not its claim). To do so we distinguish between the cases in which the final
derivation step is made using an effect axiom and a frame axiom.
1a Consider the case in which there exists an argument claiming L(Sn+1), in
which the final derivation step is made using an effect axiom.
L /∈ σn+1 entails that in every agent specification there is no effect produc-
ing L that is applicable in σn. Formally:
∀i ∈ N,∀〈CL,L〉 ∈ eff i it holds that ∃CL ∈ CL∪prei such that CL /∈ σn .
From the state completeness assumption and Proposition 8, we have that:
CL /∈ σn⇒CL ∈ σn .
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From the assumption of the induction step, we derive that:
CL /∈ σn and CL ∈ σn⇒D |≈CL .
Using Proposition 7 we infer that
D |≈CL⇒D |6≈CL.
From the MPCP problem to BAT translation mechanism and the grounding





where i∈N is an agent and CL is the set of conditions for an effect 〈CL,L〉 ∈
eff i(An+1).
For every effect axiom with head L(Sn+1), there exists at least one literal
CL in its body that is attacked and not warranted, since its complement is
warranted.
As a result, every argument claiming L(Sn+1), that uses an effect axiom for
the final derivation step, is defeated by an acceptable argument attacking
the conditions of the final derivation step.
1b Consider the case in which there exists an argument claiming L(Sn+1), in
which the final derivation step is made using a frame axiom. There are two
cases: L /∈ σn and L ∈ σn.
• If L /∈ σn, from the state completeness assumption and Proposition 8
we infer that:
L /∈ σn⇒ L ∈ σn .
From the assumption of the induction step we infer that:
L /∈ σn and L ∈ σn⇒D |≈L(Sn) .
Therefore, if L /∈ σn, then every argument which claims L(Sn+1) and
uses a frame axiom for the final derivation step is defeated by an attack
in its condition L(Sn) by an acceptable argument claiming L(Sn).
• If L ∈ σn, and since L /∈ σn+1, we reach the conclusion that every
agent’s specification has an effect producing L which is applicable in
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σn without any ambiguity. Formally:
∀i ∈ N, there exists 〈C ,L〉 ∈ eff i such that ∀C ∈ C ∪prei
it holds that C ∈ σn and C /∈ σn .
From the assumption of the induction step we have that:
C ∈ σn and C /∈ σn⇒D |≈C(Sn) .
Every ground frame axiom for L(Sn+1) has the form:
L(Sn+1)–≺L(Sn),notC1(Sn), . . . ,notCm(Sn) .
A ground frame axiom with head L is constructed for every possible
combination of one condition (including preconditions) per effect pro-
ducing L (Observation 1). Therefore, every frame axiom with head
L(Sn+1) in ground(D,Sn+1) contains one condition C in its body, such
that C ∈ C ∪prei(An+1) . Since, for every such condition C it holds that
D |≈C(Sn), every argument that uses the frame axiom for the deriva-
tion of its conclusions is defeated by an acceptable argument attacking
one of its assumptions.
From (1a) and (1b), we infer that if there exists an argument claiming L(Sn+1),
then this argument is defeated by an acceptable argument attacking its supporting
conditions (and not its claim).
2 Show that D |≈L(Sn+1), by distinguishing between the following cases: L ∈ σn
and L /∈ σn.
2a If L ∈ σn, and since we know from the hypothesis that L /∈ σn+1, we de-
rive that every agent’s specification contains an effect producing L that is
applicable in σn without any ambiguity. Formally:
∀i ∈ N there exists 〈C ,L〉 ∈ eff i(An+1) such that ∀C ∈ C ∪prei(An+1)
it holds that C ∈ σn and C /∈ σn .
From the assumption of the induction step, we have that ∀C∈C ∪prei(An+1):
C ∈ σn and C /∈ σn⇒D |≈C(Sn) .
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From the translation mechanism from MPCP problems to DBATs, and the
grounding process, we know that for any i ∈ N that there exists an axiom





where 〈C ,L〉 ∈ eff i(An+1), and every literal C(Sn) in the body of the rule is
warranted.
Since L ∈ σn+1, there exists a defeasible derivation for L(Sn+1) (Proposi-
tion 10).
As a result, there exists an argument α claiming L(Sn+1), whose final
derivation step is done using an effect axiom, the conditions of which are
all warranted. Also, according to (1), every argument β claiming L(Sn+1) if
defeated by an acceptable argument α′ different from α, since the defeater
does not attack the claim of β. Therefore, α is defended against every de-
feat by acceptable arguments different from itself. As a result, if L ∈ σn,
D |≈L(Sn+1).
2b If L /∈ σn, from the completeness assumption we derive that:
L ∈ σn .
From the induction step’s assumption we have that:
L /∈ σn and L ∈ σn⇒D |≈L(Sn) .
From (1a) we know that for every effect axiom with head L(Sn+1) there
exists at least one literal CL in its body that is attacked and not warranted.
As a result, every argument claiming L(Sn+1), that uses an effect axiom for
the final derivation step, is defeated.
From the MPCP problem to DBAT translation mechanism, and the ground-
ing mechanism, we know that there exists a frame axiom with the form:
L(Sn+1)–≺L(Sn),notC1L, . . . ,notC
m
L ,
whose body contains the default negated literals that are attacked and not
warranted. This is the case, since every frame axiom contains one literal
for each specification and conditional effect that produces the complement
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of the literal in the head of the axiom (Observation 1). Also, since a frame
axiom is produced for every possible combination of conditions, there ex-
ists a ground frame axiom in ground(D,Sn+1) whose every assumption can
be defended against every possible attack.
Therefore, α is defended against every defeat by an acceptable argument
different than itself. As a result, there exists an acceptable argument claim-
ing L(Sn+1), and D |≈L(Sn+1).
From (2a) and (2b) we conclude that: D |≈L(Sn+1) .
Using these results we conclude that if a ground literal with a ground situation term S
is warranted from a DBAT with a corresponding MPCP problem P, then we can derive
from P that this literal is part of the state that corresponds to S.
Proposition 12. Let a MPCP problem P= 〈N,F, I,O,G〉, and the corresponding DBAT
D = 〈Dss,Dap,DS0,Duna,Dc〉, both with complete initial states. Also, let the state
σk = γ(〈A1, . . . ,Ak〉, I) reached after performing the sequence of actions 〈A1, . . . ,Ak〉,
and the corresponding situation Sk = do([A1, . . . ,Ak],S0). For every ground predicate
literal L, if D |≈L(Sk) then L ∈ σk.
Proof. Proof by contradiction.
We assume that (1) D |≈L(Sk) and (2) L /∈ σk hold.
The initial state is complete. So from Proposition 8 we infer that L ∈ σk (3).
From (2), (3), and Proposition 11, it follows that D |≈L(Sk) (4).
From (4) and Proposition 7, we infer that D |6≈L(Sk) (5).
(5) directly contradicts hypothesis (1). As a result, the proposition holds.
Using the above propositions we show that, for every DBAT D that corresponds to a
MPCP problem P, every plan that is warranted from D is a candidate plan for P. This
result illustrates the correctness of the translation mechanism.
Proposition 13. Let a MPCP problem P= 〈N,F, I,O,G〉, and the corresponding DBAT
D = 〈Dss,Dap,DS0 ,Duna,Dc〉, both with complete initial states. Also, let the state σk =
γ(〈A1, . . . ,Ak〉, I) reached after performing the sequence of actions π = 〈A1, . . . ,Ak〉,
and the corresponding situation S j = do([A1, . . . ,A j],S0), for j = 0, . . . ,k . If D |≈
Poss(A1,S0),Poss(A2,S1), . . . ,Poss(Ak,Sk−1),G1(Sk),G2(Sk), . . . ,Gm(Sk), then π is a
candidate plan for P.
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Proof. Proof by induction on the length of the plan k.
(Base Case) If k = 0 then D |≈G1(S0),G2(S0), . . . ,Gm(S0). Therefore,
D |≈G1(S0) and D |≈G2(S0) and . . . and D |≈Gm(S0) .
From Proposition 12 we have, G1,G2, . . . ,Gm ⊆ I . As a result, the empty plan is a
candidate plan for P.
(Induction Step) We assume that the proposition holds for every plan of length k = n.
We show that it also holds for plans of length k = n+1.
From the hypothesis, we have that D |≈Poss(A1,S0),Poss(A2,S1), . . . ,Poss(An,Sn−1),
Poss(An+1,Sn),G1(Sn+1),G2(Sn+1), . . . ,Gm(Sn+1). Or equivalently:
D |≈Poss(A1,S0),Poss(A2,S1), . . . ,Poss(An,Sn−1) .
So, since 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 is a warranted plan from D with respect to the empty goal,
according to the induction step, it is also a candidate plan.
Also, D |≈Poss(An+1,Sn). Therefore, according to the translation mechanism of MPCP
problems to DBATs, there exists an agent i such that D |≈∧C∈prei(An+1). As a result,
∀C ∈ prei(An+1),D |≈C, and according to Proposition 12:
∀C ∈ prei(An+1),C ∈ σn .
As a result, there exists at least one specification in which the action An+1 is applicable.
Therefore, the plan 〈A1, . . . ,An+1〉 is applicable in I (1).
D |≈G1(Sn+1) and D |≈G2(Sn+1) and . . . and D |≈Gm(Sn+1) .
As a result, from Proposition 12 we have:
G1,G2, . . . ,Gm ⊆ σn+1 (2).
From (1) and (2), we derive that the plan 〈A1, . . . ,An+1〉 is a candidate plan.
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3.5 Extensions
DBATs subsume MPCP problems with respect to the expressive power of the for-
malisms. This section investigates the expressiveness of the defeasible situation cal-
culus formalism, and look into extensions to defeasible basic action theories which
provide additional expressive power that our argumentation-based formalism handles
without modifications.
3.5.1 Ramifications
This section describes extended defeasible action theories including rules that rep-
resent axiomatic beliefs about the domain that go beyond what is considered to be
classical planning knowledge. We describe how axioms like ramifications and domain
constraints can be represented with the language and describe how the argumentation-
based reasoning mechanism handles the reasoning overhead.
The argumentation mechanism can deal with rules that do not coincide with the
structure of the defeasible basic action theory axioms. For instance, such rules are
ramifications or state constraints as for example a rule stating that if an object is in
one position it cannot be in a different position in the same situation. In general, by
extended defeasible action theories we consider defeasible basic action theories with
domain constraints.
Our framework treats ramifications just like every other axiom. Contradictions
among the different axioms are resolved by the argumentation mechanism. The system
does not need to differentiate between the different axioms. This enables a uniform
treatment of reasoning steps made with different types of axioms.
Even though the reasoning mechanism is able to deal with such rules, reasoning be-
comes more demanding. Contrary to derivations with defeasible basic action theories,
every derivation step does not lead from a situation to its predecessor, as there may be
multiple steps regarding fluents of the same situation. Cycle detection is necessary in
the search for derivation, since such arguments may lead to circles in inferences.
Definition 26. An extended defeasible action theory is a tuple
D = 〈Dss,Dap,Ddc,Duna,DS0〉
containing defeasible rules describing defeasible successor state axioms, action pre-
conditions of actions, domain constraints, presumptions regarding the initial situation
and non-fluent beliefs and unique names axioms for actions.
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Defeasible domain constraints detail rules describing relations between predicates
in the same situation. The head of a defeasible domain constraint is a literal predicate
regarding a situation s (e.g. F(~x,s) or ∼F(~x,s)), and the body of the rule may be any
disjunction of conjunctions of literal predicates. Only one situation term is allowed to
appear in such rules.
Example 3. An example of a defeasible domain constraint is the belief that if there is
evidence that an object is in a position, there are reasons to believe that it is not in a
different position:
∼At(x, l,s)–≺At(x, l′,s), l 6= l′.
This domain constraint implicitly represents the belief that it is not possible for an
object to be in two different positions in the same situation.
Domain constraints can be used to identify errors in the reasoning process. Con-
sider for instance the domain constraint ∼At(x, l,s)–≺At(x, l′,s), l 6= l′. Using this
constraint we can attack arguments which are supported by beliefs that do not coincide
with the knowledge incorporated within the domain constraints.
Additionally, domain constraints can represent ramifications or indirect effects, i.e.
side-effects of actions. Consider for example the belief that switching on the lamp
produces light, and light always produces heat. This enables a more straightforward
representation of the domain differentiating between the direct effects of actions and
their side-effects, which may be potentially insignificant.
Reasoning is performed in exactly the same way as in defeasible basic action the-
ories. The agent first needs to come up with a derivation, providing the reasons to be-
lieve the desired claim, and then the argumentation process needs to identify whether
the corresponding argument is acceptable. Derivations in extended defeasible action
theories may involve multiple inference steps regarding fluents about the same situa-
tion. This is the main difference with derivations made from defeasible basic action
theories.
3.5.2 Observations
Consider a situation in which the agents agree on a plan and start executing it un-
til an action cannot be performed. In order to cope with the plan execution failure
they must re-plan while taking into account all the monitoring information they have
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distributively acquired. In complex, partially observable domains agents may moni-
tor different aspects of the system, and their collective observations may still offer a
limited view of the current state of the environment.
The collective beliefs of the agents include:
• Initial situation view of the environment
• Operator specifications
• Sequence of actions executed
• Observations from the traversed states
These beliefs can be used within a slightly different setup in order to synthesise an
alternative plan without progressing their entire theory to the current state. Reasoning
is performed based on their initial theory D = 〈Dss,Dap,DS0,Duna,Dc〉, the set Do and
the sequence of executed actions πc and the relevant current situation Sc = do([π],S0).
Do contains observations of the form L(Sk)–≺, where L is a ground fluent predicate,
with its situation term Sk being a predecessor situation of Sc and a successor situation
to S0.
Definition 27. Suppose theory D ′ = D ∪Do comprising of a defeasible basic action
theory and a set of observations after the execution of the sequence of actions πc , and
let AF = 〈Args,Defs〉 be the argumentation framework for all arguments that can be
constructed from D ′, and GEAF its grounded extension. Consider the shared goals of
the agents G1, . . . ,Gm. The sequence of actions π = 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉 is a warranted
plan if and only if:
D |≈Poss(A1,Sc),Poss(A2,Sc+1), . . . ,Poss(An,Sc+n−1),G1(Sc+n), . . . ,Gm(Sc+n) ,
where Sc = do([πc],S0) is the current situation, Si = do(Ai,Si−1) for i > c denotes the
situation resulting from the application of action Ai to the predecessor situation Si−1.
The defeat relation reflect that recent observations are more accurate. This can be
done by simply assigning to recent observations higher preference values than out-
dated planning beliefs. As a result, arguments made using recent observations will
be preferred over arguments that combine outdated information with beliefs from the
operator specifications to predict the outcome of the agents’ actions.
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3.5.3 Default Negated Conditions
Default negation allows the representation of two types of conditions (both precondi-
tions and conditional effects): conditions which must be known to hold, and conditions
for which it is sufficient to have no evidence that their complement is the case. The
first is the usual case. Conditions must be defeasibly derived and defended against
all counterarguments. The latter can be used to specify special cases, in environments
with high degrees of uncertainty, allowing the agent to reach conclusions quickly with-
out considering less significant conditions, or special cases which rarely hold and in
most cases agents are unaware about their status. These can be investigated during the
argumentation stage in the face of sufficient evidence.
Consider the following rule, stating that there is light in the room after we switch
on the light provided that there is electricity in the building:
Light(do(switch on,s))–≺Electricity(s) .
If we have no evidence related to whether the predicate Electricity(S) (for a ground
situation term S) has a positive or a negative value, we do not have reasons to believe
that Light(do(switch on,S)) holds. Consider a domain in which lack of electricity is
an unusual special case. We can represent this knowledge by modifying the rule using
default negation:
Light(do(switch on,s))–≺Light(s),not∼Electricity(s) .
This modification asserts that the rule is applicable regardless of whether there are
reasons to believe Electricity(S) or ∼Electricity(S). However, the conclusions that
are derived using this rule are not warranted if there exists strong evidence towards
∼Electricity(S). Therefore, the difference between the two rules lies in the case that
Electricity(S) cannot be defeasibly derived from the agents’ theory, and∼Electricity(S)
is not warranted. The first rule results in Light(do(switch on,S)) not being defea-
sibly derivable, whereas it is derivable in the second, and warranted provided that
∼Light(do(switch on,S)) is not warranted.
Assuming that this is the only action affecting the value of the predicate Light, we
also have the following axiom for the negative literal:
∼Light(do(a,s))–≺∼Light(s),a 6= switch on;∼Light(s),∼Electricity(s) .
In this case, the condition ∼Electricity(s) is preceded by strong negation, since the
case in which there is no electricity in the building is believed to be unusual, and the
agents should assume it does not hold, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary.
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3.5.4 Partially Warranted Plans
According to our definition of plans, all actions should be executable in sequence and
their application should result in states that achieve the shared goal. In domains of
great uncertainty, the agents may not be able to find a plan, if there is not enough
information to account for all the necessary conditions. Our aforementioned definition
of an acceptable plan is not useful in this case.
We provide a relaxed solution concept based on default negation. The idea is that
if the agents cannot synthesise a plan whose every action is believed to be executable,
they can fall back on a search for plans which contain actions that are not believed to
be inapplicable.
Partially warranted plans are defined as follows:
Definition 28. Suppose a defeasible action theory D , and let the argumentation frame-
work AF = 〈Args,Defs〉 including all arguments that can be constructed from D , and
its grounded extension GEAF. Consider the shared goals of the agents G1, . . . ,Gm. The
sequence of actions π = 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉 is a partially warranted plan iff
D |≈not∼Poss(A1,S0), . . . ,not∼Poss(An,Sn−1),G1(Sn), . . . ,Gm(Sn) ,
where Si = do(Ai,Si−1) denotes the situation resulting from the application of action
Ai to the predecessor situation Si−1.
The concept of partially warranted plans is strictly more general than the concept of
warranted plans.
Proposition 14. Suppose a defeasible action theory D , and let AF = 〈Args,Defs〉 the
argumentation framework for all arguments that can be constructed from D , and GEAF
its grounded extension. Consider G1, . . . ,Gm to be the shared goals of the agents.
If π = 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉 is a warranted plan, then π = 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉 is a partially
warranted plan.
Proof. In order for the plan to be partially warranted every (default negated) literal in
the sequence must be warranted. For every goal literal Gi, since the plan is warranted
it holds that D |≈Gi(Sn), where Sn = do([A1, . . . ,An],S0). We need to show that for ev-
ery action of the plan Ak and every situation Sk−1 = do([A1, . . . ,Ak−2],S0) it holds that
D |≈not∼Poss(Ak,Sk−1). Since the plan is warranted, D |≈Poss(Ak,Sk−1). There-
fore, every argument claiming not Poss(Ak,Sk−1) is defeated. From the specification
of default negation, D |∼not∼Poss(Ak,Sk−1). Also, every argument attacking the as-
sumption not∼Poss(Ak,Sk−1) is defeated. As a result, D |≈not∼Poss(Ak,Sk−1).
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The contrary does not hold. Consider a plan with a single action and a single precon-
dition, for which we do not have neither evidence for or evidence against. If we can
infer that this action achieves the goal, we can infer that the plan is partially warranted.
However, since we do not have any indication that the action’s precondition holds in
the initial situation, we cannot construct an argument for the plan, and the plan is not
warranted.
Potential weakly acceptable plans may be ordered by the “degree of uncertainty”
in the applicability of their actions (or conditions which are not supported by any evi-
dence). This is a measure of the assumptions that cannot be defeated, but at the same
time are not warranted.
3.6 Summary
Multi-perspective cooperative planning deals with the problem of synthesising plans
in domains where agents have contradictory views regarding the initial state of the en-
vironment and operator specifications. Based on the agents’ planning domain beliefs,
and using standard, set-theoretic planning notation we define the multi-perspective
cooperative planning problem, and specify the solution concept of candidate plans.
Candidate plans are rather weak, since they do not account for potential objections to
these plans. Defeasible situation calculus enables the encoding of MPCP in the form of
defeasible basic action theories, and formalises the notion of plan acceptability. This
allows the specification of the warranted plan solution concept, which asserts that the
plan can be defended against every possible objection. Defeasible situation calculus
subsumes MPCP problems in terms of expressive power. In addition, we provide a
translation mechanism which bridges the two formalisms and enables the use of mod-
ern planning techniques to solve MPCP problems.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• Formalisation of the MPCP problem.
• Specification of an expressive language for reasoning about contradictory dy-
namic domains.
• Concretisation of the notion of acceptability in planning domains.
• Bridging automated planning, reasoning about action and argumentation.
Chapter 4
Reasoning and Planning Algorithms
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 defines an argumentation-based framework, which formalises the notion of
plan acceptability in multi-perspective co-operative planning domains. This chapter
focuses on the algorithmic problem of synthesising warranted plans, and is separated
into two main parts. Initially, we focus on the defeasible situation calculus formalism
and describe how planning can be performed using DBATs. We focus on inherent
characteristics of the planning domain that can be exploited, in order to simplify the
necessary tasks and improve the efficiency of the process. The second part of this
chapter is based on the set-theoretic planning representation. We look at the problem
from a “classical” planning perspective and explain how search for candidate plans can
be delegated to efficient state-of-the-art planners. In this way, we exploit the planners’
highly optimised, heuristic search, further improving the practicality of our approach.
4.2 Planning with DBATs
Following the definition of a warranted plan (Definition 24), planning with a DBAT D
can be performed by searching for a ground situation S, such that:
D |≈executable(S),goals(S) .
S represents the history of the execution of the plan’s actions in sequence. The spe-
cial predicate goals abbreviates the expression G1(S),G2(S), . . . ,Gm(S), where literals
G1,G2, . . . ,Gm represent the agents’ goal predicates. The special predicate executable(S)
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is also an abbreviation and is defined for all ground situation terms S:
executable(S)≡
 true if S = S0executable(S′),Poss(A,S′) otherwise with S = do(A,S′)
For example, the predicate executable(do(A2,do(A1,S0))) abbreviates the expression
Poss(A2,do(A1,S0)),Poss(A1,S0). The abbreviation executable(S0) holds by defini-
tion, and is omitted from the expression.
4.2.1 A Simple Exhaustive Planner
Algorithm 1 implements a simple exhaustive planner, which searches the plan space for
a warranted plan. We restrict the search to plans of a reasonable size ε, by considering
only situation terms in the set Sε = {S | S is a predecessor of a ground situation term
of length ε}. The exhaustive nature of the search for a warranted plan asserts that the
planning process is sound and complete for problems with a solution of at most length
ε.




Args := {α | α is an argument that can be constructed from ground(D)};
Defs := {(α,β) | α,β ∈ Args and α defeats β};
AF := 〈Args,Defs〉;
Warranted := {Claim(α) | α is acceptable w.r.t. AF};
repeat
Select a new sequence π := 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉, with n := [0,ε);
if Warranted ⊇ {L(Sπ) | L(Sπ) appears in executable(Sπ) or goals(Sπ)}
then
return π;
until there does not exist a new plan;
return null;
Algorithm 1 is built on top of a reasoning component which is capable of evaluating
the warrant state of ground queries of the form D |≈L(S), where L(S) is a ground literal
with a ground situation term S. This process involves the following tasks:
• Theory grounding.
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• Argument Generation.
• Calculation of defeats among arguments.
• Establishing argument acceptability (with respect to the employed argumenta-
tion semantics).
• Search for acceptable arguments claiming the literals appearing in the query.
Algorithm 1 conducts these tasks in a simple, straightforward manner. It evaluates
whether a fluent is warranted by a defeasible basic action theory, and outlines the
necessary steps that need to be undertaken to assert soundness and completeness. It
is essentially a propositional argumentation mechanism reasoning over a “reasonably”
maximal ground theory.
The grounding mechanism grounds D with respect to every situation referring to a
history of less than ε actions. The number ε is used as a “reasonable” threshold. Ar-
gument generation and evaluation of argument acceptability are conducted in a simple
propositional argumentation-based reasoning manner.
The generation of the argumentation framework involves generating all arguments
and identifying the defeat relations among them. Argument generation can be per-
formed by searching for defeasible derivations and discounting those that are based
on a contradictory support. The defeat relations are identified by inspecting the argu-
ments. Attacks are identified in the light of contradictory beliefs among arguments.
Defeats are composed from attacks based on the employed defeat relation. This is an
aspect of the framework that can be fine-tuned to incorporate meta-information about
the domain. For instance, it may be the case that the more specific the conditions are
in a conditional effect, the more credible the operator is.
The evaluation of argument acceptability is performed with respect to the employed
argumentation semantics. For example, if grounded (sceptical) argumentation seman-
tics are used, we must identify which arguments are part of the grounded extension
of the argumentation framework. This task can be performed by a labelling process
(Modgil and Caminada, 2009), which follows the employed argumentation semantics.
Algorithm 1 is useful as an outline of the basic tasks that are necessary for the
synthesis of warranted plans. However, the use of general propositional argumentation
methods to synthesise warranted plans is not efficient. The main problem here arises
due to the overall size of the generated ground defeasible theory, which makes the
argumentation process, which is by its nature exhaustive, very inefficient.
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4.2.2 Strategies and Heuristics
In order to maximise the efficiency of our methods, we focus on pruning strategies and
heuristics that allow the reduction of the overall space we need to search for, in terms
of beliefs, arguments and potential plans. The rationale behind these strategies is based
on the analytical results presented in Chapter 3.
4.2.2.1 Situation-Dependent Grounding
Grounding the domain beliefs of the agents requires the substitution of the variables in
the rules in the DBAT with constant terms, for every possible combination, while re-
specting the sorts of terms and the equalities and inequalities appearing in the bodies of
the rules. This step is responsible to a great extent for the impracticality of Algorithm
1.
Even if we assume that the number of objects of the planning domain is manage-
able, we have to account for every situation term corresponding to a potential plan.
Since situation terms represent sequences of actions, we use ε to restrict the length of
potential plans to a “reasonable” threshold. However, this solution is still impractical
since the set of literals, grounded for every situation up to length k, is exponential in k.
Following Proposition 4 on page 70, we observe that the derivability of a ground
literal L(S) is independent of any rules which refer to situations that are successors to
S. Similarly, defeasible rules referring to situations that are neither predecessors nor
successors to S are also irrelevant, since all these rules refer to different sets of ground
predicates.
Observation 2. Consider a DBAT D and a ground literal L(S), where S is a ground
situation term. Assume a threshold ε and the set Sε = {S | S is a ground situation term




|∼L(S) if and only if ground(D,S) |∼L(S) .
According to the specification of the grounding mechanism, the set ground(D,S) con-
tains all defeasible rules that have been grounded with respect to situation terms that
are equal to or predecessor of S. As a result, all rules that are relevant to the derivation
of L(S) appear in ground(D,S) |≈L(S).
Equivalently, we generalise Proposition 5 on page 76, and conclude that the warrant
status of every ground literal L(S) is independent of any rules referring to situations
that are not equivalent to or that are predecessors of S.
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Observation 3. Let the DBAT D and a ground literal L(S), where S is a ground situ-
ation term. Assume a threshold ε and the set Sε = {S | S is a ground situation term of




|≈L(S) if and only if ground(D,S) |≈L(S) .
The above observations reflect that any conclusions regarding D |∼L(S) and D |≈L(S)




Accordingly, in order to answer any query of the form D |∼L(S) or D |≈L(S), we
ground the DBAT only with respect to S and its predecessor situations. Such queries
represent the main task for reasoning and planning with defeasible basic action theo-
ries.
The exhaustive planner described above is not suitable to utilise the grounding
strategy, since planning is performed as a simple search within the results of the ar-
gumentation process. In the following sections, we describe how the planning process
can be adapted, so that answering queries of the form D |∼L(S) and D |≈L(S) is placed
at the heart of the planning algorithm.
4.2.2.2 Argument and Defeater Generation
The exhaustive planner described in Algorithm 1 requires carrying out the argumen-
tation process prior to the search for a warranted plan. Even with a ground theory of
a restricted size this is impractical, since the argumentation process is expensive, pri-
marily due to its exhaustive nature. To this end, the following observation focuses on
restricting the argumentation generation process to arguments that are relevant to the
query that is under evaluation.
Observation 4. The warrant state of a ground literal L(S) depends exclusively on the
arguments with claim L(S), their defeaters, the defeaters of their defeaters, etc.
Formally, the set ArgsL(S) ⊆ Args containing all the arguments that are relevant to the
warrant state of L(S) is specified as follows:
ArgsL(S) = {α | Claim(α) = L(S) or ∃β ∈ ArgsL(S) such that (α,β) ∈ Defs} .
ArgsL(S) contains arguments with claim L(S), their defeaters, the defeaters of their
defeaters, and so forth. Any argument in the set Args \ArgsL(S) is irrelevant to the
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Algorithm 2: Construct the set ArgsL(S), with respect to the query D |≈L(S)
i := 0;
ArgsL(S) := /0;
Args0L(S) := Generate all arguments with claim L(S);
while ArgsiL(S) 6= /0 do






ArgsL(S) := ArgsL(S)∪Argsi+iL(S) ;
Return ArgsL(S);
decision of whether the ground fluent L(S) is warranted. As a result, constructing
these arguments is unnecessary.
Additionally, every ground rule that does not appear within an argument in ArgsL(S)
is also irrelevant to the query. Let ground(D)ArgsL(S) ⊆ ground(D,Sε) be the subset of
the ground theory containing only beliefs relevant to arguments in ArgsL(S):
ground(D)ArgsL(S) = {φ | ∃α ∈ ArgsL(S) such that φ ∈ {Claim(α)}∪Support(α)} .
Ground beliefs in the set ground(D,Sε)\ground(D)ArgsL(S) are not used in arguments
that are relevant to the acceptability of L(S).
In the worst case, if the warrant state of every literal in the theory depends on the
values of all other literals in the theory, the sets described above would be equivalent to
the general sets. This is rarely the case, especially in complex problems for large plan-
ning domains which usually include multiple beliefs that are irrelevant to the overall
goal.
The complete argumentation framework can be viewed as a directed graph called
an argumentation graph. Nodes correspond to the arguments of the argumentation
framework, whereas the edges represents the defeats between them. Algorithm 2 con-
structs subgraphs of the argumentation graph. Every subgraph contains an argument
α with Claim(α) = L(S), as well as every argument β, such that there is a path from
the node corresponding to β to the node representing α. Every argument β′, such that
there is no path from its corresponding node to any node representing an argument in
Args \ArgsL(S), are irrelevant to L(S). Therefore, these are not included in the sub-
graph. In the worst case, there is a path from every node in the graph to an argument
claiming L(S), and as a result ArgsL(S) = Args.
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Algorithm 2 asserts that arguments that are irrelevant to a query are not generated
and evaluated. This process is further optimised in the following chapter, in which we
present a dialogue based approach which evaluates the acceptability of a plan through
a dispute. The benefit of this process is that it does not always require the generation
of all arguments. Algorithm 2 generates the relevant argument trees in an exhaustive
breadth-first order, and labelling is performed after the tree has been constructed. This
process is further optimised by performing labelling after every iteration.
Example 4. Consider the processes of argument and defeater generation for the query
At(P,L2,do(push(R,P,L2),S0)) which denotes the belief that a parcel P is in a location
L2 after being pushed to this location. Initially, we generate arguments whose claim





This argument states that the claim holds as a direct result of the action push(R,P,L2),
because there are reasons to believe that the relevant conditions Free(L2,S0) and
Reachable(P,S0) are the case. This argument is depicted as follows:
Free(L2, S0) Reachable(P, S0)
At(P, L2, do(push(R, P, L2), S0))






If there is no other argument for our claim, we add α to the set of relevant arguments
and continue. Then we move to the next iteration and search for defeaters of α. To
do this, we search for every argument with claim ∼At(P,L2,do(push(R,P,L2),S0)),
∼Free(L2,S0) or ∼Reachable(P,S0). Let the following argument being generated in
this iteration:
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• β1 = 〈{∼Reachable(P,S0)},∼Reachable(P,S0)〉,
• β2 = 〈{∼At(P,L2,do(push(R,P,L2),S0))–≺∼At(P,L2,S0),not Free(L2,S0),
∼At(P,L2,S0)},∼At(P,L2,do(push(R,P,L2),S0))〉, and
• β3 = 〈{∼At(P,L2,do(push(R,P,L2),S0))–≺∼At(P,L2,S0),not Reachable(P,S0),
∼{At(P,L2,S0)}∼At(P,L2,do(push(R,P,L2),S0))〉
Next, we add the arguments β1, β2 and β3 to the set of relevant arguments and continue
by searching for their defeaters. We can generate the following arguments attacking
the assumptions of β2 and β3 and the premise of β1:
• α1 = 〈{Reachable(P,S0)},Reachable(P,S0)〉
• α2 = 〈{Free(L2,S0)},Free(L2,S0)〉
We add these arguments to the set and finish the process as there is no additional rele-
vant arguments, since argument β2 is already in the set. The argumentation framework





Note that the above example assumes that all arguments are equally preferred, unifying
the defeat and the attack relations. A different ordering would reduce the defeats in the
above figure, since one of β1 and α1 would be preferred.
Argument generation is based on the search for a suitable defeasible derivation.
This process can be conducted using a backward-chaining mechanism to construct a
proof tree. A completed tree corresponds to an argument, provided that it does not
contain contradicting literals. The backward-chaining process must unify an open sub-
goal (i.e. a belief that needs to be derived) to the head of a defeasible rule from the
agents’ theory, add new subgoals from the body of the rule, and continue until no
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm for the query D |≈L(S), where D is a defeasible action
theory, L a ground fluent literal and S a ground situation term
Build AFArgsL(S) = 〈ArgsL(S),DefsArgsL(S)〉;
Generate GEArgsL(S) of AFArgsL(S);




open subgoals remain. The queries are ground, and so would be the beliefs that need
to be matched to the heads of defeasible rules. Rules which have the same literal as
their head can be either grounded and then matched, or we can unify them on de-
mand; we unify the relevant terms, but not any other variables appearing in the body
of the rule. The backward-chaining mechanism asserts that we exclusively ground
rules that can potentially form the support of arguments. Unfortunately, the set of the
generated ground rules is a superset of ground(D)ArgsL(S) . This is the case, because the
backward-chaining mechanism may explore paths that do not result in the construction
of arguments. Grounded beliefs that are generated while exploring such paths may not
be part of ground(D)ArgsL(S) as they are not used by arguments in ArgsL(S).
Defeaters for an argument are constructed through argument generation for claims
that contradict beliefs that appear in the claim or the support of the argument. Essen-
tially, in order to generate all defeaters for an argument α we generate every argument
β such that Claim(β) ∈ {Claim(α)}∪Support(α).
We consider domains including finite objects and ground situation terms repre-
senting plans of finite sequences of actions. These assumptions imply that the ground
theory contains a finite number of rules, and as a result, a finite number of arguments
can be generated. Accordingly, the argument generation (and the defeater generation)
tasks always terminate, given that a cycle detection mechanism is implemented within
the defeasible derivation search mechanism, since the process of labelling finite graphs
always terminates.
The soundness of Algorithm 3 follows from our definition of warrant, since Al-
gorithm 3 will return ‘true’ if and only if there exists an argument that has the literal
of the query as its claim can be constructed from the theory, and that this argument is
included in the grounded extension. Completeness, on the other hand, can be ensured
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if exhaustive search is conducted.
Algorithm 3 generates every subgraph relevant for the queried literal, and then uses
a labelling mechanism to evaluate argument acceptability. Such subgraphs are not nec-
essarily trees as they may contain arguments defeating multiple other arguments in the
subgraph. However, they can be transformed to trees organised in layers. Layer 0 con-
tains the root argument, which claims the queried literal. Layer 1 contains the children
of the root node, which correspond to the arguments defeating the root argument. The
children of every layer 1 node represent the arguments defeating the argument that
corresponds to this node. Every node on an even-numbered layer supports the root
argument, whereas every node on an odd-numbered layer defeats the root argument or
one of its supporters. The resulting tree contains all arguments that appear in the sub-
graph. However, arguments that create multiple defeats correspond to multiple nodes,
one for every defeat.
Generating such trees in a depth-first manner is advantageous, since in certain cases
it is possible to evaluate the acceptability of the root argument before the construction
of the entire argumentation tree. This process is performed systematically for abstract
argumentation in two-party disputes as described in Vreeswijk and Prakken (2000) and
Dunne and Bench-Capon (2003). Depending on the argumentation semantics, rules
apply which ensure the correctness of the conclusions. For instance, for grounded
acceptability semantics, in order to assert that an argument cannot be supported by
itself, it is prohibited from appearing on to two nodes on even-numbered layers in the
same path. We discuss protocols for the evaluation of arguments based on argument
games in detail in the following chapter.
4.2.2.3 Situation Stratification Strategy
In the previous section, we discussed arguments that are relevant for the evaluation of a
warrant of a ground query. This section focuses on the task of defeater generation, and
provides a strategy for guiding the evaluation process, when multiple defeaters exist.
The support of an argument regarding a query of the form L(S), where S involves
the application of multiple actions, may contain beliefs related to every situation from
the initial situation S0 to the situation S. Finding all potential defeaters requires the
generation of every argument that claims the complement of a statement that appears
in the support of the claim or is the claim of the original argument itself. For an
argument α, this set is denoted by: Support(α)∪{Claim(a)}.
The set Support(α)∪{Claim(α)} is conceptually stratified with respect to the sit-
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uation terms appearing in the beliefs in this set. Let Claim(α) be equal to L(Sn), L a
ground predicate literal and Sn the ground situation term for the ground sequence of ac-
tions π= 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉. The beliefs in the set Support(α)∪{Claim(α)} can be strati-
fied into n+1 sets Si, with i= [0,n] containing the beliefs in Support(α)∪{Claim(α)},
with a situation term Si. Non-fluent beliefs are placed in S0 together with initial situa-
tion beliefs.
According to Proposition 5 on page 76, and Proposition 6 on page 76, the deriva-
tion and warrant state of a ground literal referring to a ground situation term S depends
entirely on ground beliefs with situation terms that are predecessor or equal to S. The
specification of successor state axioms (and state constraints/ramifications) asserts that
the defeasible derivation of a belief regarding a ground situation S never involves be-
liefs with successor situation terms. Therefore, while evaluating the acceptability of
an argument whose claim refers to the situation term S, we do not need to consider
arguments whose claims refer to successor situations.
The notion of a sub-argument is very important in this process. Arguments may
have multiple defeaters, some of which may be sub-arguments of others. We can utilise
this relation while evaluating the acceptability of an argument. There is a clear benefit
in initially considering defeats on earlier situations, starting from non-fluent literals
and initial situation beliefs. The reason for this is that the acceptability of literals
regarding future situations depend on literals referring to their predecessor situations.
As a result, knowledge regarding their status can help prune the search.
For example, consider an argument α which has a sub-argument α′, and let β be
an argument defeating α′. If α′ cannot be defended against β’s attack, then we know α
cannot be defended either.
Proposition 15. Consider an argumentation framework AF and two arguments α and
α′ from this framework, such that α′ is a sub-argument of α. Let GEAF be the grounded
extension of AF. If α′ 6∈ GEAF then α 6∈ GEAF.
Proof. Since a′ 6∈ GEAF, there exists at least one argument b such that b defeats a and
there does not exist c ∈ GEAF such that c defeats b. If the contrary was the case then
it holds that b ∈ GEAF. Also, from the definition of the defeat relation since a is a
sub-argument of a′ and b defeats a′, it holds that b defeats a as well. Therefore, a is
not part of GEAF.
We utilise these observations in the next algorithm for argument acceptability check-
ing. Algorithm 4 utilises the situation stratification strategy to potentially reach con-
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Algorithm 4: The situation stratification strategy for answering queries of the
form D |≈L(S). D is a defeasible action theory, L a ground fluent literal and S a
ground situation term
repeat
AF := 〈 /0, /0〉;
Generate new argument α such that Claim(α) = L(S);
Add α to AF;
S := Support(α)∪{Claim(α)};
Stratify S in n+1 layers;
foreach layer Si with i = [0,n+1] do
Extend AF with ArgsL(S) from theory ground(D,Si) ;
Extend GE for current AF;
if α 6∈ GE then
break;
if α ∈ GE then
return true;
until there exists no new argument α;
return false;
clusions about warrants without evaluating every defeater. The basic idea behind the
algorithm is that the points at which a literal can be attacked are literals which can be
stratified according to their situation terms.
We build the argumentation graph in phases, each of which introduces arguments
which claim literals with a specific situation term. The initial phase considers argu-
ments about non-fluent and fluent literals about the initial situation. Every following
phase extends the graph with arguments regarding the successor situation. The final
phase introduces arguments about the same situation as the literal of the query. In every
phase, after the expansion of the graph we extend the labelling to the newly added ar-
guments. The labelling information of the already existing arguments, apart from α, is
not affected by the added arguments. All new defeats are the product of sub-arguments
of the new arguments, which have already been considered in the previous labelling
process.
Until we reach the final phase, the labelling process cannot determine if α is de-
feated against every potential defeater. However, if at the end of any phase α is cannot
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Algorithm 5: An exhaustive breadth-first planer
l := 0;
while l < ε do
repeat
Select a new plan π of length l;
if D |≈goal(Sπ),executable(Sπ) then
return π;
until there does not exist a new plan of length l;
l ++;
return null;
be defended against a defeater, then we can derive that α is not part of the grounded
extension. the arguments that would be added by the following phases, would not af-
fect the labelling of the defeater. Therefore, if such a defeater exists, we can determine
that α is not acceptable without proceeding to the next phase.
The argument generation step can reuse derivations that have been made in the
previous phases. The exhaustive nature of argument and defeater generation implies
that Algorithm 4 is sound and complete.
4.2.2.4 Executability-Based Plan Space Pruning
Algorithm 1 does not provide any insight on the order in which plans are evaluated.
Based on plan length, we distinguish the following basic strategies: breadth-first and
depth-first planning.
An exhaustive breadth-first search strategy evaluates all plans of an increasing size,
starting from zero and gradually reaching a threshold ε. More specifically, it evaluates
whether the expression goal(Sπ),executable(Sπ) is warranted for situation term S0.
Afterwards, it progresses with the evaluation of the statement for every situation S1 =
do(A,S0) such that A is a ground action. If no warranted plan is found, it continues with
their successor situations. The search continues in the same manner, until situations
Sε = do([πε],S0), where πε is a plan of ε actions. The main advantage of breadth-first
search is the guarantee that the shortest warranted plan within the selected threshold is
always identified. Algorithm 5 describes a breadth-first planner.
An exhaustive depth-first strategy begins with the evaluation of the empty plan. If
this is not warranted, it proceeds by selecting an action and evaluating the respective
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Construct plan expression goal(Sπ),executable(Sπ);
if D |≈goal(Sπ),executable(Sπ) then
return π;
Select a ground action A such that the sequence π,A has not been
evaluated;
π := π,A;
until length(π)> ε or no new plans exist;
until no new plans exist;
return null;
plan. If this also fails to be warranted, another action is appended, and the new plan
is then evaluated. This process is repeated until a warranted plan is discovered or the
length of the plan exceeds a certain threshold. In this case, we backtrack and search
again making different action choices. A depth-first planning algorithm is outlined by
Algorithm 6.
The depth-first search does not necessarily return the shortest plan. However, this
strategy is preferable for large domains because it enables the reuse of conclusions and
provides a simple pruning mechanism based on situation executability. This mecha-
nism follows the observation that the derivation and warrant results regarding an action
sequence π are also relevant for every sequence π′ extending π. Therefore, negative
results regarding the executability of a situation carry over to every successor situation.
Observation 5. Let D be a defeasible basic action theory and S be a ground situation
term. For every situation S′ = do([A1, . . . ,An],S) extending S, if D |6≈executable(S)
then D |6≈executable(S′).
This observation follows from the executability abbreviation and the definition of the
warrant relation. The abbreviation executable(S′) is expanded to:
executable(S),Poss(A1,S), . . . ,Poss(An,do([A1, . . . ,An],S)) .
From the definition of warrant, it follows that a conjunction is warranted if every literal
in the conjunction is warranted. Therefore, since D |6≈executable(S) it holds that D |6≈
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executable(S′).
Argumentation in our framework is performed as two-step process: searching for
defeasible derivations, and evaluating the acceptability of the corresponding argu-
ments. As a result, the warrant relation is based on the notion of defeasible derivation.
Observation 6. Let D be a defeasible basic action theory and S be a ground situation
term. For every situation S′= do(π,S), where π is a possibly empty sequence of ground
actions, if D |6∼Poss(S) then D |6≈executable(S′).
The observation follows from the executability abbreviation and the definition of
the warrant relation. The abbreviation executable(S′) expands to:
executable(S),Poss(A1,S), . . . ,Poss(An,do([A1, . . . ,An],S)) .
Regardless of the number of actions in π, in order for this statement to be warranted,
executable(S) must be warranted from the theory. This is not the case, since Poss(S) is
not warranted from D , since there exists no argument claiming Poss(S).
Algorithm 7 utilises the above propositions to prune the search for a warranted
plan. Whenever a situation S that is not executable is identified, the search restarts for
a different situation sequence, since no successor of S is executable either. This al-
gorithm reduces the overall ‘amount’ of argumentation required, while increasing the
need to search for defeasible derivations. Therefore, computationally expensive pro-
cesses such as generating arguments and finding defeaters are performed exclusively
for potential plans.
For readability purposes, we extend the defeasible derivation relation to conjunctive
statements. More specifically, D |∼L1,L2, . . . ,Lm if and only if D |∼L1, D |∼L2, . . .,
and D |∼Lm.
4.2.2.5 Action Selection Heuristic
The depth-first planner presented in the previous section does not provide any insight
on the problem of action selection. More specifically, if after a plan 〈A1,A2, . . . ,Am〉
is applicable but does not achieve the goal, the planner picks an action Am+1, and
proceeds with the evaluation of the plan 〈A1,A2, . . . ,Am+1〉. When multiple options for
action Am+1 are available, this process is performed non-deterministically.
In large planning domains, the number of ground actions is considerable. Non-
deterministic action selection is impractical, since it may lead to the selection of un-
helpful or potentially even destructive actions. Exhaustive search eventually leads to a
solution, but is infeasible in many cases.
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Algorithm 7: Depth-first planner with executability-based pruning
while new plans exist do
while length(π)< ε do
π := a new plan 〈π,A〉;
Sπ := situation term for plan π;
if D|6∼Poss(Sπ) then break;
if D |∼goal(Sπ) then
if D |≈executable(Sπ) then
if D |≈goal(Sπ) then return π;
else break;
Πn−ex := Πn−ex∪{non-executable subsequence of π};
π := subsequence of π such that π /∈Πn−ex;
In order to improve the efficiency of the planning method, we propose a heuristic
action selection strategy inspired by the “no delete lists” heuristic from the planning
literature (McDermott, 1996; Bonet and Geffner, 2001; Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001).
The “no delete lists” heuristic is one of the most successful planning heuristics. The
heuristic quality of a state is measured based on the size of a plan that solves a relaxed
planning problem, in which delete lists (i.e. the negative effects of actions) are ignored.
Solutions to the relaxed planning problem are simpler to calculate, and these solutions
have been empirically shown to provide good estimates in benchmark planning do-
mains Hoffmann (2005).
Our axiomatisation of successor state axioms is based on the use of default negation
preceding disruptive effects. These axioms have the following form:
L(do(a,s))–≺γL(s);L(s),not(γL(s)) ,
where γL(s) abbreviates the body of the compound effect axiom for literal L.
Following the structure of these axioms, and the specification of the notion of de-
feasible derivation, there exists a defeasible derivation D |∼L(S′), where L(S′) is a
ground literal, S′ = do(A,S) is a ground situation term, and A is a ground action, if and
only if one of the following conditions holds:
• There exists an effect rule for action A producing L and every literal in the body
of the rule can be derived from D .
• D |∼L(S).
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Following the treatment of default negated literals as assumptions, the use of default
negation prior to the disruptive effects for L, results in defeasibly deriving L(S′) when
D |∼L(S), regardless of the derivation status of the literals of the disruptive effects.
As a result, defeasible derivations can be made for the literals produced by the final
action, or any one of the previous actions leading to the current situation. Disruptive
effects of actions are disregarded. Accordingly, the set of literals that can be derived in
a successor situation subsumes the literals derivable from its predecessors.
We introduce the term goal derivable situation to represent any situation term Sgd
such that D |∼goal(Sgd),executable(Sgd). The heuristic value is a function h(S) that
measures the quality of a situation based on the number of actions needed to reach
a goal derivable situation from the current situation. If this is not possible, then the
function takes an arbitrary high integer value.
h(S) =
 minS∗∈Sgd(|S∗|)−|S| if Sgd 6= /0maxint otherwise
Sgd is set of all goal derivable situations that are successor (or equal) to S. |S| denotes
the distance, in terms of number of actions, between S and the initial situation S0. More
specifically, |S0|= 0, |do(A,S0)|= 1 and |do([A1,A2, . . . ,Am],S0)|= m. An outline for
the calculation of the heuristic value is provided by Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8: Heuristic Value Calculation
l := 0;
S := {S0};
while l < ε do
foreach S ∈ S do
if D |∼goal(S) then
return l;
l ++;
S := {do(A,S) | S ∈ S , A is a ground action such that D |∼Poss(A,S)};
return ε;
Our use of the heuristic value follows the strategy behind the popular FastForward
planner (Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001). Initially, we search the plan space in a depth-
first manner using the enforced hill climbing strategy, which greedily moves to the
nearest, strictly better situation discovered using breadth-first search. Algorithms 9
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Algorithm 9: Enforced Hill Climbing Planner
S∗ := S0;
S := null;
while a threshold ε is not reached and S 6= S∗ do
S := S∗;
if D |≈G(S) then
return the plan that corresponds to S;





and 10 outline the enforced hill climbing and best-first search strategies respectively.
Enforced hill climbing search is not complete, since it greedily moves towards situ-
ations of higher heuristic quality. When it reaches a local maximum, that is a situation
with a better heuristic quality than any successor situations, that does not satisfy the
goal, it fails. In situations in which enforced hill climbing fails, the heuristic value
is still helpful, as it can guide the search by prioritising actions leading to situations
of higher heuristic quality (although in this case we calculate it using minS∗∈Sgd(|S∗|)
rather than minS∗∈Sgd(|S∗|)− |S| to avoid unsuccessful local maxima). In this case
search is performed in a best-first manner. Best-first search explores the plan space by
expanding the most promising, in terms of the specified heuristic value, reached situ-
ation term. Its exhaustive nature guarantees that, if a solution exists within a certain
length, it will be eventually discovered.
4.2.3 Summary
The extensive size of ground DBATs makes simple, propositional argumentation-based
approaches highly impractical. In order to tackle this problem, we do not treat sit-
uation variables in the same manner as object variables with respect to grounding.
We transform the planning algorithm so that it revolves around queries of the form
D |≈L(S). Such queries can be answered by grounding the theory for situation terms
S = {S′ | S′ is ground situation term that is predecessor or equal to S}.
Depth-first search planning is suitable for searching the plan space, since it is based
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Algorithm 10: Best-First Search Planner




while i < ε do
S := argminS′∈Σ(h(S′));
Σ := Σ\{S};
foreach ground action A such that D |≈Poss(A,S) do
S′ := do(A,S);
if D |≈goal(S′) then




on the expansion of a plan π with an additional action A in every step. Accordingly,
conclusions made regarding derivations and the warrant state of literals after the appli-
cation of π are relevant for π′ = 〈π,A〉. If we identify sequences that are inapplicable,
we prune the search space as any plan extending them is also inapplicable. In order to
perform an equivalent mechanism during breadth-first search, we would have to store
all argumentation results that are relevant to every situation that can be expanded in
the following iteration. This task is significantly complex in terms of memory require-
ments.
However, the depth-first search mechanism does not provide insight on action se-
lection, and in any realistic domain there are multiple options for every action selection
step. To this end we followed a heuristic approach. The heuristic value acts as a guide
in the search for potential plans, reducing the possibility of selecting unnecessary or
even potentially harmful, actions. The heuristic value needs to be calculated quickly,
since it is measured for every potential transition. Based on the defeasible implication
relation and the use of default negation, we calculate the heuristic value based on a
relaxed version of the planning problem. The solution to the relaxed problem is based
on defeasible derivations, rather than the expensive argumentation task, which is only
performed for actions with high heuristic quality. Hill climbing search may not lead to
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any solutions, since it only takes a single path into account. The heuristic value is still
helpful as a guide while searching the space using exhaustive best-first search.
In contrast to classical planning approaches that search the state-space of the plan-
ning domain, our methods search the situation space. The benefit of searching the state
space is that, since the same state may be reachable by different plans, it is possible to
prune the search whenever it proceeds in circles. Unfortunately, our problem is bound
to the notion of situations and has different semantics. Even if exactly the same literals
can be derived in two different situations, their warrant status may be different. The
next section focuses on the differences between MPCP with our set-theoretic formal-
ism and classical planning, and proposes methods for synthesising warranted plans that
delegate the search for potential plans to efficient, state-of-the-art planners, in order to
optimise the efficiency of the overall process.
4.3 Planning with MPCP Problems
Multi-perspective cooperative planning consists of the planning problem of synthesis-
ing potential plans, and the decision-making problem of evaluating these plans against
possible objections. This section focuses on algorithms for the solution of the problem
based on the proposed set-theoretic notation.
The planning problem is essentially the problem of synthesising candidate plans.
In order to provide an overall solution to the problem based on the set-theoretic nota-
tion, we need to provide a suitable specification of the decision sub-problem based on
the MPCP formalism. To this end, we introduce the notion of acceptability based on
MPCP problems and a preference ordering over planning beliefs, emulating the notion
of warrant on plans.
In addition, we focus on the planning sub-problem of MPCP. More particularly,
we identify its main differences from classical planning. We provide methods for the
transformation of the problem into a classical planning theory, suitable for delegating
the synthesis of candidate plans to standard planning algorithms. Finally, we provide
algorithms which utilise efficient, state-of-the-art planners, for the construction of can-
didate plans, exploiting their heuristic and highly optimised mechanisms for searching
the state space of a planning domain.
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4.3.1 MPCP-Based Argumentation
In order to represent and provide a solution to the decision-making part of the problem
using the MPCP formalism, our approach must account for the following:
• Specification of the structure of arguments.
• Specification of the defeat relation among arguments.
• Performing the task of argument acceptability evaluation.
• Performing the task of plan warrant evaluation.
Contrary to the aforementioned defeasible situation calculus argumentation-based meth-
ods, the set-theoretic notation does not offer a logic-based inference mechanism. As
a result, argument structures are specified in an ad-hoc manner which is based on the
state transition function, which is the main reasoning mechanism provided in MPCP.
Contrary to our previous work with DBATs, argumentation methods based on
MPCP are based on the notion of a state. When we traverse through a plan, we identify
the state transitions caused by its actions, and gather reasons explaining the values of
literals in the resulting states. This task is called plan projection, and is the basis of
argument generation in MPCP-based argumentation.
4.3.1.1 Plan Projection
Plan projection projects the effects of an action sequence on the state of the environ-
ment. It iterates over the actions in the plan, starting from the initial state. First, it
calculates whether this state satisfies the preconditions of the action. This is performed
by searching whether there exists an operator specification, according to which every
precondition is satisfied by this state. Then it calculates the successor state based on
the state transition function. This process continues for every action in the sequence.
When every action has been applied, the process checks whether the agents’ goals are
satisfied in the resulting state. Plan projection fails if there exists an inapplicable action
in the plan or if the goal literals are not satisfied by the final state.
The results of plan projection can be represented as a directed graph, whose nodes
are organised in layers of two different types. Odd-numbered layers correspond to
states. The nodes in these layers represent literals, and are denoted by circles. Layer 0
and every even-numbered layer is a justification layer. Every justification corresponds
to a single-step derivation describing the reasons to believe that a literal holds in a state,












































Figure 4.1: Directed graph representation of plan projection data
based on the relevant conditions in its predecessor state. Justifications are denoted in
the graphs using squares. An example of a plan projection graph is depicted in Figure
4.1.
We differentiate between the following classes of justification:
• Initial state justification
• Persistence justification
• Effect justification
Initial state justifications are equivalent to defeasible initial state axioms. For every
literal that is part of the initial state we generate an initial state justification. Initial
state justifications occupy layer 0, and do not have any incoming edges.
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Persistence justifications correspond to derivations made using the frame part of
defeasible successor state axioms. They describe that the agents have reasons to believe
that the latest action did not affect the current state of a literal. Formally, there exists a
persistence justification for every literal L in state γ(A,σ) if and only if there exists an
agent i such that for every conditional effect 〈CL,L〉 ∈ eff i(A), it holds that there exists
CL ∈ prei(A)∪CL such that CL /∈ σ or CL ∈ σ.
Effect justifications denote that a literal is added to a state because there exists an
applicable effect producing this literal. These correspond to derivations made from
the effect part of the ground defeasible effect axioms. Formally, there exists an effect
justification for literal L in state γ(A,σ) if and only if there exists an agent i with a
conditional effect 〈CL,L〉 ∈ eff i(A), such that prei(A)∪CL ⊆ σ. An edge starting from
an effect justification connects it with the literal it justifies on the following layer.
Incoming edges to the justification connect to it every condition in prei(A)∪CL in the
predecessor state. If the effect is not conditional and the action producing this effect
has no preconditions, then the effect justification node has no incoming edges.
4.3.1.2 Arguments
Plan projection graphs contain sufficient information to identify derivations and con-
struct arguments. Every literal node in the graph corresponds to a literal, related to
the corresponding action sequence. This is similar to literals grounded with respect to
a situation term corresponding to a plan in defeasible reasoning with DBATs. There
may exist multiple derivations for a literal. The compound defeasible derivation graph
conveys this information.
Definition 29. Given a plan projection graph G and a node literal L, a compound
derivation graph GL is the subgraph of G which contains every node L′ for which there
is a path from L′ to L and every arc from G among these nodes.
Figure 4.2 depicts a compound derivation graph for a literal L. This graph represents
every possible way that the literal can be derived. A derivation corresponds to a sub-
graph of this graph which contains a single justification node connected to a literal
node on the exactly higher layer. Compound derivation graphs may have multiple
justifications for the same literal.
Definition 30. Given a compound derivation graph GL for a literal L, a derivation
graph for L is a subgraph of GL which contains a justification node connected to every













































Figure 4.2: Compound derivation graph for literal L on the state represented by layer 5
constructed using plan projection data
literal node. Nodes and edges that are not part of a path leading to L are not part of
the graph.
Arguments correspond to derivations, but also require the literal layers to be non-
contradictory. This poses an additional task that needs to be executed over the task
projection data to disqualify derivations made using contradicting literals in the same
state. Similar to the formal argument definitions for arguments in defeasible logic,
these graphs are minimal, in the sense that if we omit any edges or nodes it is impos-
sible to reach the conclusion, and their premises are based on beliefs from the agents’
theory, in terms of initial state beliefs and the operator specification that formulated the
justifications.
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The compound derivation graph corresponds to compound argument graphs, which
include every possible argument that can be put forward for the respective claim. From
these graphs we must exclude every derivation which is based on contradictory literals
within the same layer. Compound arguments may contain multiple justifications of the
















































Figure 4.3: An argument claiming that L holds on the state represented by layer 5
Arguments are subgraphs of the compound derivation graphs. To construct these,
we start from the derived literal in the top literal layer k and add it to the argument
subgraph. Then, we move to the justification layer k and add one justification node j
linked to the literal added in k to the argument graph. Afterwards, we proceed to layer
k−2 and add every literal connected with justification j in layer k−1 to the argument
graph. This process continues, by selecting one justification for every literal in the
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higher layer from the layer below, and every literal for each justification in the higher
layer, until there are no other nodes to be added (i.e. justifications with no conditions
have been reached).
Attacks, similar to defeasible logic programming, are based on the notion of sub-
argument. An attack is defined as a disagreement between a literal regarding a layer
and its negation in the same layer. This can be the claim of the argument or the claim
of a sub-argument of the main argument in the graph. A sub-argument is the sub-graph
of the graph representing an argument, containing the claim of the sub-argument, and
every node for which there is a path connecting it to this literal.
Defeats are calculated based on the attack relation and specific domain dependent
principles, similar to the defeasible basic action theories case. Given an equivalent
preference ordering over arguments that is coupled with two corresponding DBAT and
MPCP problems, both theories provide equivalent acceptability results.
For example, a preference ordering over initial state beliefs and operator specifi-
cations may be used to calculate a preference ordering over arguments based on the
belief with minimal preference used for the derivation of the argument’s conclusion.
Initial state justifications receive the preference value of initial state beliefs. Persis-
tence justifications receive the preference of the literal in the previous state. Finally,
effect justifications receive preference of their least preferred condition or the relevant
action specification if it has a lower preference than the least preferred condition.
Arguments can be represented as tuples of the form 〈B,h〉. B is the support of the
argument and h represents the argument’s claim. Each element of the set B ∪{h} is a
triple of the form 〈L,k, p〉, where L is literal, k is the layer in which the literal appears
and p is the preference value for the derivation of the literal in this layer. Arguments
are non-contradictory, and as a result the support sets cannot contain contradicting
elements such as 〈L,k, p〉,〈L,k, p′〉.
In this setting, we define a relation between the arguments constructed from a
MPCP problem (which follows the initial state completeness assumption) and the ar-
guments generated from the corresponding DBAT.
Definition 31. Consider two arguments α and β, α constructed from a DBAT and β
generated from the corresponding MPCP problem. We say that α corresponds to β
(and β to α equivalently) if and only if:
• Claim(α) = Claim(β)[S], where S is the ground situation term corresponding to
the actions leading to the layer of Claim(β).
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• Every sub-argument of α corresponds to a sub-argument of β.
• Every sub-argument of β corresponds to a sub-argument of α.
The arguments constructed from a DBAT subsume the arguments constructed from the
corresponding MPCP problem.
Proposition 16. Let a MPCP problem P= 〈N,F, I,O,G〉, and the corresponding DBAT
D = 〈Dss,Dap,DS0,Duna,Dc〉, both with complete initial states. Also, let α be an ar-
gument that can be constructed from P. There exists a corresponding argument β
that can be constructed from D with claim h[S], and every sub-argument of the later
corresponds to a sub-argument of 〈B,h〉.
Proof. Proof by induction on the layer k of the claim Claim(α) = L.
(Base Case) k = 1, then the argument claims an initial state belief. From the translation
mechanism of MPCP problems to DBATs, we know that if L ∈ I then L(S0)–≺ ∈ D .
Therefore, there exists an argument claiming L(S0). None of the arguments have any
sub-arguments.
(Induction Step) We assume that the proposition holds for k = n. We show that it holds
for the following literal layer n+2.
Let k = n+ 2. Since there exists an argument for L in layer n+ 1, then L ∈
γ(〈A1, . . . ,Am〉,σ), where the sequence of action A1, . . .Am leads to the state rep-
resented by layer n+2.
From Proposition 10, we know that the defeasible derivations made using a BAT
subsume derivations made using the state transition function in MPCP problems.
As a result, since L ∈ γ(〈A1, . . . ,Am〉,σ, it holds that D ∈ L(Sm), where Sm is the
situation term corresponding to A1, . . .Am.
The final derivation step is made either using a ground defeasible effect or a
defeasible frame axiom. In both cases, every literal in the body of the rule
refers to situation Sm−1, where Sm = do(Am,Sm−1). These literals are part of
γ(〈A1, . . . ,Am−1〉,σ). For every such literal L′ it holds that D |∼L′(Sm−1).
According to the assumption of the induction step, there exists a correspond-
ing argument that can be constructed from D , with the same claim and sub-
arguments, for every argument of layer n (which is the layer where the beliefs
regarding situation terms).
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As a result, for every such literal L′, there exists a sub-argument that can be con-
structed from D . Accordingly, there exists an argument that can be constructed
from D with claim L(Sm), and every sub-argument of the later corresponds to a
sub-argument of β with claim L in layer n+2.
The use of default negation in DBATs leads to the construction of additional arguments
that cannot be constructed from the corresponding MPCP problem. These arguments
are not acceptable.
Proposition 17. Let a MPCP problem P, and the corresponding DBAT D , both with
complete initial states. For every argument α that is constructed from D and that is
acceptable with respect to grounded argumentation semantics, it holds that there exists
a corresponding argument β that can be constructed from P.
Proof. Proof by induction on k length of the situation term S for Claim(α) = L(S).
(Base Case) k = 0. Since D |≈L(S0), we infer that D |∼L(S0). From the theory trans-
lation mechanism from MPCP problems to DBATs, we derive that L ∈ I. As a result,
there exists a corresponding argument form P. Neither of the arguments has any sub-
arguments.
(Induction Step) We assume that the proposition holds for k = n, with Sn. We show
that it holds for k = n+1, in situation Sn+1.
From D |≈L(Sn+1) and Proposition 12, we derive that L ∈ γ(πn+1, I), where πn+1
is the plan corresponding to situation term Sn+1. The derivation that is used for the
acceptable argument claiming L(Sn+1) may be based either on a ground defeasible
frame or an effect axiom for the final derivation step. In both cases, every literal, apart
from the ones preceded by default negation, is warranted. As a result, following the
assumption of the induction step, there exists an argument from P for each one of
these. The MPCP argument generation method ensures that there exists an argument
for every literal that is part of a state, if the relevant conditions (in the case of an effect
rule) or the same literal (in the case of inertia) are part of the previous state. Therefore,
there exists an argument for L in the layer corresponding to situation n+1.
Equivalence of the warrant results from DBATS and MPCP problems depends on
the mechanism that links conditions with persistence justification nodes. We have de-
signed two methods for identifying the incoming connections towards a persistence
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justification node. The first is focused on practicality, whereas the other emulates in-
ference made using frame axioms in a more accurate manner, but is harder to calculate.
The first approach adds an edge from the literal being justified, in the previous
layer, to the persistence justification node. This is similar to an argument generated
from a DBAT that is based on a single step derivation that follows a ground frame
axiom, but disables attacks on default negated literals. Note that we only introduce
persistence justifications if and only if there is an action specification that entails them,
so this method does not introduce arbitrary arguments. However, this inference scheme
is biased towards persistence, compared to the warrant specification in DBATs. As a
result, there may be cases in which according to a MCPC a literal L is warranted
in a state σ (because of persistance), but on the other hand neither L(S) or L(S) are
warranted by the corresponding DBAT (where S is the situation that corresponds to the
plan to reach the state σ). Apart from this, the completeness properties of the approach
is preserved. Consider the following example.
Let 〈{¬Broken(L)},Lit(L)〉 be a conditional effect of the action switch on(L) and a
lamp L. Assume that the initial state includes both Broken(L) and ¬Broken(L), and that
they are equally preferred. As a result, the justification for the effect condition is not
acceptable, since it cannot be defended against an attack on the premises used to derive
the conclusion. Therefore, if ¬Lit(L) is acceptable in the state prior to the application
of the action, then lit(L) is also acceptable after the application of switch on(L). This
does not hold for the corresponding DBAT, since there is not adequate defence against
the attack on the assumption not¬Broken(L) which appears on the successor state
axiom for ∼Lit(L).
We designed an alternative method that overcomes this issue at the expense of
increasing the required amount of reasoning effort. This method adds a persistence
justification, which justifies literal L, for every operator specification and every set of
conditions that sufficiently provide reasons to believe that every conditional effect pro-
ducing L within this specification is not applicable. If there exists only one operator
specification with a single conditional effect this method is simple. For instance, in the
previous example, we only have to add an edge from Broken(L) to the persistence jus-
tification which justifies ¬Lit(L). In the general case this process is complex, since we
need to consider all combinations of conditions that are specified by a single specifica-
tion, and may result in the literal remaining unchanged. This process does not increase
the number of arguments that are constructed, but increases the premises in the support
of arguments that include persistence justifications. The additional premises result in
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further attacks between such arguments, since they allow attacks against these con-
ditions. As a result in order for a literal justified by a persistence justification to be
accepted, all attacks on conditions of the persistence justification must be defended.
This scheme produces the same acceptability results as DBATs in domains following
the initial state completeness assumption.
In practice, we can simplify this process slightly by only performing it literals
which are added as effects to the successor state, but are not deleted since there is
a specification according to which they are unaffected by the final action. Note that
preference orderings with respect to persistence justifications must depend exclusively
on the preference value of the justified literal in the previous state, not on any added
conditions.
4.3.1.3 Labelling Plan Projection Graphs
Argument acceptability is calculated in the same way for argument graphs as for de-
feasible basic action theory arguments. An argument must be defended against every
defeat, according to the relevant argumentation semantics. Algorithm 11 presents a la-
belling method for labelling the nodes of the plan projection graph in order to identify
which literals are warranted. The input of the process is the plan projection graph, and
the output is a labelled plan projection graph. Nodes in the labelled graph are labelled
W or N, according to their warrant information. W denotes that the literal is warranted
in the relevant state according to the agents’ theory, whereas NW represents the con-
trary. The labelling process follows the grounded (sceptical) argumentation semantics.
If a derivation for a literal is based on contradicting literals in the same state σ, then the
final justification that corresponds to this derivation is not warranted, since grounded
(sceptical) argumentation semantics ensure that at least one of these literals will not be
warranted in σ.
4.3.2 Warranted Plans
If plan projection for a plan π succeeds, then π is candidate plan. Following, the
acceptability semantics we introduced for defeasible situation calculus, a warranted
plan for a MPCP problem is a plan π such that:
• There exists an acceptable argument for every goal literal in the top layer.
• For every action Ak in π applied in layer k there exists an agent i, such that for
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Algorithm 11: Labelling algorithm for plan projection graph
Plan projection graph G ;
Labelled plan projection graph GL;
GL := G ;
foreach layer i starting from layer 1 do
if l is even then // l is a literal layer
foreach node n in current layer do
if there exists a justification j leading to n labelled as W then
if layer l does not contain the complement of n then
mark n in layer l as W ;
else if every justification j′ leading to the complement of n is
labelled as NW then
mark n in layer l as W ;
else
pref n := highest preferred justification connected to n and
labelled as W ;
pref n := highest preferred justification connected to n and
labelled as W ;
if pref n > pref n then
mark n in layer i as W ;
else
mark n in layer l as NW ;
else
mark n in layer l as NW ;
else if l is odd then // i is a justification layer
foreach node n in current layer do
if every literal leading to n is labelled W then
mark n in layer l as W ;
else
mark n in layer l as NW ;
return GL;
every literal L ∈ prei(Ak), there exists an acceptable argument with claim L in
layer k.
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Similar to the DBAT plan acceptability semantics, a plan is warranted if its applica-
bility and effectiveness is derived from the agents’ collective beliefs, and the beliefs
supporting it are “stronger” than any possible objections.
A special case of warranted plans are plans which raise no objections. We call these
plans undisputed plans. A plan π is an undisputed plan if it is a candidate plan and for
every literal that is part of the support set of an argument claiming that the goal or a
precondition of an action in the plan holds, its complement is not part of the relevant
layer in the plan projection graph.
Planning is performed as a search for a sequence of actions that forms a warranted
plan. Similar to the algorithms presented in the previous section, pruning the search is
possible based on derivation and warrant information regarding action applicability.
The main difference between planning with DBATs and planning with MPCP prob-
lems with preference orderings over beliefs is a result of the use of default negation
within successor state axioms in DBATs. As a result, defeasible derivations subsume
derivations made using the state-transition function. Defeasible derivations can be
made for arbitrary assumptions, even if there is strong indication that these do not
hold. These assumptions are then disqualified in the argumentation phase. The MPCP
reasoning mechanism does not rely on assumptions and results in deriving a reduced
number of candidate plans. Accordingly, it reduces the necessary argument evaluation
steps, since it essentially focuses on a smaller argumentation framework.
This benefit goes hand in hand with the requirement that the initial state is com-
plete, since in order to be able to handle states with uncertainty in a similar fashion
as in DBATs, a complicated specification of the state transition function is necessary.
The state transition function is used numerous times within the search for candidate
plans, and there is a significant advantage if it is quickly calculated. In addition, in
order to effectively utilise standard planners for the construction of candidate plans,
the specification of our planning domains should deviate as little as possible from the
classical planning domain specification.
4.3.3 Planning using Classical Planners
The custom planners discussed in this chapter do not offer the level of code optimi-
sation and fine-tuning of planning heuristics responsible for the efficiency of state-
of-the-art planners. In this section, we take a different view toward the problem of
identifying candidate plans, and focus on transforming the planning theory into a for-
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mat which is suitable for standard planners.
The main differences between our set-theoretic planning formalism and the classi-
cal planning formalism are:
• absence of contradictory theories,
• multiple operator specifications,
• state transition function,
• preference values over beliefs, and
• derivation and Warrant relations.
Treatment of contradictions is performed through the use of literals instead of atoms.
This is responsible for an increase in theory size, since every literal corresponds to two
atoms. The state transition function is adapted from the standard specification in order
to account for the relations among positive and negative literals referring to the same
atom, when calculating what remains unaffected after the application of an action.
The task of finding warranted plans is strictly worse than planning. The reasons
behind this are the extended size of the theory that is due to the use of literals and
preference values, the additional calculations necessary for the computation of the state
transition function, and the argumentation steps necessary to evaluate the warrant. The
problem of finding candidate plans on the other hand can be viewed as a classical
planning problem. This requires the construction of a planning theory that accounts
for literal-based states, multiple specifications and the non-standard representation of
the state transition function. The following section presents algorithms for planning
with external classical planners, exploiting their highly optimised, heuristic search of
the state space.
4.3.3.1 Synthesising Candidate Plans
Contrary to classical planning, MPCP states can be contradictory, i.e. they may con-
tain both positive and negative literals for the same atom. Standard planners usually
represent states as sets of atoms. Atoms that are not part of a state correspond to neg-
ative literals. This representation enables a compact Boolean notation for every fluent.
Every atom is either true or false in each state.
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States have slightly different semantics in our system. In MPCP problems respect-
ing the initial state completeness assumption, they describe what the agents have reason
to believe in, rather than what the agents know. There are the following cases:
1. We have reasons to believe that the fluent takes a positive value in the state.
2. We have reasons to believe that the fluent takes a negative value in the state.
3. Both (1) and (2) are the case.
We introduce the set of symbols Lp = {q | q ∈ Lp} to L , and replace every negative
ground and unground literal predicate ¬q in the theory with an atom q from Lp, which
has the same arity, constant and variable symbols.
The sets Atoms and GroundAtoms contain all unground and ground instances of the
predicate symbols in Lp. After the application of the transformations every state σ is
a subset of GroundAtoms. Also, sets containing preconditions of operators pre(o) or
conditions Γ for a conditional effect are subsets of Atoms, and effects φ are members
of Atoms.
The initial state is formulated according to the available literal information. If a
positive literal p is part of the initial state we add the atom p to the new initial state.
Accordingly, if we have reasons to believe that a negative literal ¬p holds in the initial
state, we add the atom p.
Further transformations to the operator specification are necessary. First of all, we
need to implicitly account for the removal of the complement of the effects of applied
actions. This operation is usually performed by the planner’s state transition function.
The use of the auxiliary predicates conceals the semantic relation between atoms p
and p from the planner. As a result, the introduction of one of these as an effect of an
action does not affect its complement.
In addition, the transformation needs to aggregate the operator specifications of
multiple agents into a single specification. The operator schema may contain multiple
triples of the form 〈prei,o,eff i〉 regarding the same operator o, representing the speci-
fication of operator o held by agent i. The transformation mechanism asserts that the
constructed specification adheres to the following principles:
• Only the effects for applicable specifications must be triggered (preserving the
link between preconditions and postconditions).
• Every specification implicitly describes which literals are not affected by the
action (i.e. frame axiom).
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Every specification of an operator defines a set of preconditions and a set of conditional
effects. It is rational to assume that the effects are triggered if both the preconditions
and the conditions of the conditional effect are satisfied by the state. In the aggregated
operator specification, the preconditions of each specification also play the role of ad-
ditional conditions to its conditional effects. For instance, if we have the specifications
〈p,o,{〈c,e〉}〉 and 〈p′,o,{〈c′,e〉}〉, the aggregated specification needs to contain the
effects 〈p∧c,e〉 and 〈p′∧c′,e〉. The precondition of the action is the disjunction of the
preconditions of the individual specifications. For operator o, this would be p∨ p′.
Apart from describing the effects of actions, every operator specification implicitly
describes which literals are not affected by it. Multiple specifications provide multiple
implicit rules describing when literals are not affected by an action. Following the
previous example, we focus on the specifications 〈p,o,{〈c,e〉}〉 and 〈p′,o,{〈c′,e〉}〉.
According to the first specification, if we have reasons to believe that p and c hold
in a state, then we have reasons to believe that e holds in the resulting state after the
application of the action. Therefore, according to this specification, we should not
believe that e is the case in the next state. However, if we have reasons to believe
that either p′ or c′ does not hold, then according to the second specification, e is not
affected by the action. Consequently, if we have reasons to believe that it holds in the
previous state, then e is also part of the resulting state.
Due to the use of auxiliary predicates, the planner is unaware of the conceptual
relation between the fluents p and p. If this relation was transparent the planner would
assert that the complements of the effects of the latest action do not hold. We achieve
this manually by introducing additional effects. These effects act as frame rules and
remove the complements (i.e. with respect to the symbol notation) of fluents that
are added to the resulting state. In order to take the existence of multiple operator
specifications and their implicit frame rules into account, we assert that these effects
are only applicable when all specifications are in agreement regarding the relevant
effect. If there exists at least one specification that describes reasons to believe that the
literal is not affected, then we do not remove its complement.
Algorithm 12 describes the necessary process for pre-processing the planning prob-
lem. We slightly abuse the ¯ notation; ψ denotes the replacement of negated literals
¬p with the corresponding new literals p in the negation normal form of the formula
¬ψ. The conditions of conditional effects here are considered to be expressions instead
of sets of literals. A set of literals corresponds to the conjunction of all the literals in
the set. Effects formulate the “add list” of operators, that is the literals that must be
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Algorithm 12: Algorithm for the translation of the collective planning theory to
a theory that can provide suitable input for a standard off the self planner
Replace every negated literal ¬p with a new literal p;
Create S′,O′,σ′0 and g
′;
foreach operator o do
effect := /0;
foreach fluent literal e such that ∃〈φ,e〉 ∈ eff (o) do
foreach 〈pre,o,eff 〉 ∈ O′ do
ψe := ψe∨pre(o)∧ (
∧
〈φ,e〉∈eff (o)φ);
if e /∈ eff (o) then ψe := ψe∨pre(o);












added to a state resulting from the application of the operator. Equivalently, the com-
plements of effects correspond to the “delete list”, that is the list of literals that are
deleted after the application of the operator. The symbol γclassical denotes the standard
state transition function used in classical planning.
The planning problem resulting from the application of the transformation is called
a candidate planning problem, and is the triple P′ = 〈Σ′,σ′0,γclassical〉. Every solution
to the candidate defeasible planning problem is a candidate plan to the corresponding
multiagent defeasible planning problem. This holds because the two formalisms pro-
duce equivalent state-based results, with the auxiliary literals in P′ corresponding to
negative literals in P. The initial state σ′0 is constructed so that the states are equivalent
with respect to this principle. In any successor state, if a literal is added by γ due to
an applicable conditional effect, then the atom corresponding to this literal is added by
γclassical, since an equivalent effect is added to O′. Additional effect rules introduced in
O′ assert that literals introduced by γ due to inertia are also introduced by γclassical.
The translation algorithm we described in the previous section provides a suitable
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theory to be input to a standard off-the-shelf planner. After parsing the theory, the
external planner searches the state-space for a candidate plan. If one is returned, its
warrant state can be evaluated accordingly.
Most planners are designed to return a single plan. However, if this plan is not
warranted, additional search is necessary. By performing suitable modifications to the
planner’s input, we must guide the planer to provide a different candidate plan. Ideally,
the planner should utilise the information obtained during the argumentation phase
regarding the reasons responsible for rejecting the previously synthesised candidate
plans. In this way, there would be a guarantee that future plans do not fail for the same
reasons.
4.3.3.2 Iterative Revision-Based Planner
Algorithm 13 describes the Iterative Revision-Based (IRB) planner which iteratively
calls an external, off-the-shelf planner, evaluates whether the returned candidate plan
is warranted, and revises the theory so that future plans returned from the external
planner do not suffer from the same contradictions. Similar to Algorithm 7, the search
is pruned for plans known to be unwarranted and the argumentation process is limited
to candidate plans. The IRB planning procedure resolves contradictions that are related
to candidate plans. This is particularly helpful in large domains containing information
irrelevant to the goal.
Revising initial state beliefs and simple effects of specifications with the same pre-
conditions is straightforward. We select the one with the highest preference. However,
this is not the case for contradictions in operator specifications. For example, consider
two specifications of an operator, one with the conditional effect 〈{Power(l)},Light(l)〉,
and the other with 〈{Was Sunny(l)},Light(l)〉. Also assume that no other effect in the
specifications is related to the predicate Light(l).
Assume that there are no other effects causing Light(l) or ¬Light(l), and that there
are no reasons to believe that l is lit before applying the operator. According to the first
specification, we have reason to believe that l is lit only if l is connected to a power
source, whereas according to the second this is the case only if the sun is shining.
The two specifications lead to contradictory derivations only in situations in which
we have reasons to believe exactly one of the statements Power(l) and Was Sunny(l).
The resolution of such contradictions depends both on our preferences over the spec-
ifications, and on our preferences over conditions Power(l) and Was Sunny(l) in the
previous state. In the general case, resolution of contradictions is situation-dependent
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π := call external planner(P′);
if project(π) then return π;
else
NW := NW ∪not warrated(P′,π);
P′ := revise(NW,P);
until no new plans exist;
(or plan-dependent), and encoding this information in the planning operators requires
the encoding of action histories in the state space of the planning problem. This is
obviously not practical and would lead to combinatorial explosion.
To overcome this issue, we follow a heuristic approach: We modify the operator
responsible for literals that are not warranted in future situations, and caused previous
plans to fail, so that these ground literals are not produced by the operator. This affects
only the specific ground literal and not the other instances that could arise due to the
same effect clause. This method is not complete, since by deleting the problematic
ground effect we make the generalisation that this effect always leads to contradictory
beliefs, which will not always be the case. However, soundness is preserved as the
warrant status of returned plans are evaluated externally of the employed planner.
4.3.3.3 GHC Planner
Algorithm 14 presents our GHC planner. This planner operates under a similar princi-
ple with the EHC algorithm presented in Section 4.2.2.5. GHC selects from the literals
that are warranted in the initial state and calls an external planner for a candidate plan.
If a plan is returned, it greedily traverses through the actions of the plan to the suc-
cessor states, until all actions have been applied or an action whose application is not
warranted in the corresponding state is met. The greedy approach allows minimising
calls to the external planner, enabling the quick traversal to states which can potentially
achieve the goal.
When the application of the actions finishes, if the goal is warranted, the planner
returns this plan. Alternatively, the planner searches for a state with a better quality
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Algorithm 14: GHC Planner
σ := I;
history := 〈〉;
σw := {L | L ∈ σ and L is warranted};
candidate := call external planner(σw);
candidatew := the maximal sequence of actions in candidate which are
warranted in sequence w.r.t. σ;
σ := γ(candidatew,σ);
history := history+ candidatew;
while a threshold ε is not reached do
progressed := false;
if all goal conditions are warranted in σ then
return history;
foreach action A whose application is warranted in σ do
σ′ := γ(A,σ);
σ′w := {L | L ∈ σ′ and L is warranted};
if all goal conditions are warranted in σ′ then
return history+ 〈A〉;
candidate′ := call external planner(σ′w);
candidate′w := the maximal sequence of actions in candidate′
which are warranted in sequence w.r.t. σ′;
if |candidate′w|> 0 then
σ := γ(candidate′w,σ′);
history := history+ 〈A〉+ candidate′w;
progressed := true;
break;
if progressed = false then
return null;
return null;
in the neighbourhood of the current state, i.e. the states that can be reached with one
transition by an action whose application is warranted. The quality of the state is
calculated as the number of actions in the candidate plan the external process returns
for this state, whose application is warranted in sequence. The quality of the current
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state is 0. Higher numbers correspond to better heuristic values. If a state with a higher
heuristic value is found, then the planner greedily selects it and repeats the process with
this state as the current state. The greedy approach allows the planner to quickly move
to better states without searching through the entire neighbourhood, which in extensive
domains may include thousands of states. This is very important as in every step the
planner is required to performed argumentation steps in combination with calls to the
external planner.
In order to minimise the possibility of circles in neighbouring states, the order
actions are considered is non-deterministically selected in every iteration. The standard
way to avoid such cases is to maintain lists of the traversed states. However, this
is not effective in this case, since because states containing the same literals are not
necessarily equivalent, since they may entail different warrant results. Hence, in order
to comprehensively evaluate whether two states are equivalent we must compare their
sets of literals, their warrant status and their relevant preference orders. The alternative
is to evaluate state equivalence based on the history of actions that led the planner to
these states, i.e. in a similar fashion to a situation term in DBATs.
GHC evaluates the warrant status of literals based on a forward and a backward
step. The literals that are contained in a state is computed in a forward manner. Sub-
sequently, we evaluate their warrant status based on a labelling process in a backwards
chaining manner. If the warrant results of the predecessor states have been already
evaluated before we traversed to the current state, these results are reused. We store
the warrant information and (for warranted literals and justifications) the preference
value. Accordingly, if the warrant evaluation results regarding the predecessor state
have been calculated, the labelling process is limited to one backward step.
In order to increase the potential of the returned candidate plans, GHC evaluates
the warrant status of the literals in the current state, and feeds the external planner with
a state that does not include literals that are not warranted. As a result, the external
planner solves a candidate planning problem that does not necessarily respect the ini-
tial state completeness assumption. This does not affect the correctness of the GHC
algorithm, since the returned candidate plans are used to calculate the heuristic value
of a state, which only indicates the direction of the search. The actual state transitions
are performed based on complete states.
Heuristic search may lead to a local maximum, or continue without reaching a goal
state. In order to ensure termination we limit the path the planner can traverse. Ad-
ditionally, in order to safeguard termination in domains with extensive size of actions,
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we bound the number of states that can be considered.
4.4 Summary
This chapter investigates the problem of synthesising warranted plans that solve plan-
ning problems in which agents share goals, but hold different views on the initial
state and the operator specifications. A naive implementation of this process based
on propositional argumentation is impractical due to the size of the generated ground
theories. To tackle this problem, we propose a series of planning algorithms that are
based on specific queries for the derivation and evaluation of their warrant status of
literals in the situation resulting after the application of relevant actions. With this, we
manage to prune the search space. In order to further increase efficiency, we present
strategies for selecting the most prominent point of attack during argumentation. In
addition, taking inspiration from the planning literature, we present a planning heuris-
tic based on the defeasible derivation relation that can be used to guide the search and
prioritise actions.
Apart from the presented algorithms that are based on DBAT, this chapter focuses
on the set-theoretic MPCP representation and specifies arguments, acceptability and
warranted plans. With this formalism, we focus on the differences between MPCP and
classical planing. Based on these observations, we propose algorithms that delegate
the search for candidate plans to efficient external planners.
Contrary to standard state space planning, the search for candidate plans, is bound
to the notion of situation (or history), since the warrant status of literals is relevant
to the history of actions that led to this state. States in which the same literals can
be derived do not always share the same warrant results. Warrant information can be
introduced within the state. However, this results in an significant increase in the state
space.
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• Focus on the algorithmic aspects of MPCP.
• Formulation of the planning sub-problem of MPCP in a format suitable for clas-
sical planners.
• Presentation of pruning strategies, heuristics, and algorithms for planning with




The methods described in the previous chapter provide centralised solutions to the
problem of multi-perspective cooperative planning. Such techniques require commu-
nication of all beliefs prior to planning. In the general case, this is not optimal since
it involves the communication of beliefs which neither support nor object to potential
plans. Moreover, in special cases, this process may be potentially problematic. For ex-
ample, agents with privacy constraints may not want to subscribe to mechanisms that
require them to share their entire knowledge base, including beliefs that do not provide
insight to the problem at hand.
This chapter presents a family of dialogue-based protocols for the distribution of
the solution finding mechanism. The dialogue-based approach allows cooperative
agents to search the space of potential plan proposals, resolve contradictory beliefs
and reach agreement while aligning their knowledge. This is achieved by exchanging
meaningful arguments regarding concrete potential proposals.
The approach presented in this chapter is based on the combination of argumenta-
tion theory and (defeasible) situation calculus in a distributed setting. The dialogue-
based nature of the mechanism enables the distribution of the argumentation process.
Agents initiate discussions about concrete plans they have generated individually. They
then collaboratively resolve contradictions in their beliefs that are relevant to the eval-
uation of the discussed plans. As a result, this process avoids the communication of
beliefs that are irrelevant to the specific problem and the resolution of irrelevant incon-
sistencies.
We present an abstract argument-based protocol that enables discussion of can-
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didate proposals and extend it for the specific problem of arguing about plans. The
dialogue is broken down into sub-dialogues, which discuss alternative proposals. If
a sub-dialogue fails, the protocol ensures that the source of the disagreement is dis-
covered and resolved, and that the knowledge of the agents is gradually aligned as
participants’ local misconceptions are uncovered. The main dialogue-based protocol
is extended to enable multi-party dialogue and collaborative argument generation.
The work presented in this chapter has been previously published by Belesiotis
et al. (2009) and Belesiotis et al. (2010).
5.2 Iterated Disputes
We start by describing iterated disputes, our two-agent dialogue framework at the level
of abstract argumentation (Dung, 1995), together with a protocol for iterated argumen-
tation that is suitable for arguing over plan proposals as we will later show. We assume
two-player situations; in the case of more than two agents, our results carry over as-
suming pairwise dialogues are conducted between all agents to reach agreement among
the full set of agents.
Argumentation theory provides strong theoretical foundations for formally defining
the notion of acceptability, and mechanisms for the identification and resolution of
conflicts. An abstract argumentation approach provides modular representation and
abstraction between different aspects of the problem. Argumentation-based dialogue
enables the agents to share their beliefs together with justifications explaining how the
knowledge has been obtained. Justifying claims enables the resolution of conflicts,
because it provides additional information regarding the reasons why beliefs should be
accepted.
5.2.1 Dialogue Protocol
Figure 5.1 outlines the iterated disputes dialogue protocol, which extends two-party
immediate response disputes for grounded argumentation semantics (Dunne and Bench-
Capon, 2003), in order to allow the evaluation of multiple proposals. Every iteration
is followed by an argument revision step which aligns the argument sets of the agents.
We consider the agents to have distinct argument sets, instead of sharing the same pool
of arguments, which is usually the case in disputes.
The agents evaluate the acceptability of a proposal through a dispute (Dunne and



























Figure 5.1: Outline of an iterated dispute
Bench-Capon, 2003). The agent that made the proposal plays the role of the proponent
PRO, leaving the role of opponent OPP to the other party. The proponent is respon-
sible for constructing arguments in favour of the proposal, while the opponent’s role
is to show that the proposal should not be accepted. The dialogue game progresses
with each agent presenting arguments defeating the arguments of their rival. Iterated
disputes facilitate the discussion of different proposals in sequence.
The following analysis follows Dunne and Bench-Capon (2003). Let an abstract ar-
gumentation framework AF = 〈Args,Defs〉, with Args = ArgsPRO∪ArgsOPP the union
of the arguments that are available to the proponent and the opponent respectively. A
dispute tree for some argument ρ in Args, denoted by T , is a tree with root ρ whose
vertices and edges are subsets of Args and Defs, respectively. The edges in a dispute
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tree are directed from vertices to their parent node. Depth(T ,α) for an argument α in
a dispute tree T denotes the number of edges in the dispute line from α to the root of
the tree. Children(T ,ν,e) represents all arguments in T that have ν, which is located
in depth e, as their parent node.
A dispute line is a path in the dispute tree:
νk→ . . .→ ν1→ ν0 = ρ .
For every two consecutive arguments ν j and ν j−1 in a dispute line it holds that ν j
defeats ν j−1 (i.e. ν j→ν j−1).
A dispute line is called open/closed if the agent who has to make the following
move is able/unable to defeat the other party’s most recent move. A closed dispute line
for some argument ρ is a failing defence/attack of P if the leaf node argument move
has been made by the opponent/proponent.
A dispute for some argument ρ is a sequence of moves:
d = 〈m1,m2, . . . ,mk, . . .〉
affecting a dispute tree that has ρ as its root. Every dispute evaluates the acceptability
of a candidate proposal. Dispute d after k moves will be denoted as dk. The state of
the dispute dk is a tuple:
State(dk) = 〈Tk,νk,CSPROk ,Pk,Qk,Argsk〉 .
Tk is the dispute tree after the most recent argument move νk. CSPROk contains argu-
ments that have been presented by the proponent in the current dispute line providing
defence on ρ. Pk is the set of arguments the proponent has presented in the current
dispute tree. Qk contains sets of arguments presented by the proponent that failed
to defend ρ. Argsk represents the arguments that have been exchanged in the dis-
pute by both agents, excluding the proposal argument. We will refer to a dispute as
being closed if the agent who has to make the following move is unable to make a
move affecting the tree of the dispute. A closed dispute line for some argument ρ is
a failing defence/attack if the final move affecting the dispute tree was made by the
opponent/proponent.
An iterated dispute is a sequence of disputes d = 〈d1,d2, . . . ,dl, . . .〉. An iterated
dispute can be rewritten as a sequence of legal moves d = 〈m1,0,m1,1, . . . ,ml,k, . . .〉,
where ml,k denotes the kth move of the lth dispute. The boolean function Legal(m,d)
succeeds if all the conditions specified by the move hold before the move is applied.
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CurrentDispute(d) returns the most recent dispute, PreviousMoveType(d) denotes the
type of the most recent move, and Proposal(d) is d’s root argument.
The applicability of dialogue moves is specified by sets of conditions and effects.
The following moves dictate the rules that achieve grounded semantics. We extend
the moves proposed by (Dunne and Bench-Capon, 2003) by introducing additional
ones to allow dialogue over multiple disputes and additional structures to maintain
unsuccessful proposals. The propose move initiates a new dispute. The agents are
restricted to propose new arguments from P , which is the set of all possible proposals.
ml,0 = 〈propose, i,ρ〉
Conditions: Effects:
PreviousMoveType(d) ∈ {close, Roles are switched
no-proposal}, or d= 〈〉 Tl,0 := 〈ρ〉
∀d in d, Proposal(d) 6= ρ νl,0 := ρ
ρ ∈ GE〈Argsil−1∪{P},Defs〉 CS
PRO
l,0 := {ρ}
ρ ∈ P Pl,0 := {ρ}
Ql,0 := /0
Argsl,0 := /0
The no-proposal move is made when an agent is unable to present a new proposal.
ml,0 = 〈no-proposal, i〉
Conditions:
PreviousMoveType(d) = close or d= 〈〉
@ρ s.t. Legal(m,d), for m = 〈propose, i,ρ〉
The terminate move can be used after a no-proposal move in order to terminate the dis-
cussion when no alternative proposals can be presented by either one of the agents. In
this case, the iterated dispute finishes without reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
ml,0 = 〈terminate, i〉
Conditions:
PreviousMoveType(d) = no-proposal
@ρ s.t. Legal(m,d), for m = 〈propose, i,ρ〉
Chapter 5. Dialogue Protocols 150
Counter moves respond to the other party’s most recent argument in a dispute. Se-
quences of counter moves expand the current dispute tree in a depth-first manner. In
order to conform to grounded argumentation semantics, the proponent is not allowed
to present conflicting arguments, or repeat the same arguments in the same dispute
line. In addition, the proponent is prohibited from repeating lines of defence that have
already failed in the current line of defence. This is achieved by disabling PRO to
formulate a line of defence extending a line that has been added in Ql,k.
ml,k = 〈counter,OPP,υ〉
Conditions: Effects:
PreviousMoveType(d) ∈ Tl,k := Tk−1 + 〈υ,νk−1〉
{propose,counter,retract} νl,k := υ
υ ∈ ArgsOPPl−1 ∪CSPROl,k−1 CSPROl,k := CSPROl,k−1





PreviousMoveType(d) ∈ Tl,k := Tk−1 + 〈υ,νk−1〉
{counter,backup} νl,k := υ
υ ∈ ArgsPROl−1 CSPROl,k := CSPROl,k−1∪{υ}
υ→ νl,k−1 Pl,k := Pl,k−1∪{υ}
υ 6∈ CSPROl,k−1 Ql,k := Ql,k−1
CSPROl,k−1∪{υ} is conflict-free Argsl,k := Argsl,k−1∪{υ}
∀R ∈ Ql,k, R 6⊆ Pl,k−1∪{υ}
The notation Tk−1+〈υ,νk−1〉 represents the dispute tree resulting from adding the node
υ and the edge 〈υ,νk−1〉 to the dispute tree Tk−1.
If PRO’s most recent argument cannot be countered, OPP makes an alternative
defeat using the backup move. In this way, the opponent is allowed to backtrack and
focus on the most recent argument in the current dispute tree that was presented by
PRO and is defeated by an alternative argument that is held by OPP.




υ ∈ ArgsOPPl−1 ∪CSPROl,k−1
χ = νb is the most recent argument in the dispute line
νn→ . . .→νb→ . . .→ρ for which:
− δ = Depth(χ)+1 is odd
− υ→ χ
− υ 6∈ Children(Tl,k,χ,Depth(χ)).
Effects:








The retract move can be used by the proponent in order to attempt to provide an alter-
native line of defence if it is not possible to counter an argument presented by OPP. In
order to ensure that the proponent does not repeat the same line of defence, as it has
been already shown to fail, the proponent’s arguments are stored in Ql,k.
ml,k = 〈retract,PRO〉
Conditions: Effects:
PreviousMoveType(d) Tl,k+1 := 〈ρ〉
∈ {counter,backup} νl,k+1 := ρ
@χ s.t. Legal(m,d) for CSPROl,k+1 := CS
PRO
l,0
m = 〈counter,PRO,χ〉 Pl,k := Pl,0
Ql,k := Ql,k−1∪{Pl,k−1}
Argsl,k := Argsl,k−1
The accept proposal move is preformed by the opponent, closing the most recent dis-
pute as a failing attack and terminating the dialogue in favour of the most recent pro-
posal.




@υ s.t. Legal(m,d), for m = 〈counter,OPP,υ〉









The close dispute move is available to the proponent and closes the most recent dispute




@υ s.t. Legal(m,d), for m = 〈counter,PRO,υ〉








The restrictions specified by the protocol are quite liberal, since they do not always
impose a singe move. For instance, an agent that holds different defeaters to the most
recent argument presented by the other party can make multiple legal counter moves.
In order to automate the move selection process, and ensure that the dialogue leads to
correct results, we pair the dialogue protocol with the confident strategy. A strategy
is a set of rules which select exactly one move from the set of all legal moves. The
confident strategy constructs a move based on a complete ordering over all possible
legal options. Preference over moves is calculated according to:
1. The following ordering over move types:
〈counter,backup,retract,close,accept,propose,no-proposal, terminate〉.
2. The preference level of the argument presented by the move, for moves of the
same type.
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If the preference ordering over arguments is partial, a complete ordering is obtained by
prioritising moves that are equally preferred in a non-deterministic manner.
The confident strategy ensures that every relevant argument is exchanged eventu-
ally. In addition to this, the strategy expands the argumentation tree in a depth-first
manner, which allows us to prune paths that do not alter the acceptability status of the
proposal argument that is being evaluated.
5.2.2 Properties
This section presents important properties of the abstract argumentation protocol of
iterated disputes. The following proofs assume that the dialogue is conducted between
two agents following confident strategies.
Proposition 18. An iterated dispute for agents with finite argument sets always termi-
nates.
Proof. The agents’ arguments are finite. The proponent cannot repeat the same argu-
ments in the same dispute line, and cannot repeat infinite backup moves as each one
represents an alternative line of defence. Therefore, disputes always terminate. If there
exists a dispute that is a failing attack of the proposal, the iterated dispute will termi-
nate. We show that there can be no infinite sequence of disputes that are all failing
defences. For proposal ρ and dispute l+1, if dl+1 is a failing defence of ρ, there exists
a set of arguments OPP against which ρ cannot be defended. PRO can only present
proposals that are part of GE〈ArgsPROl ∪{ρ},Defs〉, which are defended against all defeats
from ArgsPROl . Since ρ is not defended against all defeats in the dispute, there exists
at least one argument β that was presented by OPP and is not part of ArgsPROl . The
agents have finite argument sets and after every dispute they learn the arguments pre-
sented by the other party. So there cannot be an infinite sequence of disputes that are
failing attacks. Therefore, an iterated dispute always terminates.
In order to prove soundness, we introduce two key lemmas. The following lemma
shows that, if a dispute dl is a failing attack of a proposal ρ, then ρ will be in the
grounded extension of the argumentation framework 〈ArgsOPPl ∪ {ρ},Defs〉, where
ArgsOPPl are the arguments that the opponent will know after the dispute terminates.
Lemma 1. Let dl be a closed dispute about ρ between agents PRO and OPP, with
finite argument sets ArgsPRO0 = A and ArgsOPP0 = B that follow a confident strat-
egy. If dl is a failing attack of ρ then ρ ∈ GEAFOPPl for the argumentation framework
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AFOPPl = 〈ArgsOPPl ∪{ρ},Defs〉, where ArgsOPPl denotes the arguments known to OPP
after dispute dl .
Proof. All nodes presented by OPP in the dispute tree T = Tl,k have one child node
presented by PRO, since the proponent can only add a new argument to the dispute tree
using the counter move. A dispute closes as a failing attack if the proponent counters
every counter and backup move made by the opponent. Therefore, all leaf nodes are
presented by PRO. We will show that all arguments of even depth in T are part of
the grounded extension of AFOPPl by induction over the distance between them and the
leaf nodes in the tree.
(Base Case) For distance = 0, let V0 be the leaf node arguments of depth n.
These arguments were presented by PRO. Also, ∀αn ∈ V0,@βn−1 ∈ ArgsOPP∪
CSPRO such that βn−1→αn, because if such an argument existed OPP would
have presented it, due to the specification of the confident strategy and the counter
and backup moves. Let F iOPP be the characteristic function of AF
OPP
l . All leaf
node arguments in V0 are part of F 1OPP, since there are no arguments in Args
OPP
l
defeating them. So V0 ⊆ GEAFOPPl .
(Induction Step) We assume that the property holds for arguments of distance k
from the leaf nodes, Vk ⊆ GEAFOPPl . We will show that the property holds for
arguments of distance k+2. All arguments of distance k+2 from the leaf node
Vk+2 are defeated by an argument in Vk+1, which are in turn defeated by argu-
ments in Vk. Also, there is no other β′k+1 ∈ ArgsOPPl that defeats any argument
in Vk+2 that has not been presented, because of OPP’s strategy. According to
the induction step Vk ⊆ GEAFOPP , so Vk+2 ⊆ GEAFOPPl .
Therefore, all arguments of even distance from the leaf nodes will be part of
GEAFOPPl , including ρ.
The following lemma shows that for agents with finite and conflict-free initial argument
sets, which have exchanged subsets of their arguments, if a proposal is acceptable with
respect to the arguments both agents know, then it will be also acceptable with respect
to the union of both agents’ arguments.
Lemma 2. Let AF1 = 〈{ρ} ∪A ∪B ′,Defs〉, AF2 = 〈{ρ} ∪A ′ ∪B,Defs〉 and AF =
〈{ρ}∪A ∪B,Defs〉, with A , B finite, conflict-free argument sets, A ′ ⊆ A and B ′ ⊆ B .
If ρ ∈ GEAF1 ∩GEAF2 then ρ ∈ GEAF.
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Proof. We will first show by induction on the characteristic function FAF1 that ∀β ∈
B ′ s.t. β ∈ GEAF1 it holds that β ∈ GEAF. It holds that B is conflict-free, and β,ρ ∈
GEAF1 , therefore all arguments defeating β will be in A .
(Base case) ∀β ∈ F 1AF1 , there exists no argument defeating β in {ρ}∪A ∪B
′. There
will be no argument defeating β in {ρ}∪A ∪B , so β ∈ GEAF.
(Induction step) We assume that ∀β ∈ FAFk , β ∈ GEAF, and we show that is holds for
∀β ∈ FAFk+1 . All arguments defeating β in {ρ}∪A ∪B ′ are also part of {ρ}∪A ∪B .
Since ρ ∈ FAFk+1 it is defended against these attacks by arguments in FAFk . These
arguments are part of GEAF according to the induction step. Therefore, β will also be
in GEAF.
ρ ∈GEAF1 , therefore for all α in A defeating ρ, there is some β ∈GEAF1 such that
β defeats α. β will also be in GEAF. Therefore, for any argument α ∈ A defeating ρ,
there exists β ∈ GEAF defeating α.
Accordingly, we can show that for any β ∈ B defeating ρ, there exists an argument
α ∈ GEAF defeating β. Therefore, β is defended against all defeats from {ρ}∪A ∪B
by arguments in GEAF. So ρ ∈ GEAF.
The following proposition asserts that for agents following confident strategies, with
initially conflict-free argument sets, if a proposal is accepted by the dialogue, then it is
acceptable with respect to the union of the agents’ arguments.
Proposition 19. If an iterated dispute between two agents i, j following confident
strategies, terminates accepting a proposal argument ρ, then ρ is in the grounded
extension of the argumentation framework AF = 〈A ∪B ∪{ρ},Defs〉, where A and B
are the initial, finite and conflict-free argument sets for agent i and j respectively.
Proof. Let i be the agent that made the accepted proposal. Consider the following
argumentation frameworks: AFPRO = 〈A ∪B ′ ∪ {ρ},Defs〉 and AFOPP = 〈B ∪A ′ ∪
{ρ},Defs〉. A ∪B ′ denotes the arguments PRO knew before initiating the final dispute
and B ∪A ′ is the set of all the arguments OPP knows after the dispute has terminated.
A ′ ⊆ A and B ′ ⊆ B . The agents follow confident strategies, so the proponent will
propose arguments that are in the grounded extension of AFPRO. According to Lemma
1 the proposal argument will be in the grounded extension of the opponent GEAFOPP if a
dispute terminates as a failing attack. According to Lemma 2 if the proposed argument
is in GEAFPRO ∩GEAFOPP then it is part of GEAF.
In the general case the proposal acceptance of iterated disputes is sound with re-
spect to the agents’ individual arguments. In the special case in which both agents
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initial argument sets are individually consistent, accepted proposals are sound with re-
spect to the union of the agents’ arguments. This follows from the persuasion dialogue
nature of the protocol, and shows that the focus of this protocol is to reach a mutually
acceptable agreement. This result is also based on the exhaustive nature of the con-
fident strategy, which ensures that agents investigate all relevant lines of defence and
attack.
5.3 Arguing with Defeasible Basic Action Theories
Given that we now have a working protocol for iterated dispute dialogues, we focus
on the internal structure of arguments. The planning knowledge of each agent is repre-
sented in defeasible situation calculus in the form of a defeasible basic action theory.
5.3.1 Plan Proposal Arguments
Plan proposal arguments are potential solutions to the multi-perspective cooperative
planning problem. The claim of such arguments must convey that the situation term
S = do([A1,A2, . . . ,An],S0) which corresponds to the proposed plan 〈A1,A2, . . . ,
An〉, is an executable situation which satisfies the goal literals. This is denoted by
the expression:
executable(S),goal(S).
As explained in Section 4.2, the expressions executable(S) and goal(S) are abbrevia-
tions. They are equivalent to:
• Poss(A1,S0), . . . ,Poss(An,do([A1,A2, . . . ,An−1],S0)) and
• G1(S), . . . ,Gm(S) respectively.
The literal predicates G1, . . . ,Gm represent the shared goal.
Following the specification of arguments in defeasible logic programming, the
claim of an argument is a ground literal predicate. Accordingly, in order to encode
plan proposal arguments, we introduce the following additional axiom to every agent’s
DBAT:
Plan(S)–≺executable(S),goal(S) ,
The special literal Plan(S) is added to the defeasible situation calculus language to
represent that a situation term S corresponds to a plan which achieves the goals of the
agents and whose actions are applicable in sequence.
Chapter 5. Dialogue Protocols 157
5.3.2 Dialogue Setting
The dialogue setting consists of two agents, each one holding a separate DBAT rep-
resenting their planning knowledge. Given a DBAT D , the set of corresponding ar-
guments is bound by the relevant situation terms used for grounding D . In order to
restrict the setting to finite argument sets, we consider a reasonably large set of ground
situation terms. Initially the set of available arguments for agent i ∈ {1,2} is denoted
by the set Argsi0. Args
i
0 denotes the set of all arguments that can be constructed from
theory D grounded for every situation term of reasonable length ε.
In practice, agents do not have to construct their initial argument sets as argument
generation can be performed on demand. Also, for the purpose of a single dispute,
agents need to consider only the arguments that are relevant to the ground situation
term S, which appears in the claim of the plan proposal that initiated the dispute. Every
argument which does not refer to a situation that is equal to or a predecessor to S is
irrelevant.
After the kth dispute, i holds its initial argument set and the arguments introduced
by the other agent during these disputes. This set is denoted by Argsik. The pro-
posal move asserts that the proponent proposes arguments that are acceptable with re-
spect to their argumentation framework. Also, if a proposal is found acceptable in the
k + 1th dispute of the dialogue, then this proposal is defended against every defeat
presented by the opponent. As a result, the proposal argument is part of the grounded
extension of the argumentation framework AFkPRO = 〈ArgskPRO,Defs〉 and the frame-
work AFkOPP = 〈ArgskOPP ∪A ,Defs〉, where A are the arguments that the proponent
presented during dispute k+1.
5.3.3 Dialogue with Conflict-Free Argument Sets
In the general case, since individual DBATs may be contradictory, the argument sets
held by the agents are not conflict-free. However, if we restrict their initial argument
sets we can extend the results of Proposition 19 to dialogues about plans.
5.3.3.1 Arguing with Individually Acceptable Arguments
One way to ensure that the initial argument sets are conflict-free is to restrict them to
the arguments that are acceptable with respect to individual theories. In this setting,
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the argument set for agent i is specified as follows:
Ârgs
i
0 = GE〈Argsi0,Defs〉 .
Following Proposition 19, every proposal ρ accepted by the dialogue is part of the
grounded extension of the argumentation framework ÂF = 〈Ârgs,Defs〉, where Ârgs =
GE〈Args10,Defs〉∪GE〈Args20,Defs〉.
5.3.3.2 Encoding Domains without Default Negation
The use of default negation in the frame part of successor state axioms is responsible
for multiple contradictory derivations, even in theories which encode non-contradictory
planning knowledge. Defeasible derivations treat default negated literals as assump-
tions and shift the burden of the evaluation of these assumptions to the argumentation
process.
We can axiomatise the planning domain without the use of default negation, simply
by replacing it with normal negation. Consider the following ground frame axiom for
the literal L(do(a,s)), where F1 and F2 are fluent predicates:
L(do(A,S))–≺L(S),not F1(S),not∼F2(S) .
The equivalent ground axiom with normal negation in the place of the default negation
has the following form:
L(do(A,S))–≺L(S),∼F1(S),F2(S) .
During the grounding process, and after the transformation of axioms into a well-
formed structure, we simplify consecutive occurrences of normal negation symbols
by removing them in pairs for as long as two negation symbols exist in sequence.
Let a DBAT D , we represent the corresponding theory obtained by replacing default
negation as D̃ .
In the general case, there are derivations made from D based on assumptions
which cannot be derived from D̃ . These derivations may correspond to undefeated
arguments. For instance, let a ground literal L(S) such that D |6∼L(S) and D |6∼L(S).
The use of normal negation in place of default negation strictly restricts the defeasi-
ble derivations that can be made from the theory. As a result, in this case it holds
that D̃ |6∼L(S) and D̃ |6∼L(S). In addition, assume that there exists an undefeated argu-
ment claiming L′(do(A,S)), which is constructed from D based on the assumption that
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not L(S). No corresponding argument can constructed from D̃ since there exists no
derivation for L(S). Assuming that there are no other arguments claiming L′(do(A,S))
that can be constructed from D or D̃ , we reach the conclusion that D |≈L′(do(A,S))
and D̃ |6≈L′(do(A,S)).
It is clear from the previous example that, in the general case, the warrant results
obtained from theories D and D̃ do not coincide. However, the translation is still useful
in the special case in which theories are complete with respect to initial situation beliefs
and contain one successor state axiom for every literal, with non-contradictory initial
states and action effects. In other words, theories in which for every literal L and every
ground situation S it holds that D |≈L(S) or D |≈L(S). As a result, every argument
produced from the default negation-free theory based on an assumption not L(S) which
cannot be derived (i.e. D |6≈L(S)), is defeated by an acceptable argument claiming its
complement L(S).
Standard planning theories fall into the above category. Given the corresponding
DBAT without default negation D̃ , for every ground literal L(S) it holds that there
exists a defeasible derivation of exclusively one of L(S) and L(S). As a result, the
sets of arguments constructed from D̃ is conflict-free. Therefore, if both agents hold
standard planning theories, and a proposal argument is accepted by a dispute, then
this argument ρ is acceptable with respect to the argumentation framework consisting
of the union of the agents’ arguments. Formally in this case, for the plan proposal
argument ρ, it holds that ρ ∈ GEAF, where AF = 〈Args,Defs〉.
5.3.4 Belief Alignment
The iterated disputes dialogue protocol aligns the beliefs of the agents by allowing
them to incorporate the arguments that were presented by the other agent to their own
sets. This is particularly useful with respect to arguments that remained undefeated,
or are used in the dialogue to successfully defeat the agent’s proposal. By considering
these arguments, the agents assert that future proposals will not be rejected for the
same reasons that caused previous proposals to fail.
The belief alignment mechanism of the protocol works on the argument level. In
order to take this process to the belief level, the agents must consider the supporting
beliefs of the arguments. This leads to the generation of additional arguments based
on each agent’s individual knowledge combined with the new information that arises
during the dialogue. Agents may incorporate new information to their belief sets after
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the end of unsuccessful disputes. Alternatively, agents may re-calculate argument sets
after every move made by the other party. The latter speeds-up the belief alignment
process, but increases the required argument generation steps.
Arguments are supported by ground axioms which are only relevant to the specific
proposal under discussion, and other proposals based on the same action subsequences.
These ground rules have been constructed based on unground defeasible situation cal-
culus axioms. In order to further facilitate the belief alignment process, agents can
communicate, in conjunction to such ground beliefs, the unground axioms used to
obtain these rules, as well as the associated preference values.
5.3.5 Minimal Plan Proposals
The support of a plan proposal argument is the minimal set of domain beliefs from
which the claim of the proposal argument can be deduced. Depending on the length of
the plan and the form of the axioms, the size of the support set can be extensive. In the
worst case it can be comparable in size to the entire domain knowledge. In this section
we present an alternative form of plan proposal arguments and discuss the advantages
and drawbacks of such an approach.
The argument ρ is a minimal plan proposal argument if Claim(ρ) = Plan(S) and
Support(ρ) = {Plan(S)}. If DPROl are the beliefs for agent i after iteration l, then
in order for agent i to present this argument, the following statement must hold: for
all literals X appearing in the abbreviations executable(S) and goal(S) it holds that
DPROl |≈X . Minimal plan proposal arguments present the belief that the plan holds
without providing the support for this claim.
We extend our protocol, enabling the opponent to challenge the support of mini-
mal proposal arguments, and the proponent to expand them accordingly. This is useful
when the opponent has no reason to neither accept or object to the proposal and re-
quires more information to evaluate it properly.
The challenge move challenges a future situation statement in the support of a plan
proposal argument.
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ml,k = 〈challenge,OPP,X〉
Conditions: Effects:
PreviousMoveType(d) ∈ Tl,k := Tl,k−1
{proposal,expand,counter} νl,k := null
Tk = 〈ρ〉 CSPROl,k := CSPROl,k−1
∃L(S) ∈ Support(ρ) such that Pl,k := Pl,k−1
DOPPl |6≈L(S) Ql,k := Ql,k−1
Argsl,k := Argsl,k−1
The expand move can be used after a challenge move, extending the proposal argument
and justifying the challenged support. This move works as one-step derivation.
ml,k = 〈expand,PRO,Φ〉
Conditions: Effects:
µk = 〈challenge,OPP,L(S)〉 Tl,k := Tl,k−1 with ρ
Φ∪Support(ρ) is non-contradictory replaced by ρ′
Φ∪Support(ρ) |∼L(S) Vl,k := ρ′
Φ∪Support(ρ) is minimal CSPROl,k := (CSPROl,k−1 \{ρ})∪{ρ′}







The confident strategy is extended accordingly:
〈counter,backup,retract,challenge,expand,
close,accept,propose,no-proposal, terminate〉 .
A line of consecutive challenges and expansions can be continued until the support
of the proposal includes statements about the initial state. Each expansion replaces a
sentence with a set of axioms and sentences of the previous situation that are sufficient
to derive it. The overall number of consecutive challenges and expansions is bound by
the number of actions in the plan. The opponent can terminate a line of challenges and
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expansions using a counter move. If the proponent does not defend the plan against all
defeats, then the dispute terminates, and there is no need for the proponent to commu-
nicate the remaining support of ρ.
This extension is useful for proposals with extensive support. The benefit is that
the proponent will need to expand the support of ρ only for the statements for which
the agents disagree. An extreme case in which this extension minimises the required
communication is when the opponent immediately agrees with the claim of the plan
proposal argument, without making any challenges or counter moves.
The modified protocol does not always produce sound results with respect to the
union of both agents’ arguments. The opponent may accept a minimal argument if
the same conclusions are made from DOPP. However, the proponent’s argument may
be based on a literal L(S) which is not warranted from the opponent’s theory, and
against which OPP holds a defeater, that cannot be in turn defeated. Equivalently,
the proponent may hold arguments that can defeat the opponent’s view on why the
plan is acceptable. Therefore, the minimal proposal protocol may lead to incorrect
conclusions if the agents have different reasons for accepting a proposal, and all these
reasons are flawed. The following simple propositional example illustrates this issue:
Example 5. Let agent i and agent j’s theories B i = {b,a–≺b,∼c} and B j = {∼b,
a–≺c,c} respectively. Also let the preference levels pref (〈{∼c},∼c〉) >
pref (〈{c},c〉) and pref (〈{∼b},∼b〉) > pref (〈{b},b〉). We consider the preference
value of the argument to be the lowest preference value of any one of the beliefs
in its support. Both agents cannot counter and will not challenge the minimal pro-
posal argument 〈{a},a〉, since a is warranted from both agents’ beliefs. However,
in both cases the non-minimal corresponding proposal arguments 〈{b,a–≺b},a〉 and
〈{c,a–≺c},c〉, are not acceptable with respect to the union of the agents’ argument
sets.
The modified version can substantially reduce the size of the proposal arguments,
when agents disagree about a small subset of their knowledge. This protocol produces
sound results with respect to both argumentation frameworks 〈ArgsPROl−1 ∪{ρ},Defs〉,
and 〈ArgsOPPl ∪{ρ},Defs〉, for a minimal proposal argument ρ.
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5.4 Multi-Party Iterated Disputes
When faced against problems that require the cooperation of multiple agents, the it-
erated disputes protocol requires the agents to argue in pairs. Such an approach is
not always practical, since it requires multiple dialogues in order to reach agreement.
In addition, the outcome of the overall process depends on the order these dialogues
are conducted. During every dialogue, agents learn new information, which results
in the construction of additional arguments. As a result, certain chains of arguments
may never come up, since there may exist individual arguments which never become
common knowledge.
5.4.1 The Multi-Party Iterated Disputes Protocol
In order to tackle the issues related to the two-party nature of the protocol, we present
modifications that enable multiple agents to participate in one dialogue. The resulting
mechanism allows every agent to present all relevant arguments, regardless if these
arguments support or object to the evaluated proposal. The main idea behind this
extension is that the roles of the proponent and the opponent are not assigned to a
single agent for an entire dispute. On the contrary, a role is assumed temporarily, for
just one move, by the agent who is better capable to progress the state of the dialogue.
More specifically, at the beginning of every turn, all agents advertise the legal move
that they would play if they assumed the role which is active in the current turn. The
player advertising the most prominent move assumes the role and progresses the state
of the dispute by preforming this move. The selection of the move with the higher
preference is based on the confident strategy according to the following principles:
1. Ordering over move types:
〈counter,backup,retract,close,accept,propose,no-proposal, terminate〉 .
2. For backup moves, the move with the highest depth e.
3. The preference level of the argument presented by the move, for moves of the
same type.
4. If the above rules do not apply, pick an agent randomly.
The first two rules assert that the argumentation tree that corresponds to the dia-
logue is expanded in a depth-first manner for every potential plan proposal. This is
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performed by the assignment of the highest preference to moves countering the last
argument in the current path. If no agent can construct a legal counter move, then
depending on whether the current turn is played by the proponent or the opponent, the
backup and retract moves are prioritised. Backup moves enable the opponent to pro-
vide an alternative attack to an argument supporting the plan proposal. We prioritise
the potential moves based on the depth of the node in which the attack is made. Defeats
closer to the leaf of current line are preferred.
Multiple moves of the same type may be advertised (with equal e in the case of
backup moves). If these moves introduce an argument (i.e. they are counter, backup,
retract, or propose moves), the mechanism selects the move presenting the argument
with the highest preference order. Finally, if all moves are equivalent, one move is
selected non-deterministically.
When multiple proposal moves are advertised, the move that proposes the plan
with the highest preference is played. As a result, the algorithm is not sequential with
respect to turn-taking. Agents that cannot contribute to the dispute are not assigned the
role of the proponent and the proponent, and as a result their moves are not performed.
However, due to the exhaustive nature of the dialogue, every opinion that is relevant to
discovering and evaluating proposal arguments is always presented.
5.4.2 Properties
Similar to the two-party protocol, this process performs exhaustive search to the poten-
tial plan proposal arguments and the arguments supporting and defeating them. How-
ever, in the multi-party version, the virtual proponent and the opponent agents are
equipped with an argument pool containing the union of the agents’ argument sets.
Given finite initial argument sets, multi-party dialogues always terminate.
Proposition 20. Multi-party iterated disputes between between a group of agents
N = {1,2, . . . ,n} with finite initial sets of arguments and potential proposals always
terminate.
Proof. This follows from the termination of iterated disputes and the hypothesis that
initial argument sets are finite. The rules prohibiting the proponent agent to repeat
the same arguments in the same dispute line are imposed on the virtual proponent
agent. The arguments that are available to the virtual proponent agent are bound by
the union of the agents’ arguments. Since this set is finite, disputes always terminate.
Finally, since according to the hypothesis potential proposals are finite, and in every
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new dispute a new proposal must be made, the number of iterated disputes is bound
by the number of potential proposals. As a result, multi-party iterated disputes always
terminate.
The results of the dialogue are sound with respect to the set of arguments that
can be generated from all agents. More specifically, an argument is accepted by a
multi-party iterated dispute if and only if it is part of the grounded extension of the
argumentation framework 〈Args,Defs〉, where Args is the union of the arguments that
can be generated from the union of the agents’ individual theories.
Proposition 21. Let a terminated multi-party iterated dispute between a group of
agents N = {1,2, . . . ,n} with finite initial sets of arguments Argsi0 for agent i. The
final dispute is a failing attack against a proposal argument ρ if and only if ρ ∈





Proof. We focus on the final dispute accepting ρ. Due to the specification of the confi-
dent strategy in multi-party iterated disputes, this dispute is equivalent with a two-party
dispute between agents A and B, such that ArgsA = ArgsB = Args, which both follow
the standard confident strategy. In both cases, a counter move is prioritised if there
exists an argument in Args that defeats the last argument introduced by the other party.
Also, in both cases, the move presenting the argument with the highest preference is
selected. If a counter move is not available, and it is the opponent’s turn to make a
move, then OPP searches to backtrack to the most recent argument in the current path
of the dialogue that can be attacked. The same process is performed by the virtual
opponent in the multi-party dialogue. If it is the turn of the proponent the retract move
is played in both cases accordingly.
According to Lemma 1, if the dispute terminates as a failing attack on an argument
ρ, then ρ ∈ GE〈ArgsOPPl ∪{ρ},Defs〉, where Args
OPP
l are the arguments that the opponent
agent knows after the termination of the dispute. Since the agents initially hold equiv-
alent argument sets, ArgsOPPl = Args. As a result, ρ ∈ GE〈Args∪{ρ},Defs〉.
Without further modifications to the dialogue moves, this process is sound but in-
complete. The specification of proposal moves requires every proposal to be acceptable
with respect to the arguments of the agent presenting it. Consider the case in which
a proposal argument is held only by one agent, and let this argument be unacceptable
with respect to this agent’s argument set. This proposal cannot be presented. If the
agents collectively hold arguments that are acceptable and can support the proposal
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argument against every attack, then this proposal argument is part of the grounded
extension of the collective argumentation framework.
To ensure completeness, we introduce another proposal move (preferably with
lower preference) enabling agents to present proposals that are not in the grounded
extension of their individual argumentation sets. The result of the devised protocol is
sound, since the agent making the proposal can in turn attack it. At the same time, the
resulting protocol is complete, since agents may make proposals that are not accept-
able with respect to their individual argument sets, but are acceptable with respect to
the union of the agents’ arguments.
Multi-party iterated disputes do not follow the turn-taking mechanism of iterated
disputes, since they do not ensure that turn taking is alternated among the agents.
Agents who hold the most relevant arguments to the state of the dispute are given pri-
ority. The selection of the most suitable party for the current role does not require
additional centralised control. Information about the advertised moves may be broad-
cast from every agent to all other agents participating in the dialogue. The evaluation
of move preference does not require information that is internal to the agents, and can
be conducted based on the advertised moves alone.
The advantage of this protocol is twofold. On the one hand, it provides a mecha-
nism for multi-party distributed argument evaluation. On the other, by allowing agents
to present arguments both in favour and against a proposal, this method is complete.
As a result, if an acceptable argument exists, then it is always identified. However,
this process requires the agents to exchange all relevant arguments, including argu-
ments that they believe to be unacceptable. As a result, it is more expensive than a
standard iterated dispute, since it requires the exploration of every argumentation path,
regardless of the agents’ individual views.
In the two party setting with inconsistent individual argument sets, the multi-party
version of the protocol is preferable to the standard version of iterated disputes. Due to
the lack of explicit-turn taking with fixed roles, it allows agents to introduce arguments
that both defeat and defend a proposal. This is important if argument paths exist that
can be constructed from the union of the agents’ argument sets which may never appear
using the standard iterated disputes protocol.
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5.5 Inquiry-Based Iterated Disputes
The results discussed so far are based on a notion of soundness that focuses on the
argument level. More specifically, in order to evaluate the correctness of our protocols
we investigated the outcomes of iterated disputes with respect to the arguments that
can be constructed from individual agent theories.
A centralised argumentation mechanism operating over the union of the agents’
beliefs D evaluates the correctness of the proposals with respect to the arguments that
can be constructed from D . This set is greater than the union of the argument set
that can be generated from individual theories, since the generation of certain argu-
ments from D may be based on beliefs that are distributed among the agents’ theories.
Such arguments are not available to any individual agent. In order to tackle this issue,
we combine our protocol with the argument inquiry protocol presented by Black and
Hunter (2007, 2009), and enable distributed argument generation.
5.5.1 Argument Inquiry Dialogues
The argument inquiry protocol is based on multiple nested dialogues that search the






The move open initiates a new inquiry dialogue which searches for a derivation
of a defeasible rule (or a defeasible fact) r. The symbol x denotes the agent making
the move. For instance, the open move can initiate a new dialogue for the expression
a–≺b,c.
A question store is associated with each dialogue maintaining the literals that re-
quire support. Following the previous example, the move 〈open,x,a–≺b,c〉 initiates
a dialogue with the literals b and c in its question store, whereas the move 〈open,x,c〉
begins a dialogue with c in its question store.
The agents use the assert move to present the arguments they can construct and
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which claim a literal that is contained in the question store of the current dialogue.
These arguments can be later used as sub-arguments for the arguments constructed for
the main claim in question. A commitment store is associated with each agent, main-
taining the beliefs (in terms of defeasible rules and facts) supporting the arguments
asserted by this agent. These commitment stores are used for argument generation,
since each agent can utilise both its private knowledge and the beliefs in the other
party’s commitment store.
The close move denotes that the agent does not hold any other meaningful piece
of information related to the literals in the question store of the current dialogue. The
current dialogue terminates if both agents make consecutive close moves. This is called
a matched-close.
The argument inquiry strategy selects the next move for agents participating in the
inquiry protocol. Assert moves are prioritised over open moves, which are in turn
preferred over close moves.
As a result, agents initially present the arguments they can construct for every open
question in the question store of the current dialogue. After every relevant argument
has been presented, they open new dialogues following any rules they hold whose head
is a literal contained in the question store. Every such rule initiates a new dialogue,
which may lead to the construction of additional arguments that cannot be synthesised
individually. This process results in nesting inquiry dialogues. When there is no further
assert or open move that can be performed, the agents close the current dialogue and
return to the previous one.
The outcome of an inquiry dialogue is the set of arguments that can be constructed
from the union of the agents’ commitment stores. Black and Hunter (2007, 2009)
show that argument inquiry dialogues terminate and their outcome is equivalent to the
arguments that can be constructed from the union of the participating agent’s theories.
The inquiry argument protocol is designed for two-party argument generation.
However, it can be easily extended to accommodate multiple-party dialogue, since
the issues associated with multi-party dialogue are not present in this case due to the
collaborative and exhaustive nature of the process (Black and Hunter, 2009).
5.5.2 Argument Inquiry in Iterated Disputes
Similar to our methods, argument inquiry protocols are defined on top of defeasible
logic programming. The main differences in the structure of the agents’ beliefs in
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Black and Hunter (2007, 2009) and grounded defeasible basic action theories is that
DBATs consider all beliefs to be defeasible rules, and default negation is allowed in
the bodies of these rules. In DBATs, defeasible facts are represented as presumptions
(i.e. defeasible rules with an empty body).
In order to allow the use of default negation, a minor modification must be made
to the argument inquiry protocol. Default negated literals must not be added to ques-
tion stores, since they are treated as assumptions. This is a minor modification which
simplifies the argument generating process, since no new dialogues have to be intro-
duced for default negated literals. The definition of arguments should also be adapted
to account for default negation. The termination, soundness and completeness results
of the protocol are not affected by this minor modification, since they still correspond
to the equivalent argument generation process from a single collective theory.
Another difference between the two frameworks is the preference ordering over
beliefs and arguments in DBATs. To this end, the assert move must be associated with
the preference value of the presented argument. If another agent holds a different pref-
erence ordering that leads to a different preference value for this argument, a different
assert move must be made. As a result, the protocol is modified so that argument
uniqueness is defined in terms of support, claim and preference, instead of just support
and claim.
The commitment stores for the inquiry dialogue are not equivalent to the com-
mitment stores used in iterated disputes. First of all, they store different pieces of
information, since the latter store arguments, rather than beliefs. Most importantly,
they serve a different role. The commitment stores in iterated disputes are used to
create lines of attack (and defence) against the evaluated proposal argument, whereas
commitment stores in inquiry dialogue are used to extend the agents’ theories with the
beliefs presented by the other party.
5.5.2.1 The Inquiry-Based Iterated Disputes Protocol
We enable nested argument inquiry dialogues within iterated disputes using the follow-
ing additional moves: inquire proposal and inquire attack. The first initiates an argu-
ment inquiry dialogue of the form 〈open,x,Plan(S)–≺executable(S),goal(S)〉, where
S is the ground situation corresponding to plan π, and x is the agent initiating the dia-
logue. It has the following structure:
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ml,k = 〈inquire proposal, i,S〉
Conditions:
PreviousMoveType(d) = close or d= 〈〉






S ), for every agent x
Outcome(dinqS ) denotes the outcome of the inquiry dialogue initiated by agent x, for
the defeasible rule Plan(S)–≺executable(S),goal(S). Proposal inquiry moves may be
performed at the end of a dispute in order to allow agents to collaboratively generate
proposal arguments.
In a similar fashion, the agents can use inquire attack moves to search for potential
attackers against the most recent argument move.
ml,k = 〈inquire attack, i,r〉
Conditions:
PreviousMoveType(d) ∈ {propose,counter,backup}
r ∈ attacker claims(νlk−1)







), for every agent x
The inquiry attack move conducts an inquiry dialogue for a possible point of attack
against νlk−1. The elements of the set attacker claims(ν
l
k−1) denote the claims of every
potential argument attacking νlk−1. These are the complements of the claims of sub-
arguments of νlk−1, the claim of ν
l
k−1, or default negated literals appearing in the bodies
of defeasible rules in Support(νlk−1). More specifically, this set is specified as follows:
attacker claims(α) =
{ψ | α′ is α or α′ is a sub-argument of α, and Claim(α′) = ψ}∪
{ψ | r ∈ Support(α) and not ψ appears in the body of r} .
The conditions of the inquire attack move assert that the agents do not conduct the
same inquire dialogue twice, since the necessary arguments are already part of their
argument sets.
Chapter 5. Dialogue Protocols 171
The inquire attack move allows the agents to identify potential defeaters of the
most recent argument presented by the other party. In order to enable the agent to
present these arguments, turn-taking must allow the same player to make the next
move. To achieve this we introduce a the noop move that a player is obliged to perform
exactly after an inquire attack move.
ml,k = 〈noop, i〉
Conditions:
PreviousMoveType(d) = inquire attack
Argument inquiry dialogues are treated by the iterated disputes moves as black
boxes. They achieve the alignment of the agents’ argument sets regarding all argu-
ments claiming a literal r (which opened the inquiry dialogue) that can be collabora-
tively generated. Inquiry dialogues can be optimised by prohibiting the agents from
opening argument inquiry sub-dialogues that have been opened again by a previous
inquiry dialogue.
In order to assert that all relevant arguments are shared knowledge, the agents must
initiate an inquiry dialogue for every potential proposal and point of attack of any
argument presented during an iterated dispute. This leads to an exhaustive approach
which ensures that the results of the dialogue are sound and complete with respect to
the arguments that can be generated from the agents’ collective beliefs. To achieve
this, we adapt the specification of the confident strategy priority ordering as follows:
〈noop, inquire attack,counter,backup,retract,close,accept,
propose, inquire proposal,no-proposal, terminate〉 .
The inquire attack move is preferred over every argument move in the protocol. This
asserts that before presenting a defeater, agents have every defeater that can be gener-
ated from the union the agents’ theories at their disposal.
5.5.2.2 Properties
The exhaustive use of the inquire attack move ensures that accepted proposals are
sound with respect to the arguments that can be generated from the union of the agents’
beliefs.
Proposition 22. Let a terminated inquiry-based iterated dispute D between two agents
i and j following confident strategies. Also, assume that ρ is the proposal of the final
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dispute l of the iterated dispute. Dispute l terminates as a failing attack on ρ if and only
if ρ ∈ GEAF, where AF = 〈Args,Defs〉, Args are the arguments that can be generated
from the union of the agents beliefs and Defs denotes all defeat relationships between
them.
Proof. Assume that the final dispute l is a failing attack. Prior to any counter moves
made by the opponent, due to the specification of the confident strategy for inquiry-
based iterated disputes, the opponent used multiple inquire attack moves to find all
potential defeaters against the most recent argument presented by the proponent. As
a result, for every argument A presented by the proponent in the current path, all de-
featers of A are known to the opponent in l. Let ArgsOPPl be the arguments available
to the opponent after l. ArgsOPPl = Args
OPP
l−1 ∪CSPROl ∪ inquiry outcomes(l), where
inquiry outcomes(l) are the outcomes of the inquiry dialogues conducted in l. There is
no argument in Args\ArgsOPPl defeating an argument in the path form ρ to νlk presented
by the proponent. As a result, the opponent using the exhaustive confident strategy has
presented every argument in ArgsOPPl that defeats the proponents’ arguments. There-
fore, the inquiry-based dispute emulates a standard dispute in which the arguments
that are initially available to the opponent are ArgsOPPl−1 ∪ inquiry outcomes(l). Accord-





conflict-free, ρ∈GE〈ArgsOPPl ,Defs〉. Finally, since no argument in Args\Args
OPP
l defeats
ρ or the arguments that defend ρ, it holds that ρ ∈ GE〈Args,Defs〉.
If l is a failing defence of ρ, there exists a tree in which the defeaters presented by
the opponent cannot be countered by arguments presented by the proponent. For every
argument presented by opponent, the proponent knows every counter-argument from
Args. Since the exhaustive strategy enables the proponent to present any relevant ar-
gument, there exists no set of arguments defending the proposal against the arguments
presenting by the opponent. As a result ρ 6∈ GEAF.
Termination of the process requires bounding exchanged proposals to a finite set.
Proposition 23. Inquiry-based iterated disputes between two agents i and j who follow
the confident strategy and are bound to proposing plans of maximum length ε always
terminate.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 18 and from bounding the potential pro-
posal and proposal inquiry moves to finite situation terms. Termination of inquiry
dialogues is based on the results of Black and Hunter (2007, 2009), the finite size of
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the agents’ theories and the fact that the protocol of inquiry-based iterated disputes
prohibits the agents to make repeated inquiry moves for the same claim.
Completeness with respect to a finite set of plans is guaranteed by exhaustive use
of the proposal inquiry move. However, to achieve this, the proposal move has to be
modified, similar to the previous section, to enable agents present proposals that are
not acceptable with respect to their individual arguments.
Corollary 1. Let D an inquiry-based iterated dispute between two agents i and j
following confident strategies bound to plans of maximum predefined length. If the
iterated dispute fails then there exists no proposal argument P that can be constructed
from the union of the agents’ beliefs such that ρ ∈ GEAF, where AF = 〈Args,Defs〉 is
the argumentation framework containing all arguments that can be constructed from
the union of the agents’ beliefs.
Proof follows from the use of the exhaustive inquire proposal move which asserts that
the agents share knowledge regarding every argument regarding a proposal that can
be constructed from their collective beliefs, and the completeness results of argument
inquiry dialogues (Black and Hunter, 2007, 2009).
The distributed argument generation of every potential plan (bound to a threshold
on the length of the plan) is a very expensive process. As a rule of thumb, the agents
can prioritise proposal inquires regarding plans whose success can be derived from
their individual beliefs, then plans whose failure does not derive from their individual
beliefs, and then everything else. The first category are plans that have been proposed
earlier in the dialogue process unsuccessfully. Using proposal inquiry the agents can
collaboratively search for an alternative support which potentially formulates an ac-
ceptable argument. The second category searches for plans against which the agents
have no objections, even though their success does not derive from any individual the-
ory. More specifically, given an agent theory Di, such plans correspond to a situation
S such that:
• D |6≈Plan(S)–≺executable(S),goal(S),
• ∀S′ that are predecessor to S, D |6≈∼Poss(A′,S′), where A′ is the action applied
in S′ according to the plan, and
• ∀G j(S) appearing in the abbreviation goal(S), D |6≈∼G j(S).
Finally, if no plan is accepted, the agents may search the space of potential proposals
exhaustively.
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5.6 Arguing with Basic Action Theories
The abstract nature of iterated disputes allows its use in conjunction with different
underlying logical formalisms. In order to illustrate this, we present an alternative
instantiation of the protocol of iterated disputes based on standard Reiter-style situation
calculus (Reiter, 2001).
Compared to the defeasible situation calculus variant of the iterated disputes dia-
logue protocol, this version offers a more expressive logical formalism for the spec-
ification of the planning domain. However, it assumes that individual theories are
non-contradictory and agents hold one successor state axiom for every fluent predi-
cate in their theories. Similar to DBATs, a preference ordering is associated with the
contents of the agents’ initial situation beliefs and domain axioms. The resolution of
contradictions is based on the selection of the initial state belief or axiom with the
highest preference ordering. As a result, the aggregation of agents’ axioms, which is
implicitly performed while reasoning with DBATs, is not supported.
5.6.1 Arguments
The arguments held by the agents contain statements in the language of situation cal-
culus. We employ an intuitive argument definition from the literature (Amgoud and
Cayrol, 1998; Amgoud et al., 2000a). Arguments are defined based on an inference
procedure ` in a knowledge base, and reinterpret the defeat relation using logical con-
tradiction:
Definition 32. Arguments for agent i∈ {1,2} are pairs α = 〈H,h〉, where H ⊆ 2LSitCal ,
where LSitCal is the set of all well-formed situation calculus sentences.
1. H is consistent (i.e. H 0⊥),
2. H ` h,
3. H is minimal (no subset of H satisfies both (1) and (2)).
H is called the support of the argument and h its conclusion. We will also use the
following notation: Support(α) = H, and Claim(α) = h. The preference level of an
argument α is denoted by pref (A), and is the minimum preference level of a statement
in Support(α).
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Definition 33. An argument α1 = 〈H1,h1〉 defeats an argument α2 = 〈H2,h2〉, denoted
α1 → α2, if pref (A1) ≥ pref (A2) and, either there exists h′ in H2 ∪ {h2} such that
h1 ≡ ¬h′ or h1 = (F ≡Ψ), φ = (F ≡Φ) and Φ 6= Ψ, where F is a predicate symbol.
The defeat relation considers contradictory beliefs and formulas providing different
definitions of the same symbol. Reasoning about actions is based on the axioms rep-
resenting the domain. It is essential that the domain theory does not include different
axioms regarding the same predicate.
5.6.2 Planning Knowledge
The domain knowledge for agent i after dispute k, is a set of beliefs B ik, generated using
the arguments in the grounded extension of AFik, GEAFik , as illustrated below:
Algorithm 15: Algorithm for the construction of the domain knowledge bases
Compute GEAFik , for AF
i
k := 〈Argsik,Defs〉;
B ik := {h | ν ∈ GEAFik ∧Claim(ν) = h};
forall the h ∈ B ik do
pref (h) := maximum preference of an argument ν with Claim(ν) = h;
return B ik;
We consider the initial argument sets of the agents to be conflict-free. If all of their
claims are basic action theory statements, all future domain beliefs constructed by this
algorithm will be basic action theories.
5.6.3 Plan Proposals
A plan for a goal G is represented in situation calculus by the statement:
executable(Sπ)∧G(Sπ). Sπ is a variable-free situation term representing the history
for the execution of the actions of the plan in sequence, and executable(sπ)
def
=
(∀a,s∗).do(a,s∗)v sπ ⊃ Poss(a,s∗). A consequence of the definition of a plan and the
foundational axioms for situations is that ∀a,s . executable(do(a,s))≡ executable(s)∧
Poss(a,s).
Definition 34. Plan proposal arguments for agent i after dispute k for a shared goal
G, are all arguments ρ s.t. i) Claim(ρ) = G(Sπ)∧ executable(Sπ), with S0 @ Sπ, ii)
Support(ρ) is the minimal subset of B ik such that Support(ρ) ` Claim(ρ).
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If ρ is a plan proposal argument then ρ∈ P . The preference level of a plan proposal
argument is equal to the lowest preference level of the claims in its support.
The agents can obtain the support set of a plan proposal argument using Reiter’s
regression operator R . The regression operator eliminates statements with complex
situation terms by replacing them with logically equivalent statements that refer to situ-
ations closer to the initial state. The process is repeated until all fluents in the statement
refer to the initial situation. The logical equivalence follows from the relevant action
preconditions and the successor state axioms. A detailed analysis of the regression
operator can be found in Reiter (2001).
The support of a proposal argument contains the minimal subset of domain beliefs
and unique names assumptions sufficient to infer R [claim(α)], as well as the equiva-
lencies that were employed by the regression operator.
Example 6. Using the axiom ∀a,s . F(do(a,s)) ≡ (a = A1)∨ (a = A2)∨ ( f (s)∧ a 6=
A3), R [F(do(A4,S0))] returns A4 = A1 ∨A4 = A2 ∨F(S0)∧A4 6= A3, which can be
simplified to F(S0).
The following proposition asserts that for all plans that can be constructed from
an agent’s planning knowledge, the plan proposal arguments for these plans will be
part of the grounded extension of 〈Argsil ∪{ρ},Defs〉, where Argsil are the arguments
known to agent i after dispute dl .
Proposition 24. If ρ is a plan proposal argument with Claim(ρ) = G(Sπ) ∧
executable(Sπ), constructed in iteration k by agent i, then ρ ∈ GE〈Argsil∪{ρ},Defs〉.
Proof. The proposal argument ρ does not defeat any argument in GE〈Args,Defs〉, since
Claim(ρ) refers to a future situation Sπ with S0 @ Sπ, whereas all statements in the
claim or support of arguments in GE〈Args,Defs〉 are initial situation statements, non-
fluent statements and domain axioms. Therefore, ∀α∈GE〈Argsil ,Defs〉, it will be the case
that α ∈ GE〈Argsil∪{ρ},Defs〉. All statements in the support of ρ are claims of arguments
in GE〈Argsil∪{ρ},Defs〉, therefore any defeats against P will be defended by arguments in
the grounded extension. So ρ ∈ GE〈Argsil∪{ρ},Defs〉.
Proposition 25 extends the result of Proposition 19 to dialogues about plans.
Proposition 25. If an iterated dispute terminates with both agents accepting a plan
proposal ρ, then ρ ∈ GE〈Args∪P,Defs〉, for agents with initially conflict-free argument
sets following confident strategies.
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Proof follows from propositions 19 and 24. This proposition asserts that under the
aforementioned assumptions, if a plan is proposed by the proponent and accepted by
the opponent though the dialogue, then this plan is acceptable with respect to the union
of the arguments of all agents.
Plan generation is conducted as planning. Planning can be performed in situation
calculus (Reiter, 2001), or by an equivalent PDDL representation (Röger et al., 2008)
using a standard planner.
5.7 Summary
This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of a dialogue-based, distributed solution to
the problem of multi-perspective collaborative planning. This analysis is based on the
protocol of iterated disputes, which allows two agents to discuss potential proposals
and reach conclusions about their acceptability. The protocol is based on abstract
argumentation. Given a finite set of arguments it guarantees termination. In the general
case, accepted arguments are sound from each agent’s individual perspective.
The standard version of the protocol is based on persuasion. It assigns specific roles
for every specific proposal to agents, and restricts the arguments that they can present
according to their role. In the special case that the agents initially hold conflict-free
argument sets, the protocol guarantees that successful proposals are acceptable with
respect to the union of the agents’ arguments.
In order to relax the assumptions about the two-party nature of the approach, we
modified the protocol enabling multi-party discourse. The resulting version of the pro-
tocol enables the exchange of roles, allowing the agent who holds the most prominent
move to make it at any point in the dispute. The results showed that accepted propos-
als of the multi-party version of the protocol are sound with respect to the union of the
agents arguments.
In order to guarantee sound and complete results in the belief level, we presented
a two-person inquiry-based version of the protocol. In this case, agents are allowed
to enter inquiry dialogues, and collaboratively generate arguments for specific claims.
This process is very expensive, but allows sound and complete (bound to plans of
specific length) results with respect to the arguments that can be constructed form the
union of the agents’ beliefs.
Iterated disputes focus on agreement and allow agents to directly evaluate potential
proposals which they individually consider to be viable. As a result, they do not col-
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laborative explore the argument and belief space. Multi-party iterated disputes allow
the agents to collaboratively explore the argument space, offering a stronger notion
of soundness. Compared to the other versions of our protocol, multi-party iterated
disputes do not guarantee equal opportunities to agents to present their arguments.
Inquiry-based iterated disputes are the most expensive version of our protocol, since
agents are required to exhaustively search the defeasible derivation space for potential
arguments. However, inquiry-based iterated disputes offer an even stronger notion of
soundness since these results are equivalent to the ones obtained from a centralised
argumentation process operating on the union of the agents’ beliefs.
In order to show the generic nature of iterated disputes, we presented concrete
versions of the protocol for both defeasible basic action theories and standard basic
action theories. Situation calculus offers higher expressive power then defeasible situ-
ation calculus. However, this version of the protocol requires individual theories to be
non-contradictory, and does not allow agents to aggregate the conclusions made using
different axioms.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarised as follows:
• A family of abstract protocols for dialogue-based collaborative agreement on a
proposal.
• Formal analysis of termination, soundness and completeness of the presented
protocols.
• Concretisation of the protocol for the problem of multi-perspective cooperative
planning based on standard and defeasible basic action theories.
Chapter 6
Evaluation
Following our hypothesis, this chapter conducts a comprehensive evaluation of our
methods, which investigates the following questions:
1. Is the problem of multi-perspective cooperative planning common?
2. Is argumentation theory suitable for the specification of the MPCP problem?
3. What is the quality of the proposed solution to the MPCP problem?
In order to answer these questions, we review our analytical results, empirical exper-
imentation with benchmark planning domains, and discussion about MPCP problem
instances in important real-world domains. The latter is not a formal evaluation of our
methods, but a discussion regarding the applicability potential of our approach.
6.1 Review of Analytical Results
This section reviews the results of our analytical evaluation. First of all, we look into
the proposed formalism, and investigate its ability to represent MPCP problems in a
succinct manner. In order to evaluate the suitability of the formalism, we motivate
our design choices, and compare the formalism with standard languages for reasoning
about dynamic domains. The second part of this section focuses on the proposed rea-
soning mechanisms, and summarises their formal properties that were presented in the
previous chapters.
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6.1.1 Formalism
This section evaluates the expressiveness of defeasible situation calculus and defeasi-
ble basic action theories. We focus on the following questions:
• Can this formalism represent MPCP problems?
• Does it produce succinct representations?
In order to adequately answer these questions we look into the main features of the
language to investigate whether the formalism fulfils its primary purpose. We overview
important aspects of our formalism and, in order to highlight our design choices and
illustrate its expressive power, compare it to formalisms from the relevant literature.
6.1.1.1 Formalism Adequacy
The question whether the proposed formalism is sufficient to represent MPCP prob-
lems has two sides. First of all, it is related to whether the Ldefsitcal language and
DBATs are adequate to encode set-theoretic MPCP problems. In addition, since the
main purpose behind the introduction of the formalism is to provide the means to de-
cide which conclusions are rational to accept, we look into the limitations of the use of
grounded argumentation semantics.
The formal results described in Chapter 3, and particularly Proposition 13, explain
that reasoning about plans with basic action theories emulates state-based derivation,
and specifies an argumentation-based reasoning mechanism on top of that. DBATs
are strictly more expressive than MPCP problems. As a result, the expressiveness of
DBATs is sufficient to represent MPCP problems.
Ldefsitcal is based on a combination of situation calculus and defeasible logic pro-
gramming. It has been designed to allow reasoning about dynamic domains with con-
tradictory theories.
The resolution of contradictions depends on the employed argumentation seman-
tics. The presented analysis of the specification of the problem, and our proposed so-
lution mechanism, are based on grounded (sceptical) argumentation semantics. These
semantics have been selected for their practicality (i.e. they are relatively inexpen-
sive to calculate), and for their sceptical nature, which is essential in safety-critical
domains.
We designed our methods in a modular way to enable the use of different argu-
mentation semantics. The only method presented that is more tightly coupled to the
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specific semantics is the iterated disputes protocol. However, even in this case modify-
ing the protocol to follow different argumentation semantics is straightforward, since
it is based on two-party immediate response disputes, and alterations to the protocol
for different argumentation semantics have been proposed in the literature (Vreeswijk
and Prakken, 2000).
Grounded semantics have limitations in situations in which reasoning by cases is
required. In order to investigate the importance of reasoning by cases and expose any
limitations of grounded argumentation semantics in relation to reasoning with DBATs,
we investigate special cases.
Example 7. Assume a specification of the action flip(switch), containing the condi-
tional effects 〈{Up(switch)},Lit(lamp)〉 and 〈{¬Up(switch)},Lit(lamp)〉. This spec-
ification corresponds to the following successor state axiom grounded for the objects
switch = Switch and lamp = Lamp in situation S1 = do(flip(Switch),S0):
Lit(Lamp,S1)–≺Up(Switch,S0);∼Up(Switch,S0);Lit(Lamp,S0)
∼Lit(Lamp,S1)–≺∼Lit(Lamp,S0),not Up(Switch,S0),not∼Up(Switch,S0)
Let the initial state be {Up(Switch),¬Up(Switch),¬Lit(Lamp)}, and assume that all




β1 : 〈{∼Lit(Lamp,S1)–≺∼Lit(Lamp,S0),not Up(Switch,S0),not∼Up(Switch,S0),
∼Lit(Lamp,S0)},∼Lit(Lamp,S1)〉,
ψ1 : 〈{Lit(Lamp,S1)–≺Up(Switch,S0), Up(Switch,S0)},Lit(Lamp,S1)〉,
ψ2 : 〈{Lit(Lamp,S1)–≺∼Up(Switch,S0), ∼Up(Switch,S0)},∼Lit(Lamp,S1)〉.
The defeats among the arguments are depicted as follows:





The only argument that is not attacked is α3, and this argument does not attack any
other argument. Therefore, following grounded acceptability semantics, the grounded
extension contains only α3.
The argumentation framework contains two preferred extensions: {α1,ψ1,α3} and
{α2,ψ2,α3}. As a result, the only argument that is sceptically acceptable with respect
to preferred argumentation semantics is still α3, even though there exist arguments in
both extensions with the claim Lit(Lamp,S1) (i.e. arguments ψ1 and ψ2).
In order to reach different conclusions in this case sceptical preferred argumenta-
tion semantics can be used combined with a modified version of warrant that accepts
a literal if there exists an argument in every preferred extension that has this literal
as its claim. This is a special case of a problematic situation in which a specification
contains conditional effects that produce the same literal, which specify contradicting
conditions. The following example illustrates a more elaborate case with contradictory
operator specifications.
Example 8. Consider a domain with a lamp and a switch. The initial situation be-
liefs held by the agents involve ambiguity regarding whether the switch is initially in
the “on” position. In addition, there are conflicting beliefs regarding the specification
of the effects of flipping the switch. More specifically, according to one specifica-
tion flicking the switch turns the lamp on, whereas according to the other the lamp
is switched on when the switch is pushed down. Assume the following initial situa-
tion beliefs: ∼Lit(Lamp,S0), Up(Switch,S0) and ∼Up(Switch,S0). Also, assume the
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ψ2 : 〈{∼Lit(Lamp,push(Switch,S0))–≺∼Lit(Lamp,S0),not Up(Switch,S0)},
∼Lit(Lamp,push(Switch,S0))〉.
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Following grounded argumentation semantics, the only argument that is not attacked
is α3, which does not attack any other argument. Therefore, no other argument is part
of the grounded extension.
Even in such an elaborate example, reasoning by cases does not lead to better re-
sults for sceptical agents. The preferred extension of the above argumentation frame-
work are {α1,β1,α3}, {α1,ψ2,α3}, {α2,β2,α3} and {α2,ψ1,α3}. Therefore, the only
argument that is sceptically acceptable with respect to preferred argumentation seman-
tics is α3.
Grounded semantics impose a strict notion of acceptability, especially when agents
hold views that contradict each other directly, and lack any meaningful deductive
knowledge that can help in the resolution of these contradictions. In order to overcome
such situations we allow the association of beliefs and arguments with preference or-
derings. This preference ordering is not essential to our methods, but is useful in cases
in which no decision can be made based purely on the agents’ beliefs.
The origin of the preference ordering and its semantics are domain specific. No
restrictions are imposed by our framework on rules governing this ordering. It may
be based on the credibility of the origin of the information, the quality of sensors
responsible for observations, how outdated the information is, or may even be based
on the aggregation of multiple factors.
An alternative way to calculate argument preference, if such meta-information is
not present, is based on information about the axioms used to derive the conclusion of
the argument. For instance, based on domain specific knowledge, agents may prefer
arguments made using effect axioms to conclusions reached using frame rules. In this
case, the decisions regarding arguments with contradicting conclusions that are not
undercut are made based on the number of frame rules used in the derivation of the
claim. Another option is to count the number of conditions stated in the axioms that
are used to make a derivation. Depending on domain specific knowledge, agents may
prefer more specific rules, which may entail a more accurate view of the planning
domain.
6.1.1.2 Expressiveness and Tractability Trade-off
The practicality of the approach is related to the expressiveness of the formalism and
its ability to offer scalable synthesis of warranted plans. These notions are closely
related. There is a fundamental trade-off between the expressiveness of the represen-
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tation and computational tractability of the reasoning scheme. Expressive formalisms
offer succinct representations, but often lead to intractable reasoning. On the other
hand, propositional representations simplify the reasoning process but lead to imprac-
tical theory sizes.
This tension is apparent in MPCP. Our design choices focus on a tractable middle
ground which is practical with respect to both representation and reasoning. We use
variables and conditional effects, which allow succinct planning domain representa-
tions, but do not offer the complete expressive power of standard situation calculus.
Reiter-style situation calculus is based on higher-order logic. The higher-order ele-
ments of the language are introduced by the fundamental axioms for situations. In
practice, reasoning for ground queries can be performed in first-order theories using
the regression operator to translate queries about successor situations into logically
equivalent queries referring exclusively to the initial situation.
Reasoning with first-order theories is not tractable in the general case. Reason-
ing with contradictory first-order theories is an open area of research (Besnard and
Hunter, 2005). In situation calculus theories, this would requires the use of the regres-
sion operator based on the assumption that successor state axioms are complete. We
have shown how these can be used for dealing with multiple perspectives in Section
5.6. The limitation of this mechanism is that when possible alternative axioms exist, it
reasons by selecting one axiom. This process cannot aggregate the results of multiple
axioms. On the contrary, our defeasible situation calculus formalism allows the reason-
ing mechanism to consider the conclusions made using multiple axioms for the same
fluent, thus implicitly aggregating the results that can be concluded by investigating all
alternatives.
With respect to reasoning tractability, a naive, propositional argumentation-based
approach to planning with DBATs is not feasible, since it leads to an impractical theory
size. However, by utilising the inherent characteristics of the planning domain, we
have shown that planning can be performed as a series of ground queries, and that these
queries can be accurately evaluated from restricted ground theories. We investigate this
further in Section 6.2, where we evaluate our methods experimentally in benchmark
planning domains.
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6.1.2 Comparison to Related Work
This section compares the proposed formalism with relevant approaches from the lit-
erature. We present this comparison to highlight the expressiveness of our formalism
and explain the design choices behind our approach.
6.1.2.1 Classical Planning
DBATs enable the succinct representation of planning domains by allowing two very
important features of set-theoretic planning representations: variables and conditional
effects. DBATs are strictly more expressive than MPCP problems, which adapt a rep-
resentation based on STRIPS, extended to allow contradicting information, variables,
negative conditions, and conditional effects. Extended DBATs can also encode ram-
ifications and state constraints that can be represented as extended defeasible rules.
Domains in PDDL that require additional expressive power need to be translated into
a simplified theory (Nebel, 2000) before applying our methods. In their current form
DBATs cannot represent functions which could be interesting in metric planning do-
mains, or preferences which are relevant in a strategic setting.
6.1.2.2 Situation Calculus
DBATs are syntactically equivalent to the standard Prolog implementation of Reiter-
style situation calculus theories. However, there is one important distinction: DBATs
are written in terms of literals, instead of atoms, to allow the specification of rules
describing contradictory information.
Reiter (2001) offers a translation mechanism, based on a revised form of the Lloyd-
Topor transformations, which allows the translation of basic action theories to equiva-
lent theories that can be directly implemented in Prolog. Following these transforma-
tions, we presented a translation mechanism that deals with disjunctive expressions,
and negation symbols preceding expressions (and not just literals), that cannot appear
in well-formed extended defeasible rules. The presented mechanism may be extended
to incorporate additional rules from Reiter (2001) that are capable of handling exis-
tential and universal qualifications in the bodies of axioms. In a similar fashion we
can rely on standard planning translation mechanisms that can encode rich planning
theories into standard STRIPS.
Another limitation of our approach is that it focuses on answering ground queries.
As we have shown, these queries are sufficient for planning, but are not adequate for
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dealing with situation independent properties of MPCP domains.
Another major distinction from BATs is the lack of contraposition in defeasible
basic action theories. There is on going debate regarding the use of contraposition
in defeasible theories (Caminada, 2008). The lack of contraposition in our formal-
ism restricts derivations that can be made from a DBAT to proceed forwards in time.
Derivations backwards in time are not supported without additional axioms. This safe-
guards against problematic derivations that introduce additional, unwanted contradic-
tions. Consider the following example:
Example 9. Consider the following successor state axioms concerning the fluent Light(s),






{Electricity(S),∼Plugged(S),∼Light(S)} ⊆DS′ , and that
{∼Electricity(S),Plugged(S),Light(S)}∪DS′ = /0 .
Without contraposition, there is no ambiguity with respect to Plugged(S) in the initial
state beliefs. If the contraposition of these rules is considered, this no longer holds.
Using the third axiom, and the belief ∼Light(S), we can derive ∼Light(S1). Then,
using the contraposition of the second axiom we can derive ∼Electricity(S) as a side-
effect.
By considering a relation without contraposition and not including the contraposition
of the axioms, we simplify the problem and avoid these problematic cases at the ex-
pense of disabling reasoning backwards in time.
6.1.2.3 Argumentation-Based Practical Reasoning
The main distinction between our approach and work on argumentation-based practical
reasoning is the focus on planning rather than deliberation. Therefore, our formalism
is more expressive with respect to the representation of notions related to automated
planning as it can represent plans as sequences of actions, rather than just monolithic
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entities. In addition, it allows standard features from automated planning such as vari-
ables and conditional effects. The explicit representation of actions allow the aggre-
gation of conclusions made from different specifications. On the contrary, approaches
that represent the agents’ domain knowledge as state transition systems do not clarify
how agents can aggregate opinions and argue about specific effects of actions, without
merely objecting to a specific state transition altogether.
Formalisms for argumentation-based practical reasoning allow the representation
of notions related to deliberation, such as desires and intentions which are beyond the
scope of our work. However, since we based our framework on defeasible logic pro-
gramming, we could combine our theories with other DeLP frameworks for reasoning
about intentions and desires (Rotstein et al., 2007, 2008), in order to enable agent de-
liberation about desirable, rather than just executable, situations. This can be done
without modifications to our inference mechanism.
6.1.2.4 Defeasible Argumentation in Planning
The main distinction of our formalism compared to Garcı́a et al. (2008), Garcı́a et al.
(2007) and Simari et al. (2004) is that we do not assume that initial state beliefs and
action specifications are non-contradictory. Similar to their work, our formalism can
represent defeasible ramifications, but our planning language is more expressive, al-
lowing variables and conditional effects.
Another important difference is that our approach allows the specification of de-
ductive arguments which contain beliefs that refer to different situations. Therefore,
it allows deductive argumentation about the applicability and effects of sequences of
actions. On the contrary, in DeLP-POP argumentation is limited to individual states.
In order to reason about conditional effects, the ambiguity propagating nature of
defeasible derivation is essential. This leads to correct conclusions regarding condi-
tions that can be derived but are not warranted. If argumentation is performed in a
state-by-state manner, conditions that are not warranted are disregarded. In this case,
unless the state transition function is adapted, the erroneous assumption that the condi-
tion does not hold is made. The distinction between the ambiguity-propagating nature
of defeasible derivations with the ambiguity-blocking nature of the classical state tran-
sition function was discussed in Section 3.4.2 in detail.
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6.1.2.5 Argumentation-Based Reasoning about Dynamic Domains
The differences between our formalism and approaches that utilise argumentation-
based reasoning to overcome frame and ramification problems (Kakas et al., 1999,
2001; Vo and Foo, 2005), are primarily due to the different focus, but also to employ-
ing different logical formalisms and argumentation frameworks.
Our work focuses on ambiguity introduced by the different viewpoints of the agents
with respect to a collectively acceptable outcome. Our formalism is based on defeasi-
ble rules given in as successor state axioms, which encode the different views of not
only what changes, but also what remains the same.
Our design choice to employ successor state axioms instead of a purely defeasible
representation based on default persistence aims to reduce the size of the theory (in
terms of predicates and axioms). Successor state axioms allow the representation of
every condition that is relevant to a fluent within the body of the axiom that is written
for this fluent. This results in succinct representations, since for every fluent literal we
write one successor state axiom.
MPCP planning problems contain the planning knowledge of multiple agents. For
every agent, we need to encode both effect and frame information. This results in a
single axiom per fluent literal (since the resulting axioms for multiple agents can be
combined). The frame conditions are important since they allow the agents to argue
about what they believe that stays the same, in addition to what they believe is affected
by there action. In order to obtain equivalent results from a purely defeasible theory
based on default persistence, additional axioms are required. Consider encoding action
effects in the following form:
ΓL(do(a,s))–≺γL(s)
ΓL(do(a,s)) is an auxiliary predicate symbol representing that we have reason to be-
lieve that L is an effect of action a in situation do(a,s). The abbreviation γL(s) denotes
the conditions leading to the belief that action a produces L in the successor state. For
every literal at least one effect axiom is necessary for the axiomatisation of the domain.
Therefore, one auxiliary predicate is necessary for every literal.
Successor state axioms can be encoded in this case using the default negation sym-
bol, without enumerating all relevant conditions, as follows:
L(do(a,s))–≺ΓL(do(a,s));L(s),not ΓL(do(a,s))
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Here, ΓL(do(a,s)) is an auxiliary predicate denoting that we have reasons to believe that
the logical complement of L is the effect of the latest action.
The above axioms are sufficient to encode single-agent reasoning, when each agent
has non-contradictory knowledge about the effects of their actions. Moreover, they
offer the advantage that frame axioms do not need to be stated explicitly. However, they
are not adequate to reason about MPCP problems. In order to reason with the collective
beliefs of multiple agents, we need to encode rules that capture their disagreement with
respect to frame axioms as well as effect axioms. In order to voice such disagreements,
it is necessary to encode axioms stating that the conditions necessary for triggering the
effects of an action are not applicable. One way of accomplishing this is to use a






∼ΓL(do(a,s))–≺ not ΓiL(do(a,s)) .
The auxiliary predicate ΓiL denotes the belief of agent i that an L is produced in situation
do(a,s) as an effect of action a.
An alternative way that does not require the additional auxiliary predicates involves
explicit rules describing the frame conditions.
∼ΓL(do(a,s))–≺not(γL(s)) .
Encoding the domain in this manner increases the overall number of axioms, and in-
troduces additional auxiliary predicates.
Successor state axioms are the combination of the above axioms, and allow the
axiomatisation of the planning domain with one axiom for every fluent literal. Fur-
thermore, their structure asserts that one step derivations made using a successor state
axiom supported by beliefs regarding a situation lead to conclusions referring to its
successor situation s. On the contrary, axioms of the above form require an intermedi-
ate step for the derivation of beliefs regarding the effect applicability (i.e. ΓL(do(a,s))).
Additionally, the successor state axioms’ structure asserts that the conditions leading
to conclusion about the value of the literal in the axioms head refer to the predecessor
situation term from the situation that appears in the head of the axiom. As a result, a
one-step derivation made using a successor state axiom always leads from beliefs re-
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ferring to a situation s to beliefs in the successor situation. On the contrary, if auxiliary
predicates are employed two derivations are necessary for the same conclusions.
6.1.2.6 Planning under Uncertainty
This work focuses on ambiguity caused by contradictory information, rather than un-
certainty which denotes absence of information. However, contrary to the presented
set-theoretic MPCP representation, defeasible situation calculus can handle both am-
biguity and uncertainty. Uncertainty is encoded simply as the absence of information,
whereas ambiguity is encoded as support for both negative and positive values of a
proposition. Default negation allows this form of representation as conditions are as-
sumed to hold and are evaluated later in the argumentation phase. As a result, the
derivation phase leads to believing that all potential outcomes which are based on un-
certain conditions hold, without favouring positive or negative conditions by assuming
by default that conditions take on a positive or a negative value. This was discussed
in more detail in Section 3.4.2. Even though our formalism can represent uncertainty,
the development of algorithms for effectively planning with uncertain domains in con-
formant or contingent ways are beyond the scope of this work. Conformant planning
would require different argumentation semantics (as discussed previously in this chap-
ter) to allow reasoning by cases, whereas contingent planning would require the for-
malism to account for knowledge producing actions.
6.1.3 Reasoning Mechanisms
An important benefit of argumentation theory is that it provides concrete semantics to
solutions of MPCP problems. In the previous chapters, we have presented methods
for planning with MPCP problems and DBATs, shown that these two formalisms pro-
vide equivalent inferential results under the initial state completeness assumption, and
discussed the correctness of the proposed algorithms that are based on our formalisms.
The centralised methods we presented operate on the union of all agents’ beliefs.
Accordingly, the produced results take every relevant argument that can be generated
from the joint theories of the agents into account. With respect to soundness these
mechanisms produce the most accurate results (i.e. the results are sound with respect
to the argumentation framework that contains all arguments that can be generated from
the union of the agents’ beliefs, and all defeats among these arguments).
We presented a series of algorithms for planning using DBATs. These planners
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produce sound results, since potential plans are evaluated using the centralised argu-
ment evaluation methods. Search for a plan is performed by searching the situation
space. This can be done in a directed manner (i.e. depth-first or breadth-first). If
this process is conducted exhaustively, for every plan whose length is within a certain
bound, the planning process is complete with respect to the predefined bound.
A directed search of the situation space can be performed using the heuristic value
of a state as a guide. We described an algorithm that calculates this value based on the
defeasible derivation relation and explained that this process emulates the well-known
“no delete lists” heuristics in automated planning. If the planner searches the situation
space in a greedy, enforced hill climbing manner, completeness is traded for quickly
identifying potential solutions. Alternatively, the heuristic value is used to guide an
exhaustive best-first search of the situation space. The latter is complete within the
bounds of the search, but not as efficient as successful enforced hill climbing.
Based on the presented translation mechanism, set-theoretic representations with
complete initial states produce equivalent results to the defeasible logic-based imple-
mentation. We described algorithms that use these methods alongside state-of-the-art
planners in order to exploit the highly optimised implementations of these planners.
Based on exhaustive search of the state space, planning can be performed in a com-
plete fashion, bounded with respect to the length of the plan. However, the exhaustive
nature of such search, and the extensive size of the state-space of moderately sized
planning domains, makes this process highly impractical. We propose two hybrid ap-
proaches, one based on theory revision and one based on greedy hill climbing search.
In both cases we cannot guarantee completeness. A revision mechanism that guaran-
tees completeness is impractical since it leads to extensively increasing theory size to
encode the results of the argumentation phase. The greedy hill climbing approach is
incomplete by nature, but very efficient in producing solutions.
In order to allow for the distribution of planning and argumentation tasks, and to
enable the agents to reach conclusions without communicating their entire belief base,
we follow an approach based on argumentation-based dialogue. The iterated disputes
dialogue protocol enables the agents to argue in a persuasion dialogue fashion. Agents
have clear roles, with the agent proposing a plan being the proponent, leaving the
role of the opponent to the other party. This protocol aims at reaching agreement. In
combination with the confident strategy, it guarantees sound and complete results with
respect to the arguments that can be individually generated. In the special case in which
agents argue with conflict-free argument sets, iterated disputes produce sound results
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with respect to the union of the agents’ arguments. This assumption also applies to
agents arguing with standard situation calculus basic action theories.
Iterated disputes are restricted to two-agent dialogues and prohibit the exchange of
roles during a dispute. Multi-party iterated disputes allow multiple agents to present
proposals and challenge their acceptability by introducing arguments both attacking
and defending these proposals. This process may lead to longer dialogues than iterated
disputes, but if agents follow the confident strategy (as it is specified for multi-party
iterated disputes) the protocol enables a stronger notion of soundness. It guarantees
sound results with respect to the union of the agents’ arguments, regardless of whether
the agents’ initial argument sets are conflict-free or not.
Iterated disputes operate at the argument level. As a result, their guarantees are sets
of arguments, not individual beliefs. In order to reach more accurate conclusions, we
introduce inquiry-based iterated disputes which allow agents to generate arguments in
a distributed fashion. This protocol, combined with the confident strategy for inquiry-
based iterated disputes, guarantees equivalent conclusions to the centralised mecha-
nism.
The centralised methods do not guarantee privacy since they require the commu-
nication of every belief in the agents’ theories. Iterated disputes require the agents
to communicate arguments only if by doing so they affect the final decision. Multi-
party iterated disputes are similar, but they also require the agents to advertise potential
moves, which leads to the communication of arguments which are relevant to the ac-
ceptance of the current proposal, but which may alter the final outcome of the dialogue
(i.e. for advertised moves that are not selected).
Inquiry-based iterated disputes require agents to communicate rules that could po-
tentially form relevant derivations, and share all arguments that are related to partial
derivations. Search of the derivation (and the argument) space may not be successful.
As a result, this protocol may result in the communication of beliefs that are not rele-
vant to concrete plan proposals (or to their acceptance). Still, since argument inquiry
is performed only for claims that are relevant to proposals (and their defeating and
supporting arguments). Therefore, the protocol safeguards against the communication
of beliefs that are completely irrelevant to the formulation and acceptance of proposals
(i.e. there is no partial defeasible derivation which includes these beliefs and leads
to conclusions relevant to the arguments being evaluated). As a result, inquiry-based
iterated disputes offer limited privacy.
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6.2 Experimental Results
This section investigates the practicality of our framework by analysing its perfor-
mance in challenging planning domains of considerable size. Since no standard MPCP
domains exist, we selected benchmark domains from the International Planning Com-
petition (McDermott, 2000) in order to be able to test the efficiency of our methods in
domains of relevance to the automated planning community.
6.2.1 Implementation
We have developed several planners that implement the planning algorithms presented
in Chapter 4. This section overviews these and outlines their features. The extensive
size of the experimentation domains does not allow the use of implementations that are
not based on highly optimised planning code. Therefore, the empirical investigation is
limited to our hybrid implementations that delegate the search of potential candidate
plans to highly optimised, external planners.
6.2.1.1 DBAT Planner
This planner is based on a prototype Prolog implementation of our theory about plan-
ning using DBATs. It allows planning with a rich formalism based on DBATs and the
use of extended axioms. More specifically, it supports the following types of axioms:
• Defeasible situation-independent axioms
• Defeasible axioms about the initial situation
• Defeasible action precondition axioms
• Defeasible successor state axioms
• Defeasible state constraints and ramifications
• Presumptions representing observations
Search of the state space may be performed in multiple ways following the methods
presented in Section 4.2:
• Depth-first search
• Breadth-first search
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• Heuristic search
This planner was implemented as a proof-of-concept system for planning with (ex-
tended) DBATs. In practice, it can be used for planning and reasoning about simple
domains, but is impractical for use with realistic MPCP problems.
6.2.1.2 Heuristic MPCP Planner
The Heuristic MPCP planner is based on hill-climbing and best-first search. It calcu-
lates the heuristic quality of a state based on a solution to the relaxed version of the
candidate planning problem which disregards the delete lists of operators, in a similar
fashion to Hoffmann and Nebel (2001).
The Heuristic MPCP planner is capable of planning with an expressive planning
language. It allows the following features:
• Contradicting initial state beliefs and operator specifications
• Conditional effects, ramifications and state constraints
• Preference orderings over beliefs and operator specifications




The conclusion-based argumentation option performs argumentation to establish whether
candidate plans are warranted. This process minimises the argumentation overhead,
restricting it to candidate plans. On the other hand, condition-based argumentation
evaluates the warrant status of both goals and action conditions. The warrant results
are used to prune the search space by dealing with inapplicable actions. This option
implements executability-based pruning in the spirit of Algorithm 7.
Compared to the DBAT planner, the Heuristic MPCP planner cannot handle uncer-
tainty in the initial state. Uncertainty can be transformed to ambiguity by adding to the
initial state a positive and a negative literal for every uncertain atom. These have mini-
mum preference values. This process is necessary in order to obtain correct inferential
results, since MPCP problems must follow the initial state completeness assumption.
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6.2.1.3 Hybrid Planners
We have implemented the following hybrid planners based on the algorithms of Sec-
tion 4.3.3. Hybrid planners delegate search of the space of candidate plans to an ex-
ternal planning process. In order to execute this process, they transform the planning
knowledge in a format suitable for a standard planner by following Algorithm 12. Can-
didate plans that are returned by the external planning process are evaluated using the
labelling mechanism described by Algorithm 11.
Classical planner: This is the simplest implemented hybrid planner. It uses the ex-
ternal process to search for a candidate plan (without considering acceptability-
related information at planning time), which it then evaluates. If this plan is
warranted, it is returned. Otherwise, the planner fails. This planner is used as a
baseline for our algorithms.
Conformant planner: This planner constructs a conformant planning problem by in-
terpreting all ambiguity in the initial state as uncertainty, and calls a conformant
external planner to solve this problem. The conformant problem is strictly harder
than the MPCP problem, since plans must achieve the goal regardless of which
version of the contradictory beliefs might turn out to be true. This planner is
used as a baseline for our methods.
IRB Planner: The iterative revision-based planner implements Algorithm 13. It calls
the external planning process and evaluates the returned solution. If the solu-
tion is not warranted it revises the input using information obtained from the
argumentation process and repeats the process. The planner fails if the external
planner does not return a solution.
GHC Planner: The hybrid heuristic planner performs directed greedy hill-climbing
search of the state space. It calculates the heuristic quality of states using the
candidate plan returned by the external planner. This is done by measuring the
the number of actions whose applicability is warranted in sequence. This planner
implements Algorithm 14.
6.2.2 Experimental Design
We present results with three benchmark domains from the International Planning
Competition McDermott (2000):
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Table 6.1: Size of experimentation problem instances in terms of the number of ground
actions in the non-contradictory domain instances
Domain Rovers DriverLog Zeno-Travel
Actions 900 to 6624 637 to 792 13000 to 30345
Rovers is a simplification of the NASA Mars Exploration Rover problem. The goal of
the planner is to use multiple planetary rovers in order to explore the environment
by taking pictures and gathering samples.
DriverLog is concerned with the problem of delivering packages. To achieve this,
drivers walk between locations and drive trucks along roads.
Zeno-Travel is concerned with embarking and disembarking passengers onto air-
crafts, which are flying between multiple locations.
For each domain, we experiment with 5 planning problems taken from the International
Planning Competition. Table 6.1 summarises their minimum and maximum sizes. For
each planning problem, we construct multiple contradictory problem instances with a
varying degree of contradiction c∈ [0.0 : 0.5] in steps of 0.1. For every level of contra-
diction c we generate 50 contradictory problem instances for each planning problem
to address the main source of non-determinism in our investigation. Altogether, the
performance of every competing planner was evaluated in 4500 problem instances.
We introduce ambiguity in the form of contradictory initial state beliefs and con-
tradictory operators. Rate c represents the probability of introducing a contradictory
initial state belief or operator specification, tossing a coin for every effect of every op-
erator. The contradictory operators have a randomly selected precondition. Initial state
beliefs and operator specifications are assigned random numerical preference values.
The selection of random values follows a uniform distribution.
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We use Fast Forward (FF) Hoffmann and Nebel (2001), a well-understood, efficient
planner, as our classical external planner. The Conformant planner uses Conformant-
FF (Brafman and Hoffmann, 2004), which is also based on FF.
The DBAT planner and the Heuristic MPCP planner are excluded from the evalu-
ation. The first cannot deal with domains of the size of those taken from the planning
competition. The second is capable of solving a limited number of the smallest IPC
problems, but cannot compete directly with the other planners. We have provided these
implementations only to verify the implementability of our full formalisms. These
planners can solve all presented toy domain examples without difficulty.
The Conformant planner is only used in the first part of our experimentation, which
involves initial state contradictions, since it cannot handle uncertainty in operator spec-
ifications. The comparison to our methods is not a fair one as the external conformant
planner must solve a significantly harder problem, since it cannot resolve contradic-
tions. However, since there are no other approaches that can be directly compared to
our system, we resorted to the one that solves the most similar problem, given that it is
also capable of solving a transformed version of our problem, in which all ambiguity
is treated as uncertainty.
In order to ensure termination, we have imposed bounds on planning times, calls to
the external planner, and for the GHC planner, on the number of states it can traverse
during its state-space search. The time limit for the conformant planner was set to five
times the bound of the external planner.
Unfortunately, in the general case, we cannot verify solution existence, and as a
result we can only compare the relative effectiveness of the competing planners. To
compute whether a solution exists requires, in the worst case, a complete state enumer-
ation, which is infeasible due to extensive size of the state space in MPCP problems.
6.2.3 Results
This section presents the results of our empirical evaluation. First we experiment with
problem instances which include contradictions in their initial states. The purpose of
these experiments is to illustrate the behaviour of our methods in the simplest scenario.
Then we report on the results of experimentation with problem instances that contain
both contradictory operator specifications and initial state beliefs. For each experiment
we report the following metrics:
Success rates reflect the amount of problem instances in which each planner synthe-
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sised a warranted plan, for all values of c. The mean and standard deviation are
calculated across the different IPC problem scenarios.
Times describe the planning times for the successful instances. We report the mean
planning times and standard deviations for every planner and every degree of
contradiction c. All times shown are in milliseconds.
Calls illustrate the number of times our planners made a call to the external planner
requesting a candidate plan. Mean and standard deviation values are reported for
the calls made by every planner and every degree of contradiction c on successful
instances.
We focus on successful instances, since the results regarding times for external planner
calls for the failed instances are significantly skewed due to the imposed termination
conditions.
6.2.3.1 Rovers – Contradictory Initial States
The first experiment reports on problem instances of the Rovers domain generated for
different degrees of initial state contradiction. Table 6.2 shows the success rates of the
competing planners.
All non-contradictory problem instances were solved successfully by all planners.
The Classical and the Conformant planner managed to solve a very small subset of the
contradictory problem instances. On the contrary, IRB and GHC performed signifi-
cantly better, especially for c = 0.1 and c = 0.2. Both algorithms are equally capable
of resolving initial state contradictions, and as a result they solved exactly the same
contradictory problem instances.
Table 6.3 illustrates the planning times for the successful runs. Initial planning
times are low for the Classical, the Conformant and the IRB planner. As the contra-
diction rate increases, the planning times in the Conformant, IRB and GHC increase,
whereas the time for the Classical planner remains low (for c = 0.1 and c = 0.2).
The GHC planner obtains warrant results for the current state, and delegates the
task of searching for a candidate plan to the external planner. Literals that are not
warranted are removed from the initial state of the problem that is sent to the external
planner, in order to increase the possibility of returning a warranted plan. As a result,
the higher the degree of contradiction, the more complex the problem the external
planner has to solve, since more information may be missing from the initial state. The
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Table 6.2: Ratios of successful instances when attempting to synthesise a warranted
plan in all problem instances of the Rovers planning domain for variable degrees of
initial state contradiction
Rovers Success Rates – Initial State Contradiction
Classical Conformant IRB GHC
C Success Std. Success Std. Success Std. Success Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
0.1 10.40 10.14 8.80 7.69 33.60 14.79 33.60 14.79
0.2 1.20 1.10 0.00 0.00 9.60 5.18 9.60 5.18
0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.10 0.80 1.10
0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.89 0.40 0.89
0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 6.3: Synthesis times (in milliseconds) for warranted plans in all problem instances
of the Rovers planning domain for variable degrees of initial state contradiction
Rovers Planning Times – Initial State Contradiction
Classical Conformant IRB GHC
C Time Std. Time Std. Time Std. Time Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 32.76 13.17 39.69 15.42 34.55 18.65 86.55 22.11
0.1 27.62 7.39 52.14 22.19 62.81 38.22 88.15 52.05
0.2 34.33 6.03 82.04 32.50 81.13 17.49
0.3 100.00 21.21 75.50 17.68
0.4 107.00 0.00 112.00 0.00
0.5
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standard deviation values remain low. Close inspection of the results showed that there
was only a very limited number of instances in which a significant amount of time was
used (i.e. two outliers with values over 200 and 500ms respectively).
IRB solves the easiest problems faster than GHC. However, it requires additional
time for the problems with a higher degree of contradiction. IRB resolves contradic-
tions that are relevant to the plans returned by the external planner. As a result, the
external planner may be called several times until a warranted plan is found, or no plan
is returned. In the experiments conducted, we also measured number of calls to the
external planner. The calls IRB made to the external planner range from 1 to 4, with
the highest standard deviation value being 1.41 for c = 0.3.
6.2.3.2 DriverLog – Contradictory Initial States
Similar to Rovers, IRB and GHC outperformed the other planners in our evaluation
in the DriverLog domain, especially for c = 0.1 and c = 0.2. The Classical planner
solved more cases than the Conformant planner.
Table 6.4: Ratios of successfully synthesised warranted plans in all problem instances
of the DriverLog planning domain for variable degrees of initial state contradiction
DriverLog Success Rates – Initial State Contradiction
Classical Conformant IRB GHC
C Success Std. Success Std. Success Std. Success Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
0.1 40.80 6.26 22.80 6.57 55.20 5.22 55.20 5.22
0.2 13.20 9.55 5.20 5.59 28.00 14.07 28.00 14.07
0.3 4.80 5.59 0.80 1.10 14.40 7.27 14.40 7.27
0.4 1.60 2.19 0.00 0.00 5.60 3.29 5.60 3.29
0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 1.10 1.20 1.10
In the worst case, IRB conducted an average of 3.00 calls to the external planner
with a standard deviation of 1.00. As a result, the mean planning time is twice the time
of the non-contradictory problem instances (i.e. c = 0.0) in the worst case.
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Table 6.5: Synthesis times (in milliseconds) for warranted plans in all DriverLog planning
problems for variable degrees of initial state contradiction
DriverLog Planning Times – Initial State Contradiction
Classical Conformant IRB GHC
C Time Std. Time Std. Time Std. Time Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 27.89 11.33 44.28 22.46 31.39 27.95 80.54 101.96
0.1 22.34 6.41 37.37 26.86 32.33 19.02 62.58 14.50
0.2 21.52 3.30 34.23 13.40 43.83 25.39 63.33 13.20
0.3 20.50 2.11 32.50 14.85 49.53 28.28 64.86 14.23
0.4 25.75 7.27 48.43 18.75 69.73 20.17
0.5 67.67 26.73 64.67 18.50
GHC required higher planning times, which were the same across all levels of
c, apart from the easiest case, the non-contradictory problems. This high value was
skewed by one outlier in which GHC took 1643ms to solve a problem, and which
caused the high standard deviation. The average time to solve the same non-contradictory
problem in the other 49 experiments was 66.76 with a standard deviation value of
22.33. The same plan was returned in all cases.
6.2.3.3 Zeno-Travel – Contradictory Initial States
Table 6.6 shows that, compared to the other domains we experimented with, Zeno-
Travel was the domain in which the highest success rates were obtained. IRB and
GHC outperformed the Classical and the Conformant planners. The planning times in
the Zeno-Travel domain are shown in Table 6.7. IRB and GHC managed to synthesise
warranted plans in a relatively fast manner. In particular, planning times for GHC
remained low for the different values of c.
With respect to calls to the external planner, IRB required a smaller number of
re-planning steps to synthesis a warranted plan in this domain. In the case with the
highest contradiction rate, it required 2.07 calls on average, with a standard deviation
of 0.80.
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Table 6.6: Ratios of successful instances of synthesising a warranted plan in all Zeno-
Travel planning problems for variable degrees of initial state contradiction
Zeno-Travel Success Rates – Initial State Contradiction
Classical Conformant IRB GHC
C Success Std. Success Std. Success Std. Success Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
0.1 54.00 12.00 56.80 7.82 73.20 8.32 73.20 8.32
0.2 30.00 13.78 23.20 11.88 47.20 10.26 47.20 10.26
0.3 13.20 8.32 6.80 3.63 36.80 7.95 36.80 7.95
0.4 7.60 6.23 2.00 3.46 23.60 12.68 23.60 12.68
0.5 4.00 4.69 1.20 1.79 16.00 5.48 16.00 5.48
Table 6.7: Synthesis times (in milliseconds) for warranted plans in all Zeno-Travel plan-
ning problems for variable degrees of initial state contradiction
Zeno-Travel Planning Times – Initial State Contradiction
Classical Conformant IRB GHC
C Time Std. Time Std. Time Std. Time Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 25.54 38.43 27.49 34.79 25.80 23.33 72.40 88.54
0.1 22.78 5.31 27.70 5.84 29.11 13.76 64.72 9.29
0.2 21.79 4.33 28.05 9.78 31.50 15.47 62.74 12.74
0.3 21.76 2.66 30.06 5.03 42.78 20.98 62.82 9.89
0.4 21.84 2.79 29.80 5.26 39.56 16.45 61.03 5.50
0.5 20.50 1.51 27.67 0.58 48.23 20.74 63.93 6.94
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6.2.3.4 Rovers – Contradictory Initial States and Operator Specifications
The second set of our experiments describes the behaviour of the competing planners
in domains with contradictory initial states and planning operator specifications. Table
6.8 reports on the success rates of the planners in the Rovers domain.
Table 6.8: Ratios of successfully synthesising warranted plans in all problem instances
of the Rovers planning domain for variable degrees of contradiction
Rovers Success Rates – Contradiction
Classical IRB GHC
C Success Std. Success Std. Success Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
0.1 8.40 6.69 33.60 11.61 35.60 11.08
0.2 1.20 1.10 7.60 4.77 8.80 4.60
0.3 0.00 0.00 3.20 5.02 5.20 5.22
0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.10
0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.89
The performance of the Classical planner decreased compared to the previous sets
of experiments. For c= 0.1, it solved 8.4% of the instances on average, and for c= 0.2,
it solved 1.2% of the instances. IRB and GHC achieved high success rates for prob-
lems with c = 0.1. However, as the level of contradiction increased, the success rates
dropped significantly. GHC slightly outperformed IRB, and was capable of synthe-
sising a limited number of warrant plans in cases with high contradiction rates (i.e.
c = 0.4 and c = 0.5).
Table 6.9 shows the planning times for synthesising warranted plans. GHC re-
quired significantly higher planning times. With respect to the degree of contradiction
imposed on the problem instances, the planning times of GHC followed an exponen-
tial increase. The results for GHC showed high standard deviation values. This was
caused by outliers: For c = 0.1, without five outlier values 17555, 1150, 4432, 2010
and 3749ms, average times were 90.80ms with a standard deviation of 20.80. Equiva-
lently for c = 0.2, after removing the outlier values of 3502 and 1405ms, the average
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Table 6.9: Synthesis times (in milliseconds) for warranted plans in the Rovers planning
domain for variable degrees of contradiction
Rovers Planning Times – Contradiction
Classical IRB GHC
C Time Std. Time Std. Time Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 31.64 7.20 34.88 30.54 82.72 26.97
0.1 29.48 4.77 88.45 69.83 411.40 1946.08
0.2 31.33 4.51 99.95 76.18 304.95 767.57
0.3 158.50 136.72 3916.77 7252.70
0.4 12178.00 1107.33
0.5 14382.00 0.00
Table 6.10: Calls of the external planner in the Rovers planning domain for variable
degrees of contradiction
Rovers Planner Calls – Contradiction
IRB GHC
C Calls Std. Calls Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
0.1 2.52 1.38 5.70 24.73
0.2 2.95 1.68 4.86 13.75
0.3 4.63 3.25 47.38 88.14
0.4 202.00 0.00
0.5 202.00 0.00
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times were 90.00ms with a standard deviation of 14.89. The same holds for c = 0.3. In
this case, without the outlier values 15895, 17440 and 16554ms, the average planning
time is 103.80ms with a standard deviation value of 25.60.
Table 6.10 summarises information regarding the number of external planner calls
that were made by each planner. The greedy search performed by GHC resulted in
a high number of calls. This way GHC managed to solve some very difficult cases
by extensive search of the space of candidate plans returned by the external planner.
This also explains the high standard deviation over the times required to synthesise a
warranted plan.
6.2.3.5 DriverLog – Contradictory Initial States and Operator Specifications
Tables 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 outline the results for the DriverLog domain with con-
tradiction in the initial state and operator specifications. IRB and GHC preformed
significantly better than the competing planners.
Table 6.11: Ratios of successful instances of synthesising a warranted plan in the
DriverLog planning domain for variable degrees of contradiction
DriverLog Success Rates – Contradiction
Classical IRB GHC
C Success Std. Success Std. Success Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
0.1 30.40 10.81 47.20 9.44 54.00 7.35
0.2 6.40 3.29 20.00 6.32 37.20 8.90
0.3 1.60 2.19 7.20 4.60 24.00 7.07
0.4 3.20 1.10 5.20 2.68 19.20 6.57
0.5 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.10 10.40 4.77
GHC was more effective than IRB as it was capable of synthesising plans in more
complicated cases for c = 0.3, c = 0.4 and c = 0.5. To achieve this performance,
it required higher planning times for difficult problem instances. The high standard
deviation values are caused by such cases. This is depicted in Table 6.14. The final
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Table 6.12: Synthesis times (in milliseconds) for warranted plans in the DriverLog plan-
ning domain for variable degrees of contradiction
DriverLog Planning Times – Contradiction
Classical IRB GHC
C Time Std. Time Std. Time Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 25.39 10.23 28.61 17.40 69.36 23.16
0.1 109.66 528.91 530.45 3421.16 721.11 2450.04
0.2 24.81 4.74 256.30 751.29 2934.44 8527.61
0.3 23.50 1.00 65.17 30.57 2476.47 4637.36
0.4 26.25 2.49 42.85 24.22 8004.96 33168.12
0.5 44.00 19.80 5130.23 7238.99
Table 6.13: Calls to the external planner in the DriverLog planning domain for variable
degrees of contradiction
DriverLog Planner Calls – Contradiction
IRB GHC
C Calls Std. Calls Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
0.1 1.53 0.79 8.94 35.34
0.2 2.22 1.15 26.22 64.45
0.3 2.17 0.92 40.18 74.88
0.4 1.54 0.97 55.04 89.65
0.5 1.50 0.71 68.19 94.90
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Table 6.14: Rates of successful problems that were solved quickly by the GHC in the
DriverLog domain
C Cases Time Range (ms)
0.1 91% 52 to 177
0.2 77% 59 to 184
0.3 75% 61 to 179
0.4 71% 63 to 189
0.5 64% 73 to 94
case (i.e. c = 0.5) is the most interesting. Planning times come in two partitions, with
64% between 73 and 94ms and 36% between 10273 and 17194ms.
The planning times for IRB are lower. However, similar to the Classical plan-
ner, these values deviate considerably for c = 0.1 and c = 0.2. This can be attributed
to problematic instances that required high planning times from the external planner,
since the number of calls to the external planner remained low (i.e. the maximum num-
ber of calls was 5). For c = 0.1, apart form 115 instances that required between 19 and
397ms, there were three outliers which needed 4644, 21484 and 30313 milliseconds
respectively. In a similar fashion, for c = 0.2, IRB solved 47 easy instances in be-
tween 47 and 261ms, but it was also successful in three hard problems which required
a planning time of 2099 to 3781ms.
IRB is more efficient than GHC in the hard problem instances it can solve because
it does not manually search the state space. On the contrary, GHC searches the neigh-
bourhood of the current state when the application of an action in the candidate plan is
not warranted. Until a good alternative is discovered, GHC non-deterministically se-
lects a state in the neighbourhood, calculates the warrant status of the literals contained
in this state, and calls the external planner to generate the corresponding candidate
plan.
6.2.3.6 Zeno-Travel – Contradictory Initial States and Operator Specifications
Tables 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17 illustrate the results of the experiments with contradictory
instances of the Zeno-Travel domain. The success results shown in Table 6.15 show
that GHC performed fairly well, and outperformed IRB. This is evident in the final
scenario with c = 0.5.
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Table 6.15: Ratios of successful instances of synthesising a warranted plan in the Zeno-
Travel planning domain for variable degrees of contradiction
Zeno-Travel Success Rates – Contradiction
Classical IRB GHC
C Success Std. Success Std. Success Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
0.1 40.00 6.78 63.20 9.65 72.80 6.72
0.2 20.40 7.40 34.40 8.17 48.40 6.23
0.3 14.40 8.65 20.80 7.69 40.40 8.88
0.4 8.80 6.42 12.80 9.96 36.00 10.58
0.5 5.60 2.61 9.20 4.82 28.80 13.31
Table 6.16: Synthesis times (in milliseconds) for warranted plans in the Zeno-Travel
planning domain for variable degrees of contradiction
Zeno-Travel Planning Times – Contradiction
Classical IRB GHC
C Time Std. Time Std. Time Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 22.52 7.88 25.79 45.66 63.95 16.85
0.1 33.81 17.70 87.32 147.46 1349.73 5471.76
0.2 40.61 28.07 137.88 202.20 4487.21 14908.46
0.3 55.03 58.77 157.44 158.49 6976.81 19692.22
0.4 58.00 30.16 160.62 145.29 6663.92 13312.57
0.5 64.07 46.20 239.39 239.51 8528.06 19643.03
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C Calls Std. Calls Std.
Rate Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
0.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
0.1 1.58 0.89 13.15 48.03
0.2 1.76 1.24 25.92 66.51
0.3 1.85 1.45 37.62 77.35
0.4 1.81 1.64 52.37 88.16
0.5 2.17 1.97 40.08 80.11
Table 6.18: Rates of successful instances that were solved quickly by the GHC in the
Zeno-Travel domain
C Cases Time Range (ms)
0.1 89% 50 to 265
0.2 80% 56 to 247
0.3 74% 60 to 353
0.4 62% 71 to 386
0.5 70% 78 to 375
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Increased performance comes at the price of higher planning times. This is shown
in Table 6.16. GHC requires significantly higher planning times than IRB. The high
standard deviation values for these results show that GHC successfully solved some
easy problems, but at the same time, solved a lot of complicated scenarios which re-
quired additional effort. This is described in more detail by Table 6.18, which focuses
on the planning times required for GHC in easy problem instances. The difficult prob-
lems faced by GHC in this domain caused high planning times. Closer inspection of
the results showed that, for contradiction levels 0.1 to 0.5, GHC solved numerous (i.e.
6.5%, 12%, 16%, 29% and 19% respectively for different levels of c) hard problem
instances (which required over 10000ms to solve).
6.2.4 Discussion
The GHC planner has the highest success rate in most of the experiments we per-
formed. IRB fails to find a plan in certain cases due to the incomplete nature of the
revision process. The increased success rate of GHC comes at the cost of increased
planning times, especially for problem instances with higher degrees of contradiction.
The difference in success rates between GHC, IRB, and the Classical planner illus-
trates the value of resolving the contradictions identified through the planning process.
The Classical planner solves more instances than the Conformant planner, due to the
highly constrained nature of the conformant planning problem. The classical planner
succeeds by accidentally selecting warranted beliefs in the face of ambiguity.
An advantage of IRB is that it only resolves contradictions that are directly related
to candidate plans. This is preferable in situations in which argumentation is costly.
GHC follows a different strategy, and tries to pass the most accurate state it can evaluate
on to the external planner. This way it increases the possibility of receiving candidate
plans of higher quality. The warrant evaluation process has been optimised to reuse
results from previous states, and was conducted very quickly in practice.
Experimentation with the GHC planner highlights the main difference between
MPCP and classical planning: Because of the preference ordering over beliefs in every
state, states containing the same literals are not conceptually equivalent – this increases
the state space dramatically.
The success of our methods varied across domains. Increased success rates can be
attributed to domain-specific elements such as the existence of multiple plans achieving
the same goals in the respective domains and plans relying on a smaller number of con-
Chapter 6. Evaluation 212
Table 6.19: Maximum size of returned plans for all competing planners in every domain
Planners Classical Conformant IRB GHC
Rovers Initial Contradiction 38 38 39 40
DriverLog Initial Contradiction 23 61 34 34
Zeno-Travel Initial Contradiction 24 27 27 27
Rovers Contradiction 38 40 40
DriverLog Contradiction 23 25 27
Zeno-Travel Contradiction 24 27 27
ditions. The smaller the number of potential plans that exist in the non-contradictory
version of the problem, the higher the probability of introducing ambiguity that ren-
ders these plans unwarranted. Accordingly, the more conditions are relevant to the
execution of the plan, the higher the probability of introducing ambiguity on important
conditions.
Contradictions alter the structure of planning problems, especially when c takes
on high values. This affects the number of actions that must be executed to solve
these problems. Our approach does not focus on returning plans of minimum size, nor
does the external planner guarantee that the smallest candidate plan is always returned.
Regardless, the sizes of the returned plans were in most cases comparable. Table 6.19
shows the maximum size of plans returned by the competing planners for every set of
experiments.
Our results illustrate that the problem of planning with contradictory theories is
very hard. The introduction of contradictory planning operators significantly increases
the size of the planning domain. Additional actions are instantiated, introducing more
options that the planner may consider in every step. There were cases in which the
number of actions was tripled. This, in combination with the non-standard form of
transformed planning theory (which is necessary to hide the contradictions from the
planner), may result in problems that the external planner cannot handle as efficiently
as hand-coded instances.
Our planners were capable of synthesising plans in extensive contradictory the-
ories outperforming simple approaches that do not utilise information related to the
acceptability of arguments. In most cases, our planners synthesised warranted plans
in an efficient manner. GHC required significant time to solve the most complicated
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cases. IRB performed slightly worse, but maintained planning times comparable to the
simple baseline approaches.
6.3 Applicability in Real World Domains
In order to discuss the value of MPCP in a broader context, we describe instances of
MPCP problems that appear in important real-world domains. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to present examples to illustrate the commonality of the problem, and discuss
the solution that can be provided by our methods. In addition, our analysis high-
lights interesting domain characteristics and how these relate to the suitability of our
methods. Examples of such characteristics are privacy concerns, authority, individual
perspective, safety critical applications, and time constraints.
6.3.1 Emergency Response Domain
The first example is inspired by RoboCup Rescue (Kitano and Tadokoro, 2001).
RoboCup Rescue focuses on disaster rescue and emergency decision support. It in-
volves the integration of disaster information, prediction, planning, and human inter-
faces in a virtual world struck with disasters, such as earthquakes and fire. Mobile and
static agents must cooperate in order to provide rescue. The following agent types are
supported:
• Mobile agents: civilian, fire-fighter, rescuer, police
• Static agents: fire station, police station, hospital, refuge
Emergency response agents are cooperative. Even though they may have individual
goals they are pursuing, they must not exhibit individualistic, strategic behaviour, since
they collectively need to work towards the overall welfare of the system, that is rescu-
ing civilians from disaster-struck parts of the environment.
The RoboCup Rescue domains are large and complex, and as a result agents have
partial views of the world. Due to the unexpected disasters and the actions performed
by other agents, agents may hold outdated, erroneous beliefs. In such settings, agent
action must be prompt and directed. Sharing all agents’ views is not practical since
it involves the communication of extensive amounts of detailed information which
may be irrelevant to the operations specific agents engage in. In addition, due to the
extensive size of the domain, a centralised planning approach based on a joint planning
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theory may be impractical. Even though such a theory would lead to correct decisions,
it may be impossible to make these decisions in reasonable time.
Since agents operate in an unstable environment, and cannot observe every action
taken by other parties, their observations are defeasible. The confidence level of an
observation is relative to how outdated this information is. Additionally, since obser-
vations are made by different sensors, credibility values may be discounted based on
confidence information on the quality of sensors, or the proximity of agents to the to
the location of the observed events.
The following example illustrates specific MPCP problem instances inspired by the
RoboCup Rescue domain.
Example 10. An ambulance agent synthesises a plan for reaching and treating civil-
ians that have been evacuated from a collapsed building. This plan involves moving
to the location of the building, offering aid to the injured civilians and transporting
them to the closest hospital. Assume that this agent has not been operating in this spe-
cific area after the earthquake. As a result, the agent’s beliefs regarding which routes
remain unblocked are outdated. Also, assume the police centre is responsible for the
collection of information regarding blocked roads in this area from mobile agents.
The agent can communicate its transportation plans to the police centre. The centre,
after revising the plan, can identify actions that cannot be executed and communicate
the reasons to the ambulance agent. The ambulance agent re-plans based on this in-
formation and communicates the new plan. This plan is then accepted by the centre
agent.
This is an example of a two-person iterated dispute among the agents in the emer-
gency response domain. The different views of the agents in this case are the result of
divergent spatial information. The beliefs of the central agent have higher credibility
since this agent is responsible for collecting the most up-to-date information regarding
the specific area of the environment. The proposal arguments in this example are min-
imal, with the ambulance agent communicating only the transportation route, without
getting into detail regarding the reasons behind the belief that this route is valid.
In a more elaborate example, the central agent may re-plan, introducing additional
actions executed from a fire-fighter agent to clear the route from debris, allowing the
ambulance agent to proceed. In this case, the plan must be communicated to the fire
centre agent as well, in order to organise the collaborations among the different fire-
fighter agents under its command.
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Example 11. Assume the specifications of the actions the agents apply to the envi-
ronment differ across agents of different roles and authority. For example, the role of
fire station agents is to coordinate the firefighter agents under their command. Their
position is static. On the other hand, the firefighter agents operate in the environment,
and affect it by actions such as extinguishing fires and clearing debris. Firefighters
need to hold very detailed specifications of the actions they execute. For instance,
extinguishing a fire may involve conditions related to specific details of the site and
characteristics of the fire. Such low-level details cannot be observed by the fire sta-
tion, and are irrelevant to their role. Accordingly, assume that they hold high-level
specifications of the actions that are executed by mobile units. Following this example,
the action of a firefighter extinguishing a fire may only require that the location of the
firefighter is approximate to the location of the fire.
In this scenario, fire station agents can use their generic specifications to construct
plans coordinating the agents, and communicate these to the relevant agent by initiat-
ing appropriate dialogues. These agents then evaluate the plans, with respect to their
detailed operator specifications and local views, and raise possible objections. Every
objection is related to incompleteness in the high-level operator specifications held by
the station agents and lack of low-level observations. In this case, the detailed spec-
ifications and observations of the mobile agents must be assigned higher preference
values than the high-level ones held by the disembodied agent. The dialogue process
serves as the medium to align the agents’ beliefs that are relevant to the specific task,
while ensuring that mobile agents do not follow plans that are ineffective according to
their beliefs.
Incorrect or incomplete views of the environment may cause plans to fail. The
situation is harder if we consider exogenous events, such as fire spreading and build-
ings collapsing, occurring unexpectedly and interfering with the agents’ actions. In
this case, the re-planning process has to rely both on observations made during plan
execution and the anticipated outcomes of the executed actions when no relevant ob-
servations have been made.
Example 12. Assume the agents agree on a joint plan which fails during execution.
Agents have individually collected observations during plan execution. In order to
achieve their goal they must re-plan, while taking into account their observations,
which are distributed, incomplete and potentially contradictory.
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Following the multi-party protocol, an agent may initiate the re-planning process
by presenting a potential plan, leading from the current situation to a situation in which
the goal is achieved. In order to identify what holds in the current situation the agent
relies on the observations made during the execution of the plan and the expected
outcome of actions, as described by the agent’s operator specification. Beliefs that
correspond to recent observations have higher preference over conclusions regarding
the same literals derived using the specification of the operators and other potentially
outdated beliefs.
If the plan is safety-critical the agents may attempt to collaboratively generate sup-
port for potential plans using the inquiry dialogue protocol. This process is expensive,
but enables the agents to utilise their collective observations related to the situations in
which the plan was executed and exploit their full combined knowledge.
6.3.2 Medical Domain
While medical knowledge increases in size and complexity, there is an increasing need
for computational mechanisms that can be used by medical practitioners (Fox and Das,
2000). Recent research proposes argumentation theory as a good paradigm for decision
support in medical applications (Fox et al., 2007).
Consider the problem of construction and execution of treatment plans. Decisions
must be made by practitioners with different specialisations and levels of training. This
problem is well-suited to our approach: Patient treatment usually requires multiple ac-
tions that are interdependent. There is extensive knowledge encoding the anticipated
results of such actions. Due to its extensive size and complexity, as well as its con-
stant development, medical theories may be incomplete and potentially contradictory.
Usually, real-world decision making and execution involves the cooperation of sev-
eral practitioners trained in different specialisations. The decision-making process is
safety-critical. Ideally, the selected treatment plans must be defendable against all
possible objections. In addition to this, privacy is important when decision making
involves confidential personal information.
Example 13. Consider the decision making process between practitioners seeking
agreement on a patient’s treatment plan. Assume practitioner D is the patient’s per-
sonal physician, holding the patient’s complete history records. An additional special-
ist S is participating to propose potential treatments which exceed D’s specialisation.
The patient is also involved in the decision-making process when potential side-effects
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are identified which might affect their willingness to seek a therapy which is associated
with such risks.
Our framework can be employed as a mechanism for implementing this process.
Iterated disputes allow participating agents to propose potential solutions, and other
agents to evaluate them. In this case, the specialist agent could propose potential solu-
tions, based on initial information about the patient and specialised knowledge about
potential treatment actions.
By communicating the initial proposal, the specialist enables D to inspect the as-
sumptions under which S presents the treatment and check whether these assumptions
hold for the specific patient. D holds specific knowledge about the patient’s details,
and any objections raised based on the patient’s history would be assigned a higher
ordering than generic assumptions made by the specialist. The specific details regard-
ing the treatment actions presented by S are assigned higher preference values than the
generic views D holds about potential treatments.
Patient involvement in the decision-making process can be realised using our min-
imal plan proposal approach. After agreement on a potential treatment plan, D com-
municates the plan to the patient and describes further details after questions are made
by P regarding potential negative side-effects. The patient, finally, decides if certain
conditions are acceptable and accepts or rejects the presented treatment. Patients’ be-
liefs about their willingness to accept potential side-effects are assigned higher pref-
erence than the generic beliefs held by the practitioners representing general patient
tendencies towards such side-effects. These beliefs of the patient can be utilised by the
practitioners during the construction of further proposals.
Following the previous example, we consider the problem of monitoring the exe-
cution of a treatment plan:
Example 14. During the execution of a treatment plan, observations are made evalu-
ating the patient’s response to the treatment plan. If these indicate that the plan did not
have the anticipated effects, and necessary conditions for the success of future actions
were not produced, then execution should stop, since search for an alternative plan is
necessary.
Based on the observations, it is possible to identify whether the plan is expected to
have the intended outcomes, or if additional actions are required. Observations can be
encoded in our system as beliefs regarding intermediate situations which are assigned
high preference orderings. As a result, conclusions reached using observations would
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have higher preference than conclusions reached using using the axioms specifying the
anticipated effects of actions. For beliefs that are not coupled to observations, it is only
possible to reach conclusions regarding their states after the intermediate application
of the plan, by only considering the anticipated effects of actions.
6.3.3 Distributed Vehicle Monitoring
The following example is inspired by the Distributed Vehicle Monitoring Testbed
(Conway et al., 1983), which is concerned with the problem of monitoring and in-
terpreting data from spatially distributed sensors. Consider the following example:
Example 15. A set of agents are spatially distributed in a domain. Their aim is to
identify the path of a car that passed from this domain based on observations from
their sensors. We assume that different agents are mainly responsible for different
areas of the domain. However, there are intersections in their viewpoints. Sensors may
be faulty, but their functioning is checked on a regular basis.
The above problem can be formulated as an MPCP problem. Based on their obser-
vations and other assumptions about the initial location of the car, the agents present
possible plans the car could potentially have followed to their peers, which correspond
to potential paths the car has traversed. Based on these distributed observations the
agents evaluate the acceptability of the plans in a distributed fashion.
Knowledge is distributed among the agents since agents hold observations for dif-
ferent locations of the map before the dialogue process. Observations are assigned
higher preference values than inferences made based on assumptions regarding what
may have happened. Conflicts caused by contradicting observations is resolved by as-
signing relative preference values to observations based on the quality of their sensors.
More specifically, sensors that haven’t been checked recently are considered to be less
credible and are assigned to lower preference values.
Dissuasion about the potential plans can follow any of the proposed dialogue-based
protocols. The selection of which protocol would be more appropriate is based on
how the agents are connected, whether the application is safety-critical and whether
decisions have to be made in a timely fashion.
The agents can synthesise potential plans by introducing assumptions, which can
later be invalidated. These assumptions must have the lowest possible preference.
After every dialogue process the agents take a step towards aligning their beliefs by
introducing observations made by their peers into their knowledge.
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Figure 6.1: Argudem: a human-agent interface for dialogue about MPCP problems
6.3.4 Human Computer Interaction
Argumentation is an interesting tool for human-computer interaction. Instead of sim-
ply communicating a claim, argument structure enables the implicit description of the
process which leads to this conclusion. Morali (2011) empirically investigates the
efficiency of argumentation-based interaction with human users in the context of an
automated planning-based system called Argudem, a human-agent interface built on
top of our MPCP set-theoretic implementation. Figure 6.1 shows Argudem’s interface.
The Argudem scenario involves a planning agent situated in a grid world which
contains obstacles and a goal destination. Through an interface, the human user can
perceive the state of the world, which may be different from the view the situated
robotic agent has on the environment. The agent synthesises plans to reach the goal
destination and communicates these to the user. Due to the different views of the
environment, plans may not comply with the user’s view of the world. In this case,
the human user can initiate a dialogue process in order to persuade the agent about the
possible pitfalls of the plan.
Argudem offers a modular interface consisting of a visual as well a descriptive
view of the domain, the anticipated effects of the plans to the state of the world, and
the arguments exchanged during the dialogue. The modularity of the interface allows
Argudem to function in two modes: “world visualisation” and “expert oriented”. The
first depicts the state of the environment after the application of actions, and the agents
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proposed path, using a grid-like representation. The later, in the place of the domain
visualisation, offers a tree-like representation of the plan proposal argument presented
by the agent.
The following example describes Argudem in use:
Example 16. The robot initially comes up with a plan to reach the goal location. The
observer inspects the plan and identifies a problem, that the robot is about to attempt
to move through an obstacle. Accordingly, the user raises an objection against the
applicability the relevant action in the plan. The agent replies that according to their
operator specification of the action all preconditions hold. The user then inspects this
specification and challenges the problematic condition, that for instance the condition
stating that location(2,2) does not contain any obstacles. The robot explains that the
belief that the condition holds is justified by an initial state belief. The user corrects
the robot by explaining that this belief is not correct. Next, the agent accepts the users
view and updates its theory. The dialogue continues with the robot searching for an
alternative plan, utilising the human user’s input.
Morali (2011) empirically investigated the educational value of Argudem and the
quality of the system in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency through a series of ex-
periments with human users of different backgrounds. The experimentation produced
positive results with respect to the quality of the interface and the demonstrator’s ability
to convey key automated planning and argumentation concepts to novice users.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a comprehensive evaluation of our framework.
This evaluation focused on three important questions which arise from our hypothesis.
Here, we summarise the evaluation results with respect to these questions.
Is the problem of multi-perspective cooperative planning common?
We presented a series of significant problems illustrating that the problem of MPCP is
evident in different important domains. Different instances of the problem have dif-
ferent important characteristics. For example, some applications are safety-critical,
whereas in others agents must reach agreement promptly. In some applications agents
have privacy concerns, whereas in others there is a predefined structure of authority.
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We have described how these characteristics dictate which of our methods are appro-
priate in such settings, and how agents can use them to capture the problem domain in
terms of a MPCP problem.
Several approaches in the literature are concerned with related problems. More
specifically, other approaches in the literature focus on the problem of multiagent
agreement on deliberation and planning. This illustrates the commonality of the prob-
lem of coordinating agent behaviour in the light of contradictory knowledge.
Is argumentation theory suitable for the specification of the MPCP
problem?
Argumentation theory, combined with a suitable language which enables reasoning
about contradictory dynamic domains, is suitable for the specification of MPCP plan-
ning problems. Our proposed formalism is based on defeasible basic action theories in
defeasible situation calculus and is strictly more expressive than the initial set-theoretic
representation of MPCP. In addition, argumentation theory offers concrete semantics
for the specification of plan acceptability, which is essential for providing a rational
solution to the problem. An important benefit accrued from this is that it enables the
analytical evaluation of the effectiveness our methods.
What is the quality of the proposed solution to the problem of MPCP?
Our framework proposes a family of algorithms and protocols for solving the MPCP
problem. These mechanisms make different guarantees, which directly correspond to
the amount of beliefs and arguments that the agents are required to consider in each
case. All methods are sound with respect to their guarantees.
We have evaluated the practicality of our methods with respect to the ability of
the formalism to encode domains in succinct representations and the ability of the
planning methods to synthesise plans in reasonable time in extensive domains. The
proposed formalism allows features such as variables, conditional effects, and in the
extended version of our theories state constraints and ramifications. As a result, it
offers a highly expressive language for the representation of planning domains. How-
ever, this language does not allow other interesting features found in PDDL and situ-
ation calculus, such as functions and quantifiers. In addition, our methods are limited
to answering bounded-length queries, which are sufficient for planning, but do not
handle unground queries regarding properties of the domain or reasoning backwards
in time. Finally, compared to argumentation-based approaches on practical reasoning
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and deliberation, although our framework is more expressive with respect to encoding
planning domains, it does not by default enable reasoning with deliberative notions
such as intentions and desires.
We have evaluated the practicality of our approach in planning domains from the
International Planning Competition. The extensive size of these domains makes it
impossible to rely on a simple argumentation approach. However, by using the inherent
characteristics of the planning domain and utilising efficient, state-of-the-art planners
our methods managed to synthesise warranted plans in reasonable times.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• Evaluation of the formalism with respect to expressiveness compared to related
approaches.
• Empirical evaluation of the practicality of our methods in extensive domains
from the International Planning Competition.




This chapter summarises the research presented in this thesis, and presents the most
significant contributions of our work. We propose interesting directions for further
research, and provide some concluding remarks.
7.1 Thesis Summary
We have presented an argumentation-theoretic approach to the problem of multi-
perspective cooperative planning under ontological agreement. This is the problem
of synthesising a plan for multiple agents which share a goal but hold different views
about the state of the environment and the specification of the actions they can perform
to affect it.
The background chapter provided a thorough overview of work in the areas of
automated planning, reasoning about action and argumentation. Research related to
the MPCP problem was described in further detail, illustrating the novelty of our work
and outlining its context.
In Chapter 3 we formally specified the problem of MPCP using a set-theoretic
and a defeasible logic formalism. We adapted classical set-theoretic planning nota-
tion in order to define the first sub-problem of MPCP, the problem of synthesising
candidate plans. A direct result of this formalism is the ability to use standard plan-
ning techniques with only minor modifications to their input. This is very important,
since modern planning systems are highly optimised to achieve scalable plan synthesis
in complex domains. Based on argumentation theory and the novel defeasible situa-
tion calculus formalism, we formalised the notion of acceptability and concretised the
decision-making sub-problem of MPCP. In order to ensure that the solutions to the
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two sub-problems can be combined correctly, we bridged the inferential results of the
proposed formalisms.
Based on the suggested representations, Chapter 4 introduced techniques that en-
able sound reasoning and planning in MPCP domains. In order to increase the ef-
ficiency of our methods, we have proposed a series of optimisations that prune the
search space based on the inherent structure of the planning domains. In addition,
we presented heuristic planning algorithms that exploit the capabilities of off-the-shelf
planners to increase the scalability of our approach.
In Chapter 5, we presented a family of dialogue-based protocols that allow agents
to search the space of potential solutions to a problem in a distributed fashion, resolve
contradictions, and align their beliefs. Each protocol we proposed has different prop-
erties, and is suitable for domains with diverse characteristics, as for instance strict
time constraints, or safety-critical applications. Our methods terminate and provide
guarantees in terms of the correctness of the returned solutions.
Chapter 6 conducted a comprehensive evaluation of our methods. It summarised
our analytical results and reported empirical experiments with contradictory instances
of benchmark planning problems. The experimentation illustrated that the proposed
planning techniques can synthesise plans in reasonable time in extensive contradictory
planning domains. Finally, we described the commonality of MPCP, and explained
how our methods can be used to tackle such problems, based on examples of MPCP
problem instances from scenarios inspired by important real-world problems.
7.2 Summary of Contribution
The contributions of this thesis are outlined as follows:
Formalisation of the MPCP:
MPCP has been specified using two formalisms: we adapted the classical set-
theoretic planning notation, and presented defeasible situation calculus, a novel
formalism based on the combination of defeasible logic programming and situa-
tion calculus. The first maintains a close relation to classical planning and allows
the use of standard planning techniques with only minor modifications, whereas
the latter enables the specification of MPCP problems in an elegant way based
on deductive argumentation. In order to ensure correctness, we have bridged the
inferential results of the two formalisms.
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Practical algorithms for reasoning and planning with MPCP domains:
We focused on practicality: We proposed heuristics that exploit the inherent
structure of the planning domain to prune the search space, adopted powerful
planning heuristics and provided algorithms that allow the use of off-the-shelf
planning systems.
Distributed mechanisms for reaching agreement:
In order to allow the distribution of tasks, we proposed a family of abstract
dialogue-based collaborative protocols. Based on different instances of MPCP
that appear in important problems, we illustrated different characteristics of
MPCP and explained which mechanisms are better suited to provide solutions.
Analytical and experimental evaluation of our methods:
We conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the proposed methods. Analytical
investigation showed the effectiveness of our approach. Empirical experimenta-
tion illustrated that our algorithms can synthesise plans in reasonable times with
contradictory instances of benchmark planning problems.
The work conducted for this thesis lies at the intersection of multiagent systems, auto-
mated planning, reasoning about dynamic domains and argumentation. Our research
contributes to these fields in the following ways:
Automated Planning: This work is the first attempt on relaxing the assumption of
classical planning that planning knowledge is consistent. In addition, it presents
the first implemented system that can synthesise plans in a scalable way when
there exist multiple, contradictory views about the planning domain.
Reasoning about dynamic domains: Defeasible situation calculus is a novel, expres-
sive formalism for argumentation-based reasoning about contradictory dynamic
domains.
Argumentation: The proposed algorithms and heuristics allow scalable argumenta-
tion in extensive environments in which a naive argumentation approach is in-
feasible.
Multiagent Systems: We present a family of novel argumentation-based dialogue
protocols for distributed problem solving.
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Artificial Intelligence: Apart from addressing an important multiagent planning prob-
lem, our work bridges research on planning, reasoning about action and argu-
mentation.
7.3 Practical Applicability Context
This section outlines potential uses of the proposed methods within a multiagent sys-
tem and overviews its strengths and limitations. MPCP has been formalised based on
a series of assumptions, which set the scope of our approach. First of all, agents oper-
ate under ontological alignment. Agents share the names of propositions and actions,
and there is agreement about the concrete entities these names refer to. In addition,
agents are assumed to be cooperative, and there exists a set of shared goals that has
been identified a priori. We assume agreement does not involve strategic considera-
tions regarding how the workload is spread among the agents. Finally, MPCP focuses
on classical-style planning involving sequential plans.
Multiagent execution can be represented by reserving a term for every planning
operator to encode the agent (or agents for joint actions) that will execute the action.
Action capabilities can be also encoded within the specification of planning operators,
and agents may hold contradicting specifications about such capabilities as well. Con-
currency and durative actions are not inherently supported. Of course, they can be
supported within the limits of existing, conventional planning domain transformations.
Our approach is domain independent. Our methods can be applied to any MPCP
domain that is represented using the proposed formalisms. The expressive power of
these formalisms is comparable to modern planning languages, and exceeds the capa-
bilities of some state-of-the-art planners (e.g. by allowing state constraints and rami-
fications). Its main limitations compared to more expressive languages are its lack of
support for functions, metrics and explicit quantifications.
Our methods can be applied to provide acceptable solutions in planning domains
(as for instance the domains from the deterministic track of the IPC), when knowl-
edge about these domains is contradictory, or when different agents have different
views about the planning environment. Agents may also hold information regarding
the credibility of their individual beliefs. Note that existence of such information is not
necessary, and that this information need not be shared. However, credibility values
presented by an agent must be accepted by the other parties.
The proposed methods enable the identification of potential objections to concrete
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plans (i.e. reasons why these plans will not achieve the goal). Also, if the agents hold
rich information regarding the credibility and source of their beliefs, or the mechanics
of the planning domain, they can utilise this information to argue about the validity
of these objections. By utilising all relevant knowledge and investigating potential
objections, plans that are based on incorrect information (with respect to the agents’
knowledge) can be disregarded, increasing the quality of accepted solutions.
Depending on the specific characteristics of an MPCP problem different methods
can be used among the ones we have presented. The centralised method should be used
when communication of all beliefs prior to planning is possible. When communication
of all beliefs must be avoided (due to time or privacy constraints) and agents can in-
dividually construct potential plans, the iterative dispute protocol can be used. In this
version of the protocol, agents do not switch between roles, which leads to reaching
a decision faster, but the protocol lacks the ability to safeguard the plan against argu-
mentation paths that can be formed from the union of the arguments that are available
to the agents. When multi-party agreement is required (i.e. more than two agents), the
agents must argue in pairs. Alternatively, the multi-party version of the protocol may
be selected. The main difference in this case is that agents raise arguments both sup-
porting and defeating plans, switching roles when appropriate. This protocol ensures
that all arguments that are relevant to a plan proposal, and can be constructed from
the beliefs of each agent, will be weighted. When operating in safety-critical domains
in which important beliefs are distributed among the agents, the inquiry-based version
of the protocol is preferable. This version allows distributed argument generation (in-
cluding generation of proposal arguments), and achieves results that are equivalent to
the centralised method.
7.4 Future Work
There are many opportunities for further work within the context of MPCP. We outline
the most significant:
Strategic aspects: A central assumption of this thesis is that agents are purely co-
operative. They all share a common goal, and as a result, they are willing to
accept every plan that can be defended against possible objections, regardless of
how this plan distributes the effort required for its execution. The general case
of multi-perspective planning is not purely cooperative. In a strategic setting,
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agents are only willing to collaborate if by joining efforts they can achieve goals
that are otherwise unattainable, or would require them to make additional effort.
Interesting issues arise in a more competitive setting, not only related to which
plans the agents are willing to execute, but also regarding which pieces of infor-
mation agents are willing to communicate.Sharing information involves strategic
decisions, since different common knowledge may lead to reaching agreement
on different plans, with a different distribution of labour.
Domain-specific problems: The methods presented in this thesis are domain inde-
pendent. Our formalisms rely on a general representation of the planning en-
vironment and our algorithms are optimised based on the general structure of
planning domains. Further work can be performed on identifying common do-
main specific attributes that can be utilised to increase the performance of the
proposed methods. These characteristics may reflect particular domains, as for
example the emergency response domain, or be related to specific features of
the language, as for example specifying conditions using exclusively positive
literals.
Implementation: Our results illustrated that planning in MPCP domains can be con-
ducted in an efficient manner using state-of-the-art planners. We allowed this
by modifying the input of the planner in order to delegate search for candidate
plans. We believe that this approach can be further optimised by modifying such
planners, producing native, highly-optimised MPCP implementations. The re-
sulting planner would enable a more extensive search of the state space, while
better utilising the results of the argumentation process.
Concrete theories for reasoning about planning beliefs: In order to resolve contra-
dictions on the belief level we resorted to preference orderings. For the exper-
imentation process, we instantiated these preferences using arbitrary numerical
values. An interesting extension is to investigate the ramifications of combin-
ing our systems with concrete defeasible logic theories for reasoning about the
sources and credibility of beliefs. This way, further work can be conducted on
identifying heuristics and strategies for deciding when to argue, in situations in
which the resolution of conflicts requires extensive argumentation.
Expressiveness: The presented work isolates the problem of MPCP from other in-
teresting aspects of multiagent planning, such as distributed execution and par-
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tially ordered plans. Interesting directions of research include the investigation
of MPCP with more expressive formalisms allowing representation and reason-
ing about distributed plans for actions, and partial solutions.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
This thesis presented an argumentation-theoretic solution to the problem of multi-
perspective cooperative planning under ontological agreement. MPCP relaxes the im-
plicit assumption of classical planning that planning beliefs are consistent, which is
not realistic for complex, multiagent domains. The resulting problem is strictly harder
than classical planning, since the additional constraint of plan acceptability is imposed
on solutions. We separated the two problems and followed a structured approach that
exploits the advantages of both modern planning and argumentation techniques. De-
ductive argumentation allowed the formal specification of the notion of plan warrant
based on an expressive logical formalism. Based on this notion, the correctness of our
methods was shown. In addition, in order to develop efficient methods, we deviated as
little as possible from classical planning. This allowed the delegation of the search of
the state space to highly optimised, external planners. The results of our empirical ex-
perimentation show that although the MPCP problem is very complex, it is possible to
synthesise warranted plans in contradictory instances of benchmark planning problems
within reasonable times.
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